TY - PAT A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Unifizierter Multiplizierer Y1 - 2010 ER - TY - PAT A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Peter, St. T1 - Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Berechnen einer Polynom-Multiplikation, insbesondere für die elliptische Kurven-Kryptographie Y1 - 2006 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Maye, Oliver A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sorge, R. A1 - Winkler, R. A1 - Kraemer, Rolf T1 - Plasma - A Middleware for Location-Based Services: Design, Implementations and Lessons Learned Y1 - 2004 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Vater, Frank A1 - Maye, Oliver A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Kraemer, Rolf T1 - Efficient Implementations of Cryptographic Routines - A Review and Performance Analysis of Various Approaches Y1 - 2004 ER - TY - PAT A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Area Efficient Hardware Implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography by Iteratively Applying Karatsuba's Method Y1 - 2005 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Area Efficient Hardware Implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography by Iteratively Applying Karatsuba's Method Y1 - 2005 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Piotrowski, Krzysztof A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Maye, Oliver A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Protecting Privacy in E-Cash Schemes by Securing Hidden Identity Approaches against Stochastic Attacks Y1 - 2006 ER - TY - PAT A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Unifizierter Multiplizierer Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Jenihhin, Maksim A1 - Hamdioui, Said A1 - Sonza-Reorda, Matteo A1 - Krstic, Milos A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Sauer, Christian A1 - Klotz, Anton A1 - Hübner, Michael A1 - Nolte, Jörg A1 - Vierhaus, Heinrich Theodor A1 - Selimis, Georgions A1 - Alexandrescu, Dan A1 - Taouil, Mottaqiallah A1 - Schrijen, Geert-Jan A1 - Sterpone, Luca A1 - Squillero, Giovanni A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Raik, Jaan T1 - RESCUE: Interdependent Challenges of Reliability, Security and Quality in Nanoelectronic Systems T2 - ArXiv.org Y1 - 2019 UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.01561 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Sensitivity of Standard Library Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks in IHP 250 nm Technology T2 - Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6947-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134146 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Natarov, Roman A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Maksymyuk, O. A1 - Iegorova, O. A1 - Krishtal, Oleg A. A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Resilience Aspects in Distributed Wireless Electroencephalographic Sampling T2 - 2020 9th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6947-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134157 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Pérez, Eduardo A1 - Mahadevaiah, Mamathamba Kalishettyhalli A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Wenger, Christian A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Evaluation of the Sensitivity of RRAM Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks T2 - EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2020), Special Session: Architecture and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-7281-9535-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00047 SN - 978-1-7281-9536-0 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Vogel, Elisabeth A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - No Resilience without Security T2 - International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-Things (CPS & IoT 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6950-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134179 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Natarov, Roman A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Bohovyk, R. A1 - Fedoriuk, M. A1 - Isaev, Dmytro S. A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Maksymyuk, O. A1 - Krishtal, Oleg A. A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Artefacts in EEG Signals Epileptic Seizure Prediction using Edge Devices T2 - International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-Things (CPS & IoT 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6950-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134076 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sorge, Roland A1 - Schaeffner, Jan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Radiation-Hard Registers T2 - Proc. 24th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2021), Special Session: Architectures and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA), 371 Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2106.07271 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Fast Dual-Field ECDSA Accelerator with Increased Resistance against Horizontal SCA Attacks T2 - 2021 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-0285-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR51186.2021.9527912 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kuba, Michael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Octopuses: Biological Facts and Technical Solutions T2 - 2021 10th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-2989-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO52532.2021.9459727 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - GPS-Spoofing Attack Detection Mechanism for UAV Swarms T2 - 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-2290-3 SN - 979-8-3503-2291-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154998 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Cherninskyi, Andrii A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Intelligence and Motion Models of Continuum Robots: an Overview T2 - IEEE Access N2 - Many technical solutions are bio-inspired. Octopus-inspired robotic arms belong to continuum robots which are used in minimally invasive surgery or for technical system restoration in areas difficult-to-access. Continuum robot missions are bounded with their motions, whereby the motion of the robots is controlled by humans via wireless communication. In case of a lost connection, robot autonomy is required. Distributed control and distributed decision-making mechanisms based on artificial intelligence approaches can be a promising solution to achieve autonomy of technical systems and to increase their resilience. However these methods are not well investigated yet. Octopuses are the living example of natural distributed intelligence but their learning and decision-making mechanisms are also not fully investigated and understood yet. Our major interest is investigating mechanisms of Distributed Artificial Intelligence as a basis for improving resilience of complex systems. We decided to use a physical continuum robot prototype that is able to perform some basic movements for our research. The idea is to research how a technical system can be empowered to combine movements into sequences of motions by itself. For the experimental investigations a suitable physical prototype has to be selected, its motion control has to be implemented and automated. In this paper, we give an overview combining different fields of research, such as Distributed Artificial Intelligence and continuum robots based on 98 publications. We provide a detailed description of the basic motion control models of continuum robots based on the literature reviewed, discuss different aspects of autonomy and give an overview of physical prototypes of continuum robots. KW - Robots KW - Artificial intelligence KW - Resilience KW - Continuum robots Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3286300 SN - 2169-3536 IS - 11 SP - 60988 EP - 61003 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Vulnerability of Atomic Patterns to Simple SCA T2 - 19th IEEE East-West Design & Test Symposium (EWDTS 2023), (2023) N2 - In this work we discuss the vulnerability of atomic pattern algorithms for elliptic curve point multiplication against simple side-channel analysis attacks using our own implementation as an example. One of the assumptions, on which the atomicity principle is based, is the indistinguishability of operations with different registers, i.e. storing of the data into two different registers cannot be distinguished if their old and new data values are the same. But before the data can be stored in a register/block, this register/block has to be addressed for storing the data. Different registers/blocks have different addresses. The key-dependent addressing of registers/blocks is an inherent feature of the binary kP algorithms and allows to reveal the key k. In our work we demonstrated it. This means that the main assumption, that addressing of different registers/blocks is an indistinguishable operation, may no longer be applied when realizing kP implementations, at least not for hardware implementations. KW - Elliptic curves KW - NIST KW - Elliptic curve cryptography KW - Atomicity principle KW - Side-channel Analysis (SCA) KW - Simple Power Analysis (SPA) KW - Horizontal attacks KW - Address-bit attacks Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-1484-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/EWDTS59469.2023.10297074 SN - 2472-761X ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Sklavos, Nicolas A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Successful Simple Side Channel Analysis: Vulnerability of an Atomic Pattern kP Algorithm Implemented with a Constant Time Crypto Library to Simple Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks T2 - 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2023), 167 (2023) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-2291-0 SN - 979-8-3503-2290-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154940 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Randomized Addressing Countermeasures are Inefficient against Address-Bit SCA T2 - IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR 2023), 580 (2023) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-1170-9 SN - 979-8-3503-1171-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224968 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Non-Profiled Unsupervised Horizontal Iterative Attack against Hardware Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication Using Machine Learning T2 - Future Internet N2 - While IoT technology makes industries, cities, and homes smarter, it also opens the door to security risks. With the right equipment and physical access to the devices, the attacker can leverage side-channel information, like timing, power consumption, or electromagnetic emanation, to compromise cryptographic operations and extract the secret key. This work presents a side channel analysis of a cryptographic hardware accelerator for the Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication operation, implemented in a Field-Programmable Gate Array and as an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit. The presented framework consists of initial key extraction using a state-of-the-art statistical horizontal attack and is followed by regularized Artificial Neural Networks, which take, as input, the partially incorrect key guesses from the horizontal attack and correct them iteratively. The initial correctness of the horizontal attack, measured as the fraction of correctly extracted bits of the secret key, was improved from 75% to 98% by applying the iterative learning. KW - side channel analysis KW - machine learning KW - horizontal attack KW - non-profiled attack KW - FPGA KW - ASIC Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16020045 SN - 1999-5903 VL - 16 IS - 2 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter T1 - A Survey on sensor- and communication-based issues of autonomous UAVs T2 - Computer Modeling in Engineering & Sciences Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.32604/cmes.2023.029075 SN - 1526-1506 VL - 138 IS - 2 SP - 1019 EP - 1050 PB - Tech Science Press ER - TY - GEN A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Advantages of unsupervised learning analysis methods in single-trace SCA attacks T2 - Microprocessors and Microsystems Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2023.104994 SN - 0141-9331 VL - 105 PB - Elsevier BV ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Schaeffner, Jan A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klein, Dominik A1 - Freud, Sven A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Stealth attacks on PCBs: an experimental plausibility analysis T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR61664.2024.10679465 SP - 905 EP - 912 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis-Aikaterini A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Static power consumption as a new side-channel analysis threat to elliptic curve cryptography implementations T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR61664.2024.10679507 SP - 884 EP - 889 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Towards secure and reliable heterogeneous real-time telemetry communication in autonomous UAV swarms T2 - Poster : iCCC2024 - iCampµs Cottbus Conference 2024-05-14 - 2024-05-16 Cottbus Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5162/iCCC2024/P15 SP - 222 EP - 225 PB - AMA Service GmbH CY - Von-Münchhausen-Str. 49, 31515 Wunstorf, Germany ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Exploiting static power consumption in side-channel analysis T2 - 2024 IEEE 25th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS62223.2024.10534604 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - EC P-256: Successful Simple Power Analysis T2 - arXiv Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2106.12321 SP - 1 EP - 5 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - EC Scalar Multiplication: Successful Simple Address-Bit SCA Attack against Atomic Patterns T2 - IEEE 22nd Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-2058-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS53581.2021.9651877 SN - 2373-0862 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sosa, Omar Alejandro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Simulation of Electromagnetic Emanation of Cryptographic ICs: Tools, Methods, Problems T2 - 19th IEEE East-West Design & Test Symposium (EWDTS 2021), 12 (2021) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-4504-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/EWDTS52692.2021.9581013 SN - 2472-761X ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Jamming Detection for IR-UWB Ranging Technology in Autonomous UAV Swarms T2 - 2021 10th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-2989-4 SN - 978-1-6654-3912-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO52532.2021.9460250 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Multiplier as a Mean for Reducing Vulnerability of Atomic Patterns to Horizontal Address-Bit Attacks T2 - 2021 10th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-2989-4 SN - 978-1-6654-3912-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO52532.2021.9460158 SN - 2377-5475 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Clustering versus Statistical Analysis for SCA: when Machine Learning is Better T2 - 2021 10th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-2989-4 SN - 978-1-6654-3912-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO52532.2021.9460161 SN - 2377-5475 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sosa, Omar Alejandro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Cryptographic ICs: Simulation of Electromagnetic Radiation T2 - Proc. 33rd Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-33-13 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Ensuring a Secure Communication Between a GCS and a UAV via the MAVlink Protocol T2 - Proc. 33rd Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-33-21 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Optical Fault Injection Attacks: Single-Mode versus Multi-Mode Laser T2 - Proc. 33rd Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-33-23 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Breaking of an Open Source Fully Balanced Elliptic Curve Design using Automated Simple SCA T2 - Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-32-23 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Efficient Implementation of Unified ECC Accelerators based on the Karatsuba Multiplication Method T2 - Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-32-24 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Extended Horizontal SCA Attack using Clustering Algorithm T2 - Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-32-25 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Laser Fault Injection Attacks against IHP Chips T2 - Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-32-22 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - FFT based Horizontal SCA Attack against ECC T2 - 2021 11th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-4400-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/NTMS49979.2021.9432665 SN - 2157-4960 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Haddadi Esfahani, Ali A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Ortmann, Steffen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Impact of Data Preparation in Freezing of Gait Detection using Feature-Less Recurrent Neural Network T2 - IEEE Access Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3117543 SN - 2169-3536 IS - 9 SP - 138120 EP - 138131 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Resistance of the Montgomery Ladder against Simple SCA: Theory and Practice T2 - Journal of Electronic Testing Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10836-021-05951-3 SN - 1573-0727 SN - 0923-8174 VL - 37 IS - 3 SP - 289 EP - 303 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Pérez, Eduardo A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Katzer, Jens A1 - Schäffner, Jan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Sensitivity of HfO2-based RRAM Cells to Laser Irradiation T2 - Microprocessors and Microsystems Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2021.104376 SN - 0141-9331 IS - 87 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Vogel, Elisabeth A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Resilience in the Cyber World: Definitions, Features and Models T2 - Future Internet Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/fi13110293 SN - 1999-5903 VL - 13 IS - 11 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Schäffner, Jan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - On the Complexity of Attacking Commercial Authentication Products T2 - Microprocessors and Microsystems Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2020.103480 SN - 0141-9331 IS - 80 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Atomicity and Regularity Principles do not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks T2 - Sensors Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/s22083083 SN - 1424-8220 VL - 22 IS - 8 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Lang, Patrick A1 - Haddadi Esfahani, Ali A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter ED - Rehman, Masood Ur T1 - FPGA-based Realtime Detection of Freezing of Gait of Parkinson Patients T2 - Body Area Networks. Smart IoT and Big Data for Intelligent Health Management : 16th EAI International Conference, BODYNETS 2021, Virtual Event, October 25-26, 2021, Proceedings Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-030-95593-9 SN - 978-3-030-95592-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95593-9_9 SN - 1867-8211 SN - 1867-822X SP - 101 EP - 111 PB - Springer International Publishing ER - TY - GEN A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Panic, Goran A1 - Calligaro, Cristiano A1 - Krstic, Milos A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - On the SCA Resistance of Crypto IP Cores T2 - 23rd IEEE Latin-American Test Symposium (LATS 2022), Montevideo, Uruguay, 05-08 September 2022 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-1-6654-5707-1 SN - 978-1-6654-5708-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS57337.2022.9937007 SN - 2373-0862 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Distributed Artificial Intelligence as a Means to Achieve Self-X-Functions for Increasing Resilience: the First Steps T2 - 11th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO), Budva, Montenegro, 07-10 June 2022 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-1-6654-6828-2 SN - 978-1-6654-6827-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO55406.2022.9797193 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya ED - Kotulski, Zbigniew T1 - Horizontal attack against EC kP accelerator under laser illumination T2 - Electronics N2 - Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator, while using different equipment for the measurement of its power traces, i.e., we performed the measurements using a current probe from Riscure and a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy, with an attack success of 70% and 90%, respectively. Our experiments showed that laser illumination increased the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption, but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks changed insignificantly. After applying 100% of the laser beam output power and illuminating the smallest area of 143 µm² , we observed an offset of 17 mV in the measured trace. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power, as well as concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current, can significantly improve the attack’s success. The attacks exploiting the Static Current under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel, and their potential has not yet been fully investigated. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in downscaling technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future. KW - Power analysis KW - Dynamic power KW - Static leakage power KW - Laser illumination Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14102072 SN - 2079-9292 VL - 14 IS - 10 SP - 1 EP - 21 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - GEN A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Panic, Goran A1 - Calligaro, Cristiano A1 - Krstic, Milos A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter T1 - On the influence of cell libraries and other parameters to SCA resistance of crypto IP cores T2 - 2024 13th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) N2 - The ever-growing complexity of modern systems as well as the shrinking time to market enforces the use of already designed hardware components i.e. hard and soft IP cores. The fact that also requirements with respect to security significantly increased and that side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks are meanwhile a well-known threat it is paramount to ensure SCA resistance of ASICs and FPGA implementations derived from cryptographic IP cores. This requires to evaluate this feature for each IP core and target technology even down to the level of the cell library. The experiments reported here clearly show that the three available cell libraries even though developed for the same 130nm technology of IHP exhibit different sensitivity to SCA attacks ranging from quite resistant to very vulnerable. KW - Cryptographic IP cores KW - Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) KW - Side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks KW - SCA resistance KW - Differential power analysis (DPA) KW - Horizontal attacks Y1 - 2024 SN - 979-8-3503-8756-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO62516.2024.10577776 SP - 1 EP - 5 PB - IEEE CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Resilient movement planning for continuum robots T2 - MODeM 2024 : Multi-Objective Decision Making Workshop at ECAI 2024, 20 October 2024, Santiago de Compostela, Spain N2 - The paper presents an experimental study of resilient path planning for con-tinuum robots taking into account the multi-objective optimisation problem. To do this, we used two well-known algorithms, namely Genetic algorithm and A* algorithm, for path planning and the Analytical Hierarchy Process algorithm for paths evaluation. In our experiment Analytical Hierarchy Process algorithm considers four different criteria, i.e. distance, motors damage, mechanical damage and accuracy each considered to contribute to the resilience of a continuum robot. The use of different criteria is necessary to increasing the time to maintenance operations of the robot. The experiment shows that on the one hand both algorithms can be used in combination with Analytical Hierarchy Process algorithm for multi criteria path-planning, while Genetic algorithm shows superior performance in the comparison of the two algorithms. Y1 - 2024 UR - https://modem2024.vub.ac.be/papers/MODeM2024_paper_3.pdf U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2404.06178 SP - 1 EP - 7 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - On the SCA resistance of TMR-protected cryptographic designs T2 - Electronics N2 - The influence of redundant implementations on success of physical attacks against cryptographic devices is currently under-researched. This is especially an issue in application fields such as wearable health, industrial control systems and the like in which devices are accessible to potential attackers. This paper presents results of an investigation of the TMR application impact on the vulnerability of FPGA-based asymmetric cryptographic accelerators to side-channel analysis attacks. We implemented our cryptographic cores using full- and partial-TMR application approaches and experimentally conducted evaluation of their side-channel resistance. Our results reveal that TMR can significantly impact side-channel leakage, either increasing resistance by introducing noise or amplifying leakage depending on the part of the design where redundancy was applied. KW - Triple modular redundancy KW - TMR KW - Side-channel analysis attacks KW - SCA; Cryptographic hardware KW - FPGA security KW - Fault tolerance KW - Hardware redundancy KW - Physical attacks KW - Secure design KW - Elliptic curve cryptosystems Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14163318 SN - 2079-9292 VL - 14 IS - 16 SP - 1 EP - 15 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Chitauro, Ronald A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter T1 - Channel state information analysis for jamming attack detection in static and dynamic UAV networks – an experimental study T2 - 2025 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing in Smart Systems and the Internet of Things (DCOSS-IoT) N2 - Networks built on the IEEE 802.11 standard have experienced rapid growth in the last decade. Their field of application is vast, including smart home applications, Internet of Things (IoT), and short-range high throughput static and dynamic inter-vehicular communication networks. In this work, we conduct an experimental study on the feasibility of jamming attack detection in static and dynamic vehicular networks by using real-time Channel State Information (CSI) analysis of the communication channel. To set up a communication network between an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and a Ground Control Station (GCS), we utilize the ESP32-S3 modules from Espressif Systems. The configured link is then subjected to experimental testing of the constant jammer impact on the CSI parameters, including individual subcarrier amplitude attenuation, phase shift, temporal variation (jitter) and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) in static and dynamic conditions. Our study experimentally confirms the feasibility of jamming attack detection through CSI analysis in both static and dynamic communication scenarios. KW - IEEE 802.11 KW - Internet of Things (IoT) KW - UAV KW - Wireless Security KW - CSI KW - Jamming Attack Y1 - 2025 SN - 979-8-3315-4372-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/DCOSS-IoT65416.2025.00060 SP - 322 EP - 327 PB - IEEE CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pidvalnyi, Illia A1 - Kostenko, Anna A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Isaev, Dmytro A1 - Maximyuk, Oleksandr A1 - Krishtal, Oleg A1 - Iegorova, Olena A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Ortmann, Steffen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Classification of epileptic seizures by simple machine learning techniques : application to animals’ electroencephalography signals T2 - IEEE access N2 - Detection and prediction of the onset of seizures are among the most challenging problems in epilepsy diagnostics and treatment. Small electronic devices capable of doing that will improve the quality of life for epilepsy patients while also open new opportunities for pharmacological intervention. This paper presents a novel approach using machine learning techniques to detect seizures onset using intracranial electroencephalography (EEG) signals. The proposed approach was tested on intracranial EEG data recorded in rats with pilocarpine model of temporal lobe epilepsy. A principal component analysis was applied for feature selection before using a support vector machine for the detection of seizures. Hjorth’s parameters and Daubechies discrete wavelet transform coefficients were found to be the most informative features of EEG data. We found that the support vector machine approach had a classification sensitivity of 90% and a specificity of 74% for detecting ictal episodes. Changing the epoch parameter from one to twenty-one seconds results in changing the redistribution of principal components’ values to 10% but does not affect the classification result. Support vector machines are accessible and convenient methods for classification that have achieved promising classification quality, and are rather lightweight compared to other machine learning methods. So we suggest their future use in mobile devices for early epileptic seizure and preictal episode detection. KW - Epilepsy KW - Single-channel intracranial encephalographic data KW - PCA KW - SVM KW - Automated system KW - Rats Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2025.3527866 SN - 2169-3536 VL - 13 SP - 8951 EP - 8962 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Impact of thermal effects on cryptographic resilience : a study of an ASIC implementation of the Montgomery ladder T2 - 2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) N2 - The side-channel attack resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms can vary significantly with operating parameters, such as operating voltage, clock frequency, temperature, etc. This study investigates the influence of temperature on the resilience of an ASIC implementation of the Montgomery ladder against SCA. We conducted a series of experiments to evaluate how varying temperature conditions impact the resistance of our ASIC to horizontal attacks. Our results reveal that in contrast to the state-of-the-art approach of increasing the operating temperature, operating under sub-zero temperatures can result in increased vulnerability to side-channel attacks compared to high temperature experiments. We present a detailed analysis of the thermal sensitivity of our ASIC, correlating specific temperature ranges with potential security degradation. KW - Side-channel analysis KW - SCA KW - Static power KW - Static current KW - Leakage current KW - Leakage current attacks KW - Leakage power analysis (LPA) KW - Attacks exploiting static current KW - Operating parameters KW - Thermal sensitivity horizontal attacks KW - ECC KW - Montgomery Ladder KW - Static current SCA Y1 - 2025 SN - 978-1-6654-7763-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963949 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Sensitivity of logic cells to laser fault injections : an overview of experimental results for IHP technologies T2 - IEEE transactions on device and materials reliability N2 - In this work, we provide an overview of our front-side Fault Injection (FI) experiments with different logic cells manufactured in two IHP BiCMOS technologies using Riscure equipment for laser FIs. We were able to inject faults into different types of cells including standard library cells as well as into two types of radiation tolerant flip-flops. Experimenting with radiation-tolerant flip-flops faults were injected illuminating areas with PMOS transistors in OFF state. We determined the cells areas, which were sensitive to the laser FI attacks. Only few works discussed this aspect in the past determining NMOS transistors as the sensitive part of the logic cells. Knowledge about the areas which are sensitive to the laser FI attacks can be generalized experimenting with other technologies and used in future by designers to implement corresponding countermeasure(s) at the initial stage of chip development. KW - Laser fault injection attack KW - Radiation tolerant cells KW - Cell’s sensitive area Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/TDMR.2025.3596380 SN - 1530-4388 SN - 1558-2574 VL - 25 IS - 3 SP - 410 EP - 423 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis Aikaterini A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Li, Sze Hei A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Kabin, Ievgen T1 - Revisiting atomic patterns for elliptic curve scalar multiplication revealing inherent vulnerability to simple SCA T2 - 2025 12th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS) N2 - Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication, denoted as kP operation, is the basic operation in all Elliptic Curve-based cryptographic protocols. The atomicity principle and different atomic patterns for kP algorithms were proposed in the past as countermeasures against simple side-channel analysis. In this work, we investigated the resistance of a kP algorithm implemented in hardware using Longa’s atomic patterns. We analysed its simulated power trace. We show in the example of our kP implementation for the NIST EC P-256 that the field squaring operations are distinguishable from the field multiplications even if they are performed by the same field multiplier, due to the addressing of the second multiplicand. This inherent vulnerability of atomic patterns can be successfully exploited to reveal the scalar k. KW - Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) KW - kP KW - Atomic patterns KW - Simple Power Analysis (SPA) KW - Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks KW - Longa’s atomic patterns Y1 - 2025 SN - 979-8-3315-5276-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/NTMS65597.2025.11076762 SP - 252 EP - 258 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Case study : horizontal side-channel analysis attack against elliptic curve scalar multiplication accelerator under laser illumination T2 - 2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) N2 - Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks was changed insignificantly. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power and concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current can improve the attack success significantly. The horizontal attacks against public key cryptosystems exploiting the Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel and their potential is not investigated yet. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in scaled technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future. KW - Security KW - Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) KW - Laser illumination KW - Power consumption KW - Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI) attacks Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963958 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis Aikaterini A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Kabin, Ievgen T1 - Atomic patterns : field operation distinguishability on cryptographic ASICs T2 - 2025 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) N2 - Scalar multiplication kP is the most frequently attacked operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) protocols. To counter simple Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), the atomicity principle and various atomic block constructions have been proposed in the past. In this paper, we demonstrate that binary kP algorithms based on atomic patterns remain vulnerable to simple SCA, due to different energy consumption of the field multiplier while obtaining the second multiplicand for field multiplication or squaring operations. The reasons for this difference are the data-bit as well as the address-bit effects. Please note, this leakage does not depend on the multiplication formula used. We validate this vulnerability through experiments using Longa’s atomic patterns, revealing that such leakage significantly compromises the SCA resistance of numerous atomic implementations and facilitates potential key extraction. We conclude by providing some potential solutions to mitigate the revealed vulnerability. Y1 - 2025 SN - 979-8-3315-3591-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR64739.2025.11130154 SP - 990 EP - 995 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER -