A Stealthy False Command Injection Attack on Modbus based SCADA Systems
- Modbus is a widely-used industrial protocol in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for different purposes such as controlling remote devices, monitoring physical processes, data acquisition, etc. Unfortunately, such a protocol lacks security means i.e., authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. This has exposed industrial plants using the Modbus protocol and made them attractive to malicious adversaries who could perform various kinds of cyber-attacks causing significant consequences as Stuxnet showed. In this paper, we exploit the insecurity of the Modbus protocol and perform a stealthy false command injection scenario concealing our injection from the SCADA operator. Our attack approach is comprised of two main phases: 1) Pre-attack phase (offline) where an attacker sniffs, collects and stores sufficient valid request-response pairs in a database, 2) Attack phase (online) where the attacker performs false command injection and conceals his injection by replaying a valid response from his database upon eachModbus is a widely-used industrial protocol in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for different purposes such as controlling remote devices, monitoring physical processes, data acquisition, etc. Unfortunately, such a protocol lacks security means i.e., authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. This has exposed industrial plants using the Modbus protocol and made them attractive to malicious adversaries who could perform various kinds of cyber-attacks causing significant consequences as Stuxnet showed. In this paper, we exploit the insecurity of the Modbus protocol and perform a stealthy false command injection scenario concealing our injection from the SCADA operator. Our attack approach is comprised of two main phases: 1) Pre-attack phase (offline) where an attacker sniffs, collects and stores sufficient valid request-response pairs in a database, 2) Attack phase (online) where the attacker performs false command injection and conceals his injection by replaying a valid response from his database upon each request sent from the HMI user. Such a scenario is quite severe and might cause disastrous damages in SCADA systems and critical infrastructures if it is successfully implemented by malicious adversaries. Finally, we suggest some appropriate mitigation solutions to prevent such a serious threat.…
Author: | Wael Alsabbagh, Samuel Amogbonjaye, Diego Urrego, Peter LangendörferGND |
---|---|
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC51644.2023.10059804 |
ISBN: | 978-1-6654-9734-3 |
ISBN: | 978-1-6654-9735-0 |
ISSN: | 2331-9860 |
Title of the source (English): | 20th Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC), (2023) |
Document Type: | Conference publication peer-reviewed |
Language: | English |
Year of publication: | 2023 |
Tag: | Command Injection Attacks; Industrial plants; Performance evaluation; SCADA systems |
Number of pages: | 9 |
Way of publication: | Open Access |
Faculty/Chair: | Fakultät 1 MINT - Mathematik, Informatik, Physik, Elektro- und Informationstechnik / FG Systeme |