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Combining Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing rules in Team Tournaments to Incentivize Energy-Efficient Behavior in a Principal-Agent Context

  • Triggering the energy-efficient behavior of agents in firms simultaneously decreases costs and mitigates CO2 emissions. If firms use team tournaments to increase energy-efficient behavior and thus employee performance, they may face unintended consequences, like a bifurcation effect: Individuals drop out if they believe that they cannot win the contest. By contrast, high-performing employees may overexert themselves. Additionally, some individuals might be tempted to free-ride. In a field experiment with truck drivers, we analyze whether proportional sharing of the bonus within teams based on individual effort instead of egalitarian sharing reduces both bifurcation and free-riding during team tournaments. Our results reveal that (1) the team contest improves performance; (2) this increase in performance is overall slightly stronger under the proportional than under the egalitarian sharing rule, using ceteris paribus comparisons; and (3) the performance increase is mainly driven by the team member performing worse.

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Metadaten
Author: Christin HoffmannORCiD, Kirsten ThommesORCiDGND
URL:https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1086026620945343
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026620945343
ISSN:1552-7417
Title of the source (English):Organization & Environment
Document Type:Scientific journal article peer-reviewed
Language:English
Year of publication:2020
Volume/Year:35 (2022)
Issue number:2
First Page:307
Last Page:331
Faculty/Chair:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG ABWL, insbesondere Organisation und Unternehmensführung
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