TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism T2 - Kyklos N2 - Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12106 SN - 1467-6435 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 135 EP - 156 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y SN - 1432-1386 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 29 IS - 5 SP - 1399 EP - 1414 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Döring, Thomas A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany T2 - Constitutional Political Economy N2 - This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions. KW - Federalism KW - Government Centralization KW - State and Local Autonomy KW - Bryce Law KW - Popitz Law KW - Institutional Evolution KW - Constitutional economics KW - Formal institutions Y1 - 2011 SN - 1043-4062 VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 83 EP - 102 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity T2 - Public Choice N2 - Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach. KW - Terrorism KW - Deterrence KW - Reciprocity KW - Anti-terrorism policies Y1 - 2006 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/25487598 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 129 IS - 3/4 SP - 301 EP - 313 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Behavioral political economy: A survey T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research. KW - Behavioral political economy KW - Rational irrationality KW - Cognitive biases KW - Social norms KW - Voting KW - Paternalism Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 40 IS - B SP - 395 EP - 417 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them. KW - Structural change KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Grants in aid KW - Creative destruction Y1 - 2012 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 22 IS - 3 SP - 563 EP - 583 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Die geplante Kindergrundsicherung: ein sinnvoller Ansatz? T2 - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2023-2011 SN - 2366-0317 SN - 0721-3808 VL - 72 IS - 2 SP - 150 EP - 158 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Eine kritische Diskussion T2 - ORDO : Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft N2 - Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie veröffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu stärken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung für diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelständisch geprägten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die Fähigkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungsträger, die in der Realität kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative würde in einer Rückbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gewährleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensität, bestehen. KW - Industriepolitik KW - Innovationspolitik KW - Nationale Industriestrategie KW - Strukturwandel KW - nationale Champions KW - Innovation Policy KW - Structural Change KW - National Champions Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2020-0019 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 70 IS - 1 SP - 340 EP - 371 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making? T2 - Journal of Bioeconomics N2 - This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans. KW - Classical liberalism KW - Evolution KW - Darwinism KW - Economic policy KW - Cultural evolution KW - Institutional evolution Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6 SN - 1573-698 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 70 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Evolving Hierarchical Preferences and Behavioral Economic Policies T2 - Public Choice Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0607-4 SN - 1573-7101 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 178 IS - 1/2 SP - 31 EP - 52 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis T2 - Economic Inquiry N2 - The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12331 SN - 1465-7295 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 1445 EP - 1463 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research T2 - Environment and Planning – Government and Policy N2 - In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework. KW - fiscal federalism KW - fiscal decentralization KW - growth KW - economic performance Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1068/c1054r SN - 1472-3425 VL - 29 IS - 2 SP - 224 EP - 243 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Herausforderungen für die Finanzpolitik in Deutschland nach der Covid-Krise T2 - Zeitschrift für Politik : ZfP Y1 - 2021 SN - 0044-3360 VL - 68 IS - 2 SP - 175 EP - 192 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Bjørnskov, Christian A1 - Dreher, Axel A1 - Fischer, Justina A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Gehring, Kai T1 - Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match T2 - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization N2 - We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990–2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness. KW - Happiness KW - Life satisfaction KW - Subjective well-being KW - Inequality KW - Income distribution KW - Redistribution KW - Political ideology KW - Justice KW - Fairness KW - World Values Survey Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017 SN - 0167-2681 VL - 91 SP - 75 EP - 92 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Kollektiver Verbraucherschutz und Finanzmarktwächter: eine ordnungspolitische Diskussion aktueller Entwicklungen beim finanziellen Verbraucherschutz T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s41025-017-0053-y SN - 0937-0862 SN - 2364-3943 VL - 42 IS - 4 SP - 365 EP - 394 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing. KW - Economic policy KW - Model uncertainty KW - Collective beliefs KW - Collective learning Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y SN - 0936-9937 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 101 EP - 116 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik N2 - In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren. KW - Paternalismus KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Verhaltensökonomik Y1 - 2014 SN - 0937-0862 VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 239 EP - 257 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective, and a Proposal for an Extension of the Research Agenda T2 - The American Journal of Economics and Sociology N2 - New Political Economy has something very important in common with welfare economics: its focus on static, technical efficiency criteria to judge the rationality of a social, political or economic order. This often leads theorists to perceive their objects of research as well-defined problems to which clear-cut solutions can be found and prescribed as policy proposals, addressed at the policymaker or the democratic sovereign. This perspective frequently excludes important empirical phenomena from the research agenda. Although, for example, certain well-defined informational asymmetries are frequently modeled, fundamental knowledge problems such as ignorance of the true model of the economy are usually ignored. In the present paper, this approach is criticized from a Hayekian point of view, with an emphasis on the problems of "scientism" (i.e., the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences) and irremediably imperfect knowledge, troubling both the agents in the theoretical model and the theorist. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated with two examples that an extension of Public Choice's research agenda along Hayekian lines may be fruitful, because it leads to a fresh perception even of such problems that already have been extensively researched within the traditional framework. Y1 - 2002 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/3487744 SN - 0002-9246 SN - 1536-7150 VL - 61 IS - 1 SP - 193 EP - 214 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms. KW - Libertarian paternalism KW - Soft paternalism KW - Social norms KW - Informal institutions KW - Behavioral political economics KW - Sour grapes KW - Expressive behavior Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 28 IS - 2 SP - 266 EP - 277 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland T2 - European Economic Review N2 - Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities. KW - Centralization KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Fiscal referendums Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005 SN - 1873-572X VL - 52 IS - 4 SP - 611 EP - 645 ER -