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Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan

  • An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer.

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Metadaten
Author: Jan SchnellenbachORCiD
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-0001-y
ISSN:1043-4062
Title of the source (English):Constitutional Political Economy
Document Type:Scientific journal article peer-reviewed
Language:English
Year of publication:2006
Contributing Corporation:Philipps-University Marburg
Tag:Cognitive dissonance; H26; Informal institutions; Tax evasion; Tax morale; Z13
Volume/Year:17
Issue number:2
First Page:117
Last Page:132
Faculty/Chair:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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