TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models T2 - Journal of Business Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0 SN - 1861-8928 SN - 0044-2372 VL - 84 IS - 9 SP - 1237 EP - 1259 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On the Behavioural Political Economy of Regulating Fake News T2 - Ordo - Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Y1 - 2018 SN - 2366-0481 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 68 SP - 197 EP - 219 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Valdesalici, Alice ED - Palermo, Francesco T1 - Fiscal Sovereignty in a Globalised World: The Pressure of European Fiscal Governance on Domestic Public Finance T2 - Comparing Fiscal Federalism Y1 - 2018 SN - 978-90-04-34095-4 SP - 328 EP - 346 PB - Brill-Martinus Nijhoff CY - Leiden ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Can Cultural Property Protection Be an Effective Counter-Terrorism Instrument? T2 - The Journal of Art Crime Y1 - 2018 SN - 1947-5926 VL - 19 SP - 47 EP - 59 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Military Spending and Inequality in Autocracies: A Simple Model T2 - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy N2 - In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator’s own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime’s rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society’s institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending. KW - Inequality KW - autocracies KW - military spending KW - rent-seeking Y1 - 2018 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/peps.2018.24.issue-4/peps-2018-0025/peps-2018-0025.xml?format=INT U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2018-0025 SN - 1554-8597 VL - 24 IS - 4 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Evolving Hierarchical Preferences and Behavioral Economic Policies T2 - Public Choice Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0607-4 SN - 1573-7101 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 178 IS - 1/2 SP - 31 EP - 52 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y SN - 1432-1386 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 29 IS - 5 SP - 1399 EP - 1414 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - On the Regulation of the International Exchange of Cultural Property T2 - ORDO : Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft N2 - With its foundation in 1945, UNESCO declared as its main purpose the promotion of international cultural exchange1. A number of legal instruments (Conventions, Recommendations and Declarations) should duly help to substantiate that general purpose and make it work in practice. In this process, the regulation of the international exchange of cultural property plays a key role. However, the proper regulation of cultural property exchange has been a highly controversial issue. This paper focus on UNESCO's guiding ideas and conceptions of cultural property, international exchange and regulation. The central question is: Are the regulations codified in UNESCO’s Conventions and Recommendations helpful in encouraging international cultural exchange or are we faced, due to the neglect of private agents and the roles they play in cultural exchange, with some sort of one-sided regulation running counter to that aim? The author argues that UNESCO's legal instruments are driven by and express a strong anti-private and anti-market bias, which produce problematic economic incentives in the art and antiquities world to the disadvantage of the international exchange of cultural property. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/ordo/70/1/article-p166.xml?tab_body=pdf-69320 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 70 IS - 1 SP - 166 EP - 187 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. A1 - Tridimas, George T1 - The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars T2 - Public Choice N2 - In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon’s ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group. KW - Ancient Athens KW - Solon KW - Political non-neutrality KW - Rent seeking KW - Intra-elite competition KW - Political apathy KW - Civil war KW - Inclusive institutions Y1 - 2022 UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 192 IS - 3-4 SP - 249 EP - 272 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - The Concept of Ordnungspolitik: Rule-Based Economic Policy-Making from the Perspective of the Freiburg School T2 - Public Choice Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00903-z SN - 1573-7101 VL - 195 SP - 283 EP - 300 ER -