TY - CHAP A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit T2 - Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008 Y1 - 2008 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios ED - Shinnick, Edward ED - Pickhardt, Michael T1 - A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion T2 - The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance Y1 - 2008 SN - 978-1-84844-079-1 SP - 43 EP - 62 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Legacy of Open Thought Y1 - 2009 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Four Budget Deficit Theories in One Model Y1 - 2011 UR - http://frank.mtsu.edu/~jee/issues_2011summer.html ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - The egalitarian battlefield: Reflections on the origins of majority rule in archaic Greece Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Consumer Choice: Income, Tastes, and Prices N2 - Wolfram Demonstrations Project Y1 - 2011 UR - http://demonstrations.wolfram.com ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schubert, Christian ED - Schubert, Christian ED - Wangenheim, Georg von T1 - A contractarian view on institutional evolution T2 - Evolution and Design of Institutions Y1 - 2006 SN - 978-0-415-37531-3 SP - 149 EP - 179 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP ED - Backhaus, Jürgen G. T1 - Hayek and the Evolution of Designed Institutions: A critical assessment T2 - Entrepreneurship, money and coordination : Hayek's theory of cultural evolution Y1 - 2005 SN - 1-84542-130-2 SP - 107 EP - 130 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - The pitfalls of Darwinian “progress”: a comment on “Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics” by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin T2 - Journal of Bioeconomics Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0 SN - 1573-6989 VL - 15 IS - 3 SP - 325 EP - 328 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing. KW - Economic policy KW - Model uncertainty KW - Collective beliefs KW - Collective learning Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y SN - 0936-9937 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 101 EP - 116 ER -