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Fiction, Fake and Fact: A Set-Theoretic Modeling Together with a Discussion of Represented Worlds

  • Following Aristotle, factuality, fictionality and fake are differentiated exclusively on the level of content. The concrete starting point for this is Michael Titzmann’s proposal to understand represented worlds as a set of ordered propositions. Accordingly, the necessary set-theoretical foundations are presented step by step and, on the basis of three exemplary represented worlds, a one-to-one differentiation as well as an exact definition of factuality, fictionality and fake is undertaken. Based on this, the limits of a one-to-one model can be discussed and its possible modification can be shown. Independently of this, for the classification of a represented world as factual, fictional or fake, the conception of which propositions are true in the real world is crucial, which is why, after a consideration of philosophical theories of truth, the real world is modelled as a set of sufficiently proven represented worlds. Subsequently, it is shown that it is necessary to model indeterminacy with respect to propositions, which is solvedFollowing Aristotle, factuality, fictionality and fake are differentiated exclusively on the level of content. The concrete starting point for this is Michael Titzmann’s proposal to understand represented worlds as a set of ordered propositions. Accordingly, the necessary set-theoretical foundations are presented step by step and, on the basis of three exemplary represented worlds, a one-to-one differentiation as well as an exact definition of factuality, fictionality and fake is undertaken. Based on this, the limits of a one-to-one model can be discussed and its possible modification can be shown. Independently of this, for the classification of a represented world as factual, fictional or fake, the conception of which propositions are true in the real world is crucial, which is why, after a consideration of philosophical theories of truth, the real world is modelled as a set of sufficiently proven represented worlds. Subsequently, it is shown that it is necessary to model indeterminacy with respect to propositions, which is solved by means of the introduction of trivalence of truth values. The paper concludes with a discussion of the case-specificity and subjectivity of reality and their implications for the model presented here, showing that due to the relational approach the model remains productive even in the case of the assumption of subjective or “alternative” realities.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author: Peter KlimczakGND
ISBN:978-3-658-40405-5
Title of the source (English):Truth and Fake in the Post-Factual Digital Age
Publisher:Springer
Place of publication:Wiesbaden
Editor: Peter KlimczakGND, Thomas ZoglauerGND
Document Type:Part of a book (chapter)
Language:English
Year of publication:2023
Tag:Factuality; Fake; Fictionality; Formal logic; Indeterminacy; Perspectivity; Set theory; Theories of truth; World represented
First Page:45
Last Page:71
Way of publication:Open Access
Faculty/Chair:Fakultät 1 MINT - Mathematik, Informatik, Physik, Elektro- und Informationstechnik / FG Angewandte Medienwissenschaften
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