TY - CHAP A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Zinnen, Andreas A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale T2 - Proceedings of the 23rd Internet Society (ISOC) Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2016), San Diego, USA, February 2016 Y1 - 2016 SN - 1-891562-41-X PB - Internet Society CY - Reston, VA ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - POSTER: Fingerprinting Tor Hidden Services T2 - In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '16). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA Y1 - 2016 SN - 978-1-4503-4139-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2989054 SP - 1766 EP - 1768 PB - ACM CY - New York ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Analysis of Fingerprinting Techniques for Tor Hidden Services T2 - WPES '17 Proceedings of the 2017 on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, Dallas, Texas, USA, October 2017 Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-4503-5175-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3139550.3139564 SP - 165 EP - 175 PB - ACM CY - New York, NY ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas T1 - The state of affairs in BGP security: A survey of attacks and defenses T2 - Computer Communications Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2018.04.013 SN - 0140-3664 VL - 124 SP - 45 EP - 60 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Reuter, Sebastian A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing T2 - Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (Poster) (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019 N2 - Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888029 SN - 978-1-7281-2700-2 SN - 978-1-7281-2701-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888029 SN - 2643-3303 SN - 1092-1648 PB - IEEE Press ER - TY - GEN A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Dahlmanns, Markus A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments T2 - Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019 N2 - An increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-toend security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices. KW - Routing, Internet of Things, Protocols, Cryptography, Servers Y1 - 2019 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888033 SN - 978-1-7281-2700-2 SN - 978-1-7281-2701-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888033 SN - 2643-3303 SN - 1092-1648 PB - IEEE Press ER - TY - GEN A1 - De La Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting T2 - CCS '19 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security , London, UK, November 11 - 15, 2019. N2 - Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95% to less than 35% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3319535.3363249 SN - 978-1-4503-6747-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363249 SP - 2533 EP - 2535 PB - ACM Press CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Hohlfeld, Oliver A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Hi Doppelgänger: Towards Detecting Manipulation in News Comments T2 - Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW '19 Companion), 4th Workshop on Computational Methods in Online Misbehavior (CyberSafety '19), May 13–17, 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-1-4503-6675-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3308560.3316496 SP - 197 EP - 205 PB - ACM CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Kaiser, Daniel A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas ED - Foley, Simon N. T1 - Analysis of Multi-path Onion Routing-based Anonymization Networks T2 - Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXXIII : 33rd Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Conference, DBSec 2019, Charleston, SC, USA, July 15–17, 2019, Proceedings Y1 - 2019 UR - https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-030-22479-0 SN - 978-3-030-22478-3 SN - 978-3-030-22479-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22479-0_13 SN - 0302-9743 SN - 1611-3349 SP - 240 EP - 258 PB - Springer CY - Frankfurt am Main ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Panchenko, Andriy ED - Reinhardt, Delphine ED - Langweg, Hanno ED - Witt, Bernhard C. ED - Fischer, Mathias T1 - Analyzing PeerFlow - A Bandwidth Estimation System for Untrustworthy Environments T2 - Sicherheit 2020 : Sicherheit, Schutz und Zuverlässigkeit ; Konferenzband der 10. Jahrestagung des Fachbereichs Sicherheit der Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI) ; 17.- 20. März 2020 in Göttingen Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-88579-695-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/sicherheit2020_02 SP - 29 EP - 40 PB - Gesellschaft für Informatik CY - Bonn ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Aleksandrova, Marharyta A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Security and Performance Implications of BGP Rerouting-resistant Guard Selection Algorithms for Tor T2 - ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection : 35th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2020, Maribor, Slovenia, September 21–23, 2020 Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-030-58201-2 SN - 978-3-030-58200-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58201-2_15 SN - 1868-4238 SN - 1868-422X SP - 219 EP - 233 PB - Springer CY - Cham ER -