TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Flashback on Control Logic Injection Attacks against Programmable Logic Controllers T2 - Automation N2 - Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) make up a substantial part of critical infrastructures (CIs) and industrial control systems (ICSs). They are programmed with a control logic that defines how to drive and operate critical processes such as nuclear power plants, petrochemical factories, water treatment systems, and other facilities. Unfortunately, these devices are not fully secure and are prone to malicious threats, especially those exploiting vulnerabilities in the control logic of PLCs. Such threats are known as control logic injection attacks. They mainly aim at sabotaging physical processes controlled by exposed PLCs, causing catastrophic damage to target systems as shown by Stuxnet. Looking back over the last decade, many research endeavors exploring and discussing these threats have been published. In this article, we present a flashback on the recent works related to control logic injection attacks against PLCs. To this end, we provide the security research community with a new systematization based on the attacker techniques under three main attack scenarios. For each study presented in this work, we overview the attack strategies, tools, security goals, infected devices, and underlying vulnerabilities. Based on our analysis, we highlight the current security challenges in protecting PLCs from such severe attacks and suggest security recommendations for future research directions. KW - industrial control system KW - programmable logic controller KW - control logic injection attack KW - program injection KW - program modification Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/automation3040030 SN - 2673-4052 VL - 3 IS - 4 SP - 596 EP - 621 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A New Injection Threat on S7-1500 PLCs - Disrupting the Physical Process Offline T2 - IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/OJIES.2022.3151528 SN - 2644-1284 IS - 3 SP - 146 EP - 162 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - No Need to be Online to Attack - Exploiting S7-1500 PLCs by Time-Of-Day Block T2 - Proc. 28th International Conference on Information, Communication and Automation Technologies (ICAT 2022), arajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16-18 June 2022 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-1-6654-6692-9 SN - 978-1-6654-6691-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAT54566.2022.9811147 SN - 2643-1858 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter ED - Jasperneite, Jürgen ED - Lohweg, Volker T1 - A Remote Attack Tool on Siemens S7-300 Controllers: Practical Report T2 - Kommunikation und Bildverarbeitung in der Automation : Ausgewählte Beiträge der Jahreskolloquien KommA und BVAu 2020 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-662-64282-5 SN - 978-3-662-64283-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64283-2_1 SN - 2522-8579 SP - 3 EP - 21 PB - Springer Vieweg CY - Heidelberg ER -