TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism T2 - Kyklos N2 - Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12106 SN - 1467-6435 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 135 EP - 156 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes T2 - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy N2 - Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2014-0040 SN - 1554-8597 VL - 20 IS - 4 SP - 697 EP - 707 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis T2 - Economic Inquiry N2 - The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12331 SN - 1465-7295 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 1445 EP - 1463 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Backhaus, Jürgen G. T1 - Path-dependent rule evolution T2 - Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Schubert, Christian ED - Wangenheim, Georg von T1 - Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions T2 - The Evolution and Design of Institutions Y1 - 2006 SN - 9-78-0-415-37531-3 SP - 123 EP - 143 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Moss, Laurence S. T1 - New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective T2 - The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World Y1 - 2002 SN - 0-631-23497-7 SN - 0-631-23496-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1536-7150.00156 N1 - Reprint aus dem American Journal of Economics and Sociology SP - 193 EP - 214 PB - Blackwell Publishers CY - Malden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Büstorf, Guido ED - Cantner, Uwe ED - Hanusch, Horst ED - Huttner, Michael ED - Lorenz, Hans-Walter ED - Rahmeyer, Fritz T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies Y1 - 2013 SN - 978-3-319-01495-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8 N1 - Nachdruck des gleichnamigen Beitrages aus dem Journal of Evolutionary Economics SP - 187 EP - 207 PB - Springer CY - New York, NY [u.a.] ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Marciano, Alain ED - Rosselin, Jean-Michel T1 - Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations T2 - Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-1-84720-126-3 SP - 192 EP - 220 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Alm, James ED - Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ED - Torgler, Benno T1 - Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance T2 - Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance N2 - This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity. KW - tax compliance KW - tax morale KW - tax evasion KW - reciprocity Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-0-415-57698-7 SN - 0-415-57698-9 SP - 56 EP - 73 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2012 UR - http://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/taxation_in_europe_2012_-_iref_yearbook.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER -