TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies T2 - Public Choice N2 - We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. KW - Redistribution KW - Formal institutions KW - Fiscal decentralization KW - Presidential and parliamentary regimes KW - Electoral systems Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 159 IS - 3 SP - 435 EP - 455 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik N2 - In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren. KW - Paternalismus KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Verhaltensökonomik Y1 - 2014 SN - 0937-0862 VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 239 EP - 257 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes T2 - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy N2 - Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2014-0040 SN - 1554-8597 VL - 20 IS - 4 SP - 697 EP - 707 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models T2 - Journal of Business Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0 SN - 1861-8928 SN - 0044-2372 VL - 84 IS - 9 SP - 1237 EP - 1259 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - "The Map is Not the Territory!" Modelle und Modellbildung in der Volkswirtschaftslehre T2 - Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken Y1 - 2014 SN - 2510-4179 SN - 0026-0096 VL - 68 IS - 778 SP - 267 EP - 272 ER -