TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Lohmöller, Johannes A1 - Ziemann, Torsten A1 - Hoerchner, Carl A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of Webpages T2 - Proceedings of the 28th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2021), Seoul, Virtual Event, South Korea, November 2021 Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-4503-8454-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485347 SP - 2411 EP - 2413 PB - ACM Press CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Zinnen, Andreas A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - CUMUL & Co: High-Impact Artifacts for Website Fingerprinting Research T2 - 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2022), Austin, Texas, USA, December 5-9, 2022. N2 - Anonymous communication on the Internet is about hiding the relationship between communicating parties. At NDSS ’16, we presented a new website fingerprinting approach, CUMUL, that utilizes novel features and a simple yet powerful algorithm to attack anonymization networks such as Tor. Based on pattern observation of data flows, this attack aims at identifying the content of encrypted and anonymized connections. Apart from the feature generation and the used classifier, we also provided a large dataset to the research community to study the attack at Internet scale. In this paper, we emphasize the impact of our artifacts by analyzing publications referring to our work with respect to the dataset, feature extraction method, and source code of the implementation. Based on this data, we draw conclusions about the impact of our artifacts on the research field and discuss their influence on related cybersecurity topics. Overall, from 393 unique citations, we discover more than 130 academic references that utilize our artifacts, 61 among them are highly influential (according to SemanticScholar), and at least 43 are from top-ranked security venues. This data underlines the significant relevance and impact of our work as well as of our artifacts in the community and beyond. KW - Traffic Analysis;Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy Y1 - 2022 UR - https://www.acsac.org/2022/program/artifacts_competition/ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Reuter, Sebastian A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Demo: Traffic Splitting for Tor – A Defense against Fingerprinting Attacks T2 - Conference on Networked Systems 2021 (NetSys 2021) N2 - Website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks on the anonymity network Tor have become ever more effective. Furthermore, research discovered that proposed defenses are insufficient or cause high overhead. In previous work, we presented a new WFP defense for Tor that incorporates multipath transmissions to repel malicious Tor nodes from conducting WFP attacks. In this demo, we showcase the operation of our traffic splitting defense by visually illustrating the underlying Tor multipath transmission using LED-equipped Raspberry Pis. KW - Onion Routing; Website Fingerprinting; Multipath Traffic; Privacy Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.14279/tuj.eceasst.80.1151.1128 SN - 1863-2122 ER -