TY - GEN A1 - Döring, Thomas A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany T2 - Constitutional Political Economy N2 - This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions. KW - Federalism KW - Government Centralization KW - State and Local Autonomy KW - Bryce Law KW - Popitz Law KW - Institutional Evolution KW - Constitutional economics KW - Formal institutions Y1 - 2011 SN - 1043-4062 VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 83 EP - 102 ER -