TY - CHAP A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Legacy of Open Thought Y1 - 2009 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2009 PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Capturing Four Budget Deficit Theories in a Simple Graphical Model T2 - SSRN eLibrary Y1 - 2009 UR - http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511282 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit T2 - Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008 Y1 - 2008 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios ED - Shinnick, Edward ED - Pickhardt, Michael T1 - A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion T2 - The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance Y1 - 2008 SN - 978-1-84844-079-1 SP - 43 EP - 62 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments? T2 - Journal of Economics and Statistics N2 - A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region. KW - Policy decentralisation KW - fiscal competition KW - model uncertainty KW - collective learning Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990268 SN - 0021-4027 VL - 228 IS - 4 SP - 372 EP - 393 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland T2 - European Economic Review N2 - Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities. KW - Centralization KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Fiscal referendums Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005 SN - 1873-572X VL - 52 IS - 4 SP - 611 EP - 645 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2008 PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Witt, Ulrich A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How much do we need to know about Risk Preferences? T2 - Constitutional Political Economy Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9044-6 SN - 1572-9966 VL - 19 IS - 3 SP - 203 EP - 225 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Political and Economic Effects of Tax Competition and Deficits Y1 - 2008 ER -