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The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach

  • The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Schnellenbach, JanORCiD, Feld, Lars P., Schaltegger, Christoph A.
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1
ISSN:1435-8131
Titel der Quelle (Englisch):Economics of Governance
Dokumentart:Wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftenartikel referiert
Sprache:Englisch
Erscheinungsjahr:2010
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:Centralisation; Direct democracy; Public good provision; Representative democracy
Band / Jahrgang:11
Ausgabe / Heft:1
Erste Seite:3
Letzte Seite:26
Fakultät / Fachgebiet:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik