On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland
- Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.
Author: | Lars P. Feld, Christoph A. Schaltegger, Jan SchnellenbachORCiD |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005 |
ISSN: | 1873-572X |
Title of the source (English): | European Economic Review |
Document Type: | Scientific journal article peer-reviewed |
Language: | English |
Year of publication: | 2008 |
Tag: | Centralization; Fiscal federalism; Fiscal referendums |
Volume/Year: | 52 |
Issue number: | 4 |
First Page: | 611 |
Last Page: | 645 |
Faculty/Chair: | Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik |