TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Henrekson, Magnus ED - Sandström, Christian ED - Stenkula, Mikael T1 - A Behavioral Economics Perspective on the Entrepreneurial State and Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy T2 - Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy N2 - It is argued that the concepts of mission-oriented innovation policy and also of the entrepreneurial state will lead to the implementation of policies that are highly vulnerable to behavioral biases and the inefficient use of heuristics. In political practice, we can therefore not expect efficient mission-oriented policies. In particular, I argue that missions as a political commitment mechanism intended to devote massive resources to a specific cause will often only work if biases like the availability bias and loss aversion are deliberately used in order to secure voter consent. Furthermore, I also argue that the argument used by Mazzucato (Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. London: Penguin UK, 2021) herself also contains several behavioral biases. Y1 - 2024 SN - 9783031491955 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49196-2_4 SN - 1572-1922 SP - 61 EP - 76 PB - Springer Nature Switzerland CY - Cham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Dopfer, Kurt ED - Nelson, Richard R. ED - Potts, Jason ED - Pyka, Andreas T1 - Public entrepreneurship in economic evolution T2 - Routledge handbook of evolutionary economics Y1 - 2024 SN - 9780367025687 SN - 9781032533391 SP - 402 EP - 410 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption T2 - European Journal of Law and Economics N2 - We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens’ wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization’s higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge. KW - Inequality KW - Corruption KW - Organized crime KW - Public security Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x SN - 0929-1261 VL - 55 IS - 3 SP - 469 EP - 509 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On the reform of fiscal rules in the European Union : what has been achieved, and how did we get here? T2 - Economist’s voice N2 - In April 2024, the European Union has reformed its set of fiscal rules, aimed at securing sustainable public finances in its member countries. In this paper, we discuss the pathway towards reform and highlight the main characteristics of the reformed set of rules. It is argued that, relative to the original proposals by the Commission, the rules have improved. However, the numerical safeguards may be circumvented to some extent. In sum, there remains plenty of discretionary leeway for a conflict-averse Commission to appease non-compliant member countries. Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/ev-2024-0060 SN - 1553-3832 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ; Boston, Massachusetts ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Revisiting the tension between classical liberalism and the welfare state T2 - Journal of Contextual Economics Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365 SN - 2568-7603 SN - 2568-762X VL - 139 IS - 2-4 SP - 365 EP - 384 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Soeren C. T1 - Extractive politics, redistribution, and war : on the rationality of kleptocratic mismanagement T2 - Defence and peace economics N2 - We study a model on the impact of vertical inequality on autocrats’ exploitation of societal wealth and their intended risk of war. Using a general equilibrium model, we demonstrate that autocrats are willing to use the military for redistribution when it increases their share of the rents. They are also willing to harm the economy to deter external threats and are most powerful for extreme un-/equal distributions. These findings offer interesting interpretations. Firstly, even in the absence of external military threats, some autocrats maintain large armies for redistribution, depending on the level of inequality. Secondly, not too low inequality can benefit ordinary citizens. Thirdly, kleptocratic mismanagement is not necessarily an unintended side effect of shameless self-enrichment, but rather a rationally chosen governance to deter too large military threats. This policy could prevent hostilities, but ruins the economy, destroying a society’s wealth. The latter causes ordinary citizens to favor war since the autocrat would then lose their grip at home. These results help to explain why some autocrats maintain excessively large armies, while others stifle their economies, and yet others are drawn into wars. KW - Kleptokracy KW - Economic development KW - Vertical inequality KW - Military expenditures KW - War KW - Corruption Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389 SN - 1024-2694 VL - 36 IS - 5 SP - 683 EP - 705 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - London ; Abingdon ER -