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On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland

  • Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.

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Metadaten
Author: Lars P. Feld, Christoph A. Schaltegger, Jan SchnellenbachORCiD
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005
ISSN:1873-572X
Title of the source (English):European Economic Review
Document Type:Scientific journal article peer-reviewed
Language:English
Year of publication:2008
Tag:Centralization; Fiscal federalism; Fiscal referendums
Volume/Year:52
Issue number:4
First Page:611
Last Page:645
Faculty/Chair:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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