TY - GEN A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis T2 - Economic Inquiry N2 - The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12331 SN - 1465-7295 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 1445 EP - 1463 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Auktionsrekorde. Sammler, Händler, Finanziers - Kunst und Markt, Garantien und Kommerz T2 - Lettre International Y1 - 2016 SN - 0945-5167 IS - 112 SP - 102 EP - 105 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Der Mehrwert des Hybriden. Die hybridologische Forschungsperspektive im Kontrast zum Ansatz der Bikulturalität T2 - Letopis. Zeitschrift für sorbische Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur Y1 - 2016 VL - 63 IS - 1 SP - 89 EP - 96 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Groß, Steffen T1 - Unruhige Kunstmärkte. Spekulation und Statusgewinn als daseinssteigernde Erfahrung T2 - Lettre International Y1 - 2016 SN - 0945-5167 IS - 115 SP - 76 EP - 80 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism T2 - Kyklos N2 - Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12106 SN - 1467-6435 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 135 EP - 156 ER -