TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik N2 - In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren. KW - Paternalismus KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Verhaltensökonomik Y1 - 2014 SN - 0937-0862 VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 239 EP - 257 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making? T2 - Journal of Bioeconomics N2 - This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans. KW - Classical liberalism KW - Evolution KW - Darwinism KW - Economic policy KW - Cultural evolution KW - Institutional evolution Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6 SN - 1573-698 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 70 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Behavioral political economy: A survey T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research. KW - Behavioral political economy KW - Rational irrationality KW - Cognitive biases KW - Social norms KW - Voting KW - Paternalism Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 40 IS - B SP - 395 EP - 417 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism T2 - Kyklos N2 - Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12106 SN - 1467-6435 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 135 EP - 156 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes T2 - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy N2 - Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2014-0040 SN - 1554-8597 VL - 20 IS - 4 SP - 697 EP - 707 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Völkerrecht als Restriktion für das Handeln von Regierungen: Diplomatie durch Zwang und internationales öffentliches Luftrecht N2 - Ausgehend von einer ausführlichen Darstellung der Entwicklungslinien des Völkerrechts analysiert Sören C. Schwuchow die Entstehung von Jurisdiktionskonflikten im internationalen Luftraum vor dem Hintergrund rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen sowie der strategischen Interessen der Staaten. Grundlage ist die Annahme, dass manche Regierungen „Kanonenbootdiplomatie“ im Luftraum betreiben, indem sie über umstrittenen Territorien gezielt Abfangmanöver provozieren, um die eigene Konfliktbereitschaft zu signalisieren. Der Autor analysiert modelltheoretisch die strategische Interdependenz der Staaten und überprüft sie empirisch. Er liefert so einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der Bestimmungsgründe staatlicher Außenpolitik sowie der Ausgestaltung des Völkerrechts. KW - Lufthoheit KW - Kompetenzkonflikt KW - Luftfahrtrecht KW - Politisches Handeln KW - Streiterledigung KW - Diplomatie KW - Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts KW - Völkerrecht Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-658-07782-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07782-2 PB - Springer Gabler CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - GEN A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis T2 - Economic Inquiry N2 - The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12331 SN - 1465-7295 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 1445 EP - 1463 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Klinck, Fabian ED - Riesenhuber, Karl T1 - Verbraucherleitbilder aus ökonomischer Sicht T2 - Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplinäre und europäische Perspektiven Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-11-036339-5 SP - 53 EP - 72 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Respektiert eine Politik des weichen Paternalismus die Autonomie individueller Konsumenten? Gutachten im Auftrag von Prometheus - das Freiheitsinstitut gGmbH, Berlin Y1 - 2016 PB - Fakultät für Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikroökonomie CY - Cottbus-Senftenberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Eccleston, Richard ED - Krever, Richard T1 - German Federalism at the Crossroads: Renegotiating the Allocation of Competencies in a New Financial Environment T2 - The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-78471-777-3 SP - 147 EP - 172 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham, UK ER -