TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2011 UR - http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.irefeurope.org/ContentPages/2515413947.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. T1 - The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach T2 - Economics of Governance N2 - The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution. KW - Centralisation KW - Direct democracy KW - Representative democracy KW - Public good provision Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1 SN - 1435-8131 VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 26 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Alm, James ED - Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ED - Torgler, Benno T1 - Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance T2 - Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance N2 - This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity. KW - tax compliance KW - tax morale KW - tax evasion KW - reciprocity Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-0-415-57698-7 SN - 0-415-57698-9 SP - 56 EP - 73 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2010 PB - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales CY - Marseille ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Savioz, Marcel T1 - Gebhard Kirchgässner, 60 Years On T2 - Public Choice Y1 - 2010 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 144 IS - 3-4 SP - 393 EP - 399 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Legacy of Open Thought Y1 - 2009 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2009 PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Capturing Four Budget Deficit Theories in a Simple Graphical Model T2 - SSRN eLibrary Y1 - 2009 UR - http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511282 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit T2 - Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008 Y1 - 2008 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios ED - Shinnick, Edward ED - Pickhardt, Michael T1 - A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion T2 - The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance Y1 - 2008 SN - 978-1-84844-079-1 SP - 43 EP - 62 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER -