TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models T2 - Journal of Business Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0 SN - 1861-8928 SN - 0044-2372 VL - 84 IS - 9 SP - 1237 EP - 1259 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - "The Map is Not the Territory!" Modelle und Modellbildung in der Volkswirtschaftslehre T2 - Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken Y1 - 2014 SN - 2510-4179 SN - 0026-0096 VL - 68 IS - 778 SP - 267 EP - 272 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Der Mehrwert des Hybriden. Die hybridologische Forschungsperspektive im Kontrast zum Ansatz der Bikulturalität T2 - Letopis. Zeitschrift für sorbische Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur Y1 - 2016 VL - 63 IS - 1 SP - 89 EP - 96 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Can Cultural Property Protection Be an Effective Counter-Terrorism Instrument? T2 - The Journal of Art Crime Y1 - 2018 SN - 1947-5926 VL - 19 SP - 47 EP - 59 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - The Monuments Men Are Back. Kulturgüterschutz als sicherheitspolitische Herausforderung T2 - Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken Y1 - 2017 SN - 2510-4179 SN - 0026-0096 VL - 71 IS - 820 SP - 23 EP - 34 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Vom "Gesetz" zur "Form". Überlegungen zum epistemischen und methodologischen Status der Volkswirtschaftslehre T2 - ORDO - Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Y1 - 2011 SN - 2366-0481 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 62 SP - 405 EP - 424 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Unruhige Kunstmärkte. Spekulation und Statusgewinn als daseinssteigernde Erfahrung T2 - Lettre International Y1 - 2016 SN - 0945-5167 IS - 115 SP - 76 EP - 80 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - On the Regulation of the International Exchange of Cultural Property T2 - ORDO : Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft N2 - With its foundation in 1945, UNESCO declared as its main purpose the promotion of international cultural exchange1. A number of legal instruments (Conventions, Recommendations and Declarations) should duly help to substantiate that general purpose and make it work in practice. In this process, the regulation of the international exchange of cultural property plays a key role. However, the proper regulation of cultural property exchange has been a highly controversial issue. This paper focus on UNESCO's guiding ideas and conceptions of cultural property, international exchange and regulation. The central question is: Are the regulations codified in UNESCO’s Conventions and Recommendations helpful in encouraging international cultural exchange or are we faced, due to the neglect of private agents and the roles they play in cultural exchange, with some sort of one-sided regulation running counter to that aim? The author argues that UNESCO's legal instruments are driven by and express a strong anti-private and anti-market bias, which produce problematic economic incentives in the art and antiquities world to the disadvantage of the international exchange of cultural property. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/ordo/70/1/article-p166.xml?tab_body=pdf-69320 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 70 IS - 1 SP - 166 EP - 187 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - Ist "Freiheit" als "negative Freiheit" ausreichend bestimmt? Die Positionen Friedrich August von Hayeks und Isaiah Berlins im Kontrast sowie ein Vorschlag zur Diskussion T2 - ORDO - Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Y1 - 2009 SN - 2366-0481 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 60 SP - 23 EP - 52 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - "The Other Side of the Argument": Isaiah Berlin versus F.A. von Hayek on Liberty, Public Policies and the Market T2 - Constitutional Political Economy Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9193-3 SN - 1572-9966 SN - 1043-4062 VL - 26 IS - 4 SP - 475 EP - 494 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - Die Diplomatie der Vertreibung: Der griechisch-türkische Bevölkerungsaustausch von Lausanne und seine Auswirkungen auf die internationale Minderheitenpolitik Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - Vertreibung und Diplomatie: Hintergründe und Umdeutungen des griechisch-türkischen >Bevölkerungsaustauschs< von 1923 Y1 - 2010 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios T1 - The egalitarian battlefield: Reflections on the origins of majority rule in archaic Greece Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing T2 - Research Policy N2 - The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an “as is” review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review. KW - Academic journals KW - Scientific publishing KW - Peer review policy KW - Property rights Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005 SN - 0048-7333 VL - 41 IS - 8 SP - 1440 EP - 1447 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Consumer Choice: Income, Tastes, and Prices N2 - Wolfram Demonstrations Project Y1 - 2011 UR - http://demonstrations.wolfram.com ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes T2 - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy N2 - Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2014-0040 SN - 1554-8597 VL - 20 IS - 4 SP - 697 EP - 707 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal. KW - Greek debt crisis KW - Crisis management KW - Brinkmanship Y1 - 2017 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016301574 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 48 SP - 40 EP - 53 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Siebel, Jens Peter T1 - Four Budget Deficit Theories in One Model Y1 - 2011 UR - http://frank.mtsu.edu/~jee/issues_2011summer.html ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing. KW - Economic policy KW - Model uncertainty KW - Collective beliefs KW - Collective learning Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y SN - 0936-9937 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 101 EP - 116 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan T2 - Constitutional Political Economy N2 - An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer. KW - Tax evasion KW - Tax morale KW - Cognitive dissonance KW - Informal institutions KW - H26 KW - Z13 Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-0001-y SN - 1043-4062 VL - 17 IS - 2 SP - 117 EP - 132 ER -