TY - CHAP A1 - Ötsch, Walter A1 - Priddat, Birger A1 - Groß, Steffen ED - Ötsch, Walter ED - Priddat, Birger ED - Groß, Steffen T1 - Imaginaton und Ökonomie: zum Vorwort T2 - Das Imaginative der Politischen Ökonomie Y1 - 2024 SN - 978-3-7316-1536-1 SP - 7 EP - 28 PB - Metropolis CY - Marburg ET - 1. Auflage ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. A1 - Tridimas, George T1 - The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars T2 - Public Choice N2 - In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon’s ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group. KW - Ancient Athens KW - Solon KW - Political non-neutrality KW - Rent seeking KW - Intra-elite competition KW - Political apathy KW - Civil war KW - Inclusive institutions Y1 - 2022 UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 192 IS - 3-4 SP - 249 EP - 272 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Völkerrecht als Restriktion für das Handeln von Regierungen: Diplomatie durch Zwang und internationales öffentliches Luftrecht N2 - Ausgehend von einer ausführlichen Darstellung der Entwicklungslinien des Völkerrechts analysiert Sören C. Schwuchow die Entstehung von Jurisdiktionskonflikten im internationalen Luftraum vor dem Hintergrund rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen sowie der strategischen Interessen der Staaten. Grundlage ist die Annahme, dass manche Regierungen „Kanonenbootdiplomatie“ im Luftraum betreiben, indem sie über umstrittenen Territorien gezielt Abfangmanöver provozieren, um die eigene Konfliktbereitschaft zu signalisieren. Der Autor analysiert modelltheoretisch die strategische Interdependenz der Staaten und überprüft sie empirisch. Er liefert so einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der Bestimmungsgründe staatlicher Außenpolitik sowie der Ausgestaltung des Völkerrechts. KW - Lufthoheit KW - Kompetenzkonflikt KW - Luftfahrtrecht KW - Politisches Handeln KW - Streiterledigung KW - Diplomatie KW - Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts KW - Völkerrecht Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-658-07782-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07782-2 PB - Springer Gabler CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Military Spending and Inequality in Autocracies: A Simple Model T2 - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy N2 - In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator’s own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime’s rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society’s institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending. KW - Inequality KW - autocracies KW - military spending KW - rent-seeking Y1 - 2018 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/peps.2018.24.issue-4/peps-2018-0025/peps-2018-0025.xml?format=INT U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2018-0025 SN - 1554-8597 VL - 24 IS - 4 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption T2 - European Journal of Law and Economics N2 - We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens’ wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization’s higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge. KW - Inequality KW - Corruption KW - Organized crime KW - Public security Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x SN - 0929-1261 VL - 55 IS - 3 SP - 469 EP - 509 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schwuchow, Soeren C. T1 - Extractive politics, redistribution, and war : on the rationality of kleptocratic mismanagement T2 - Defence and peace economics N2 - We study a model on the impact of vertical inequality on autocrats’ exploitation of societal wealth and their intended risk of war. Using a general equilibrium model, we demonstrate that autocrats are willing to use the military for redistribution when it increases their share of the rents. They are also willing to harm the economy to deter external threats and are most powerful for extreme un-/equal distributions. These findings offer interesting interpretations. Firstly, even in the absence of external military threats, some autocrats maintain large armies for redistribution, depending on the level of inequality. Secondly, not too low inequality can benefit ordinary citizens. Thirdly, kleptocratic mismanagement is not necessarily an unintended side effect of shameless self-enrichment, but rather a rationally chosen governance to deter too large military threats. This policy could prevent hostilities, but ruins the economy, destroying a society’s wealth. The latter causes ordinary citizens to favor war since the autocrat would then lose their grip at home. These results help to explain why some autocrats maintain excessively large armies, while others stifle their economies, and yet others are drawn into wars. KW - Kleptokracy KW - Economic development KW - Vertical inequality KW - Military expenditures KW - War KW - Corruption Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389 SN - 1024-2694 VL - 36 IS - 5 SP - 683 EP - 705 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - London ; Abingdon ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schubert, Christian A1 - Cordes, Christian T1 - Role Models that make you unhappy: Light Paternalism, Social Learning and Welfare T2 - Journal of Institutional Economics Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000015 SN - 1744-1382 VL - 9 IS - 2 SP - 131 EP - 159 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Eine kritische Diskussion T2 - ORDO : Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft N2 - Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie veröffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu stärken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung für diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelständisch geprägten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die Fähigkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungsträger, die in der Realität kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative würde in einer Rückbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gewährleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensität, bestehen. KW - Industriepolitik KW - Innovationspolitik KW - Nationale Industriestrategie KW - Strukturwandel KW - nationale Champions KW - Innovation Policy KW - Structural Change KW - National Champions Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2020-0019 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 70 IS - 1 SP - 340 EP - 371 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Behavioral political economy: A survey T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research. KW - Behavioral political economy KW - Rational irrationality KW - Cognitive biases KW - Social norms KW - Voting KW - Paternalism Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 40 IS - B SP - 395 EP - 417 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y SN - 1432-1386 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 29 IS - 5 SP - 1399 EP - 1414 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Pamp, Oliver ED - Mause, Karsten ED - Müller, Christian ED - Schubert, Klaus T1 - Finanzpolitik T2 - Politik und Wirtschaft. Ein integratives Kompendium Y1 - 2018 SN - 978-3-658-06476-1 SP - 267 EP - 296 PB - Springer CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Kliemt, Hartmut T1 - Pro & Contra: Sollte Sterbehilfe in Deutschland erlaubt sein? T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650-2018-4-38 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 47 IS - 4 SP - 38 EP - 39 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: ökonomische Perspektiven T2 - Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschlüsse Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-406-66238-6 SP - M11 EP - M65 PB - Beck CY - München ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism T2 - Kyklos N2 - Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12106 SN - 1467-6435 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 135 EP - 156 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik N2 - In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren. KW - Paternalismus KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Verhaltensökonomik Y1 - 2014 SN - 0937-0862 VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 239 EP - 257 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making? T2 - Journal of Bioeconomics N2 - This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans. KW - Classical liberalism KW - Evolution KW - Darwinism KW - Economic policy KW - Cultural evolution KW - Institutional evolution Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6 SN - 1573-698 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 70 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Die Politische Ökonomie des Entscheidungsdesigns: Kann Paternalismus liberal sein? T2 - Zeitschrift für Politik N2 - Das Konzept des sogenannten "liberalen" oder "libertären" Paternalismus wird in der akademischen Debatte zunehmend kontrovers diskutiert und findet gleichzeitig immer mehr das Interesse politischer Praktiker. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass es sich beim neuen Paternalismus nicht um ein liberales Konzept handelt. Zunächst wird in einer kurzen theoriegeschichtlichen Zusammenfassung gezeigt, welchen Weg die Ökonomik von traditionellen homo oeconomicus zur modernen Verhaltensökonomik zurückgelegt hat und wieso aus dieser heutigen Perspektive die Frage nach der Effizienz paternalistischer Intervent ionen naheliegend ist. Darauf aufbauend werden grundsätzliche Probleme paternalistischer Ansät ze diskutiert und es wird gezeigt, dass diese Ansätze mit zwei fundamentalen Eigenschaften einer liberalen Politik nicht vereinbar sind, nämlich dem Respekt für die Autonomie heterogener Individuen und der Offenheit für ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Wandel. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0044-3360-2015-1-66 SN - 0044-3360 VL - 62 IS - 1 SP - 67 EP - 84 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - "Für Ökonomen muss alles auf eine einzige Leinwand passen" Interview mit Geoffrey Brennan T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik Y1 - 2014 SN - 1465-6493 VL - 15 IS - 4 SP - 334 EP - 345 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Goldschmidt, Nils ED - Kolev, Stefan ED - Zweynert, Joachim T1 - Politisch-ökonomische Implikationen der Verhaltensökonomik: eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme und einige Ansätze zu Alternativen T2 - Neue Ordnungsökonomik KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Soziale Marktwirtschaft KW - Ordoliberalismus Y1 - 2016 SN - 978-3-16-152994-8 SN - 3-16-152994-4 SP - 153 EP - 174 PB - Mohr Siebeck CY - Tübingen ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Klinck, Fabian ED - Riesenhuber, Karl T1 - Verbraucherleitbilder aus ökonomischer Sicht T2 - Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplinäre und europäische Perspektiven Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-11-036339-5 SP - 53 EP - 72 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER -