TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Büstorf, Guido ED - Cantner, Uwe ED - Hanusch, Horst ED - Huttner, Michael ED - Lorenz, Hans-Walter ED - Rahmeyer, Fritz T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies Y1 - 2013 SN - 978-3-319-01495-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8 N1 - Nachdruck des gleichnamigen Beitrages aus dem Journal of Evolutionary Economics SP - 187 EP - 207 PB - Springer CY - New York, NY [u.a.] ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2013 UR - http://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/taxation-in-europe-yearbook_iref-europe-2013.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - How to evaluate creative destruction: Reconstructing Schumpeter’s approach T2 - Cambridge Journal of Economics Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bes055 SN - 1464-3545 VL - 37 IS - 2 SP - 227 EP - 250 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schubert, Christian A1 - Cordes, Christian T1 - Role Models that make you unhappy: Light Paternalism, Social Learning and Welfare T2 - Journal of Institutional Economics Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000015 SN - 1744-1382 VL - 9 IS - 2 SP - 131 EP - 159 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing T2 - Research Policy N2 - The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an “as is” review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review. KW - Academic journals KW - Scientific publishing KW - Peer review policy KW - Property rights Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005 SN - 0048-7333 VL - 41 IS - 8 SP - 1440 EP - 1447 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues T2 - Public Finance and Management N2 - This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints. KW - net wealth tax KW - wealth KW - inequality KW - redistribution Y1 - 2012 SN - 1523-9721 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 368 EP - 400 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them. KW - Structural change KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Grants in aid KW - Creative destruction Y1 - 2012 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 22 IS - 3 SP - 563 EP - 583 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms. KW - Libertarian paternalism KW - Soft paternalism KW - Social norms KW - Informal institutions KW - Behavioral political economics KW - Sour grapes KW - Expressive behavior Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 28 IS - 2 SP - 266 EP - 277 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2012 UR - http://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/taxation_in_europe_2012_-_iref_yearbook.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Is Novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0257-x SN - 1432-1386 VL - 22 IS - 3 SP - 585 EP - 619 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Pursuing Happiness T2 - Kyklos Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00537.x SN - 1467-6435 VL - 65 IS - 2 SP - 245 EP - 261 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Four Budget Deficit Theories in One Model Y1 - 2011 UR - http://frank.mtsu.edu/~jee/issues_2011summer.html ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - The egalitarian battlefield: Reflections on the origins of majority rule in archaic Greece Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Consumer Choice: Income, Tastes, and Prices N2 - Wolfram Demonstrations Project Y1 - 2011 UR - http://demonstrations.wolfram.com ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research T2 - Environment and Planning – Government and Policy N2 - In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework. KW - fiscal federalism KW - fiscal decentralization KW - growth KW - economic performance Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1068/c1054r SN - 1472-3425 VL - 29 IS - 2 SP - 224 EP - 243 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Döring, Thomas A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany T2 - Constitutional Political Economy N2 - This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions. KW - Federalism KW - Government Centralization KW - State and Local Autonomy KW - Bryce Law KW - Popitz Law KW - Institutional Evolution KW - Constitutional economics KW - Formal institutions Y1 - 2011 SN - 1043-4062 VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 83 EP - 102 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2011 UR - http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.irefeurope.org/ContentPages/2515413947.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. T1 - The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach T2 - Economics of Governance N2 - The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution. KW - Centralisation KW - Direct democracy KW - Representative democracy KW - Public good provision Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1 SN - 1435-8131 VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 26 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Alm, James ED - Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ED - Torgler, Benno T1 - Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance T2 - Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance N2 - This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity. KW - tax compliance KW - tax morale KW - tax evasion KW - reciprocity Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-0-415-57698-7 SN - 0-415-57698-9 SP - 56 EP - 73 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2010 PB - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales CY - Marseille ER -