TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments? T2 - Journal of Economics and Statistics N2 - A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region. KW - Policy decentralisation KW - fiscal competition KW - model uncertainty KW - collective learning Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990268 SN - 0021-4027 VL - 228 IS - 4 SP - 372 EP - 393 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland T2 - European Economic Review N2 - Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities. KW - Centralization KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Fiscal referendums Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005 SN - 1873-572X VL - 52 IS - 4 SP - 611 EP - 645 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. T1 - The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach T2 - Economics of Governance N2 - The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution. KW - Centralisation KW - Direct democracy KW - Representative democracy KW - Public good provision Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1 SN - 1435-8131 VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 26 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pitsoulis, Athanassios A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing T2 - Research Policy N2 - The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an “as is” review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review. KW - Academic journals KW - Scientific publishing KW - Peer review policy KW - Property rights Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005 SN - 0048-7333 VL - 41 IS - 8 SP - 1440 EP - 1447 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues T2 - Public Finance and Management N2 - This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints. KW - net wealth tax KW - wealth KW - inequality KW - redistribution Y1 - 2012 SN - 1523-9721 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 368 EP - 400 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Bjørnskov, Christian A1 - Dreher, Axel A1 - Fischer, Justina A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Gehring, Kai T1 - Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match T2 - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization N2 - We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990–2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness. KW - Happiness KW - Life satisfaction KW - Subjective well-being KW - Inequality KW - Income distribution KW - Redistribution KW - Political ideology KW - Justice KW - Fairness KW - World Values Survey Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017 SN - 0167-2681 VL - 91 SP - 75 EP - 92 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies T2 - Public Choice N2 - We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. KW - Redistribution KW - Formal institutions KW - Fiscal decentralization KW - Presidential and parliamentary regimes KW - Electoral systems Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 159 IS - 3 SP - 435 EP - 455 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik N2 - In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren. KW - Paternalismus KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Verhaltensökonomik Y1 - 2014 SN - 0937-0862 VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 239 EP - 257 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making? T2 - Journal of Bioeconomics N2 - This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans. KW - Classical liberalism KW - Evolution KW - Darwinism KW - Economic policy KW - Cultural evolution KW - Institutional evolution Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6 SN - 1573-698 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 70 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research T2 - Environment and Planning – Government and Policy N2 - In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework. KW - fiscal federalism KW - fiscal decentralization KW - growth KW - economic performance Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1068/c1054r SN - 1472-3425 VL - 29 IS - 2 SP - 224 EP - 243 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Döring, Thomas A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany T2 - Constitutional Political Economy N2 - This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions. KW - Federalism KW - Government Centralization KW - State and Local Autonomy KW - Bryce Law KW - Popitz Law KW - Institutional Evolution KW - Constitutional economics KW - Formal institutions Y1 - 2011 SN - 1043-4062 VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 83 EP - 102 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Wohlwollendes Anschubsen? Liberaler Paternalismus und seine Nebenwirkungen T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik N2 - In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter überzeugt sind, die Qualität der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu können. Nach einem Überblick über die verhaltensökonomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-ökonomischen Implikationen diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ansätze selbst Entscheidungen häufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualität individueller Entscheidungen höchst zweifelhaft ist. KW - Paternalismus KW - inkonsistente Präferenzen KW - expressives Verhalten Y1 - 2011 SN - 1465-6493 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 445 EP - 459 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them. KW - Structural change KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Grants in aid KW - Creative destruction Y1 - 2012 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 22 IS - 3 SP - 563 EP - 583 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms. KW - Libertarian paternalism KW - Soft paternalism KW - Social norms KW - Informal institutions KW - Behavioral political economics KW - Sour grapes KW - Expressive behavior Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 28 IS - 2 SP - 266 EP - 277 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis T2 - Economic Inquiry N2 - The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12331 SN - 1465-7295 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 1445 EP - 1463 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: ökonomische Perspektiven T2 - Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschlüsse Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-406-66238-6 SP - M11 EP - M65 PB - Beck CY - München ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Der griechische Bailout und seine institutionellen Folgen T2 - ifo-Schnelldienst Y1 - 2010 SN - 2199-4455 SN - 0018-974X VL - 63 IS - 11 SP - 3 EP - 6 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Alm, James ED - Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ED - Torgler, Benno T1 - Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance T2 - Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance N2 - This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity. KW - tax compliance KW - tax morale KW - tax evasion KW - reciprocity Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-0-415-57698-7 SN - 0-415-57698-9 SP - 56 EP - 73 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Steuerehrlichkeit als reziprokes Handeln T2 - Zeitschrift für Risk, Fraud & Compliance N2 - Die neuere ökonomische Forschung zur Steuerehrlichkeit geht nicht mehr davon aus, dass lediglich Steuerlasten und Strafandrohungen das Verhalten von Steuerzahlern bestimmen. Vielmehr wird berücksichtigt, dass Steuerzahler in gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen stehen, die Einfluss auf ihre Steuerehrlichkeit haben. In diesem Beitrag werden zentrale Ergebnisse der Literatur kurz präsentiert und Anregungen für eine effiziente Politik der Steuerdurchsetzung formuliert. Y1 - 2011 SN - 1867-8394 VL - 6 IS - 3 SP - 106 EP - 110 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Weicher Paternalismus? Normative Implikationen beschränkter individueller Rationalität T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) Y1 - 2012 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 41 IS - 11 SP - 594 EP - 599 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Mehr Autonomie für die Bundesländer: Ansatzpunkte zu einer grundlegenden Reform der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen T2 - ifo-Schnelldienst N2 - Lars P. Feld, Universität Freiburg und Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Jan Schnellenbach, Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Universität Heidelberg, formulieren einen Reformvorschlag, der den Finanzausgleich in seiner Gesamtheit deutlich anreizorientierter ausgestaltet. Y1 - 2014 VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 32 EP - 36 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Behavioral Political Economy: Ein neues Forschungsfeld T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : (WiSt) N2 - Das Forschungsgebiet der Politischen Ökonomik kon- zentrierte sich bisher vor allem darauf, das ökonomi- sche Verhaltensmodell rational-eigeninteressierten Handelns auf den Forschungsgegenstand der Politik anzuwenden. Mit der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik gera- ten aber strikte Annahmen individueller Rationalität zu- nehmend in die Kritik. Dazu kommt, dass die Anreiz- strukturen gerade bei kollektivem Handeln in der Politik nicht dafür sprechen, dass Menschen individuellen Aufwand betreiben, um vollständig rational zu handeln. Deshalb ist die Anwendung verhaltensökonomischer Ansätze auf diesem Gebiet besonders vielversprechend. KW - Politische Ökonomik KW - Public Choice KW - Verhaltensökonomik KW - Rationalität KW - Wählerverhalten Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650_2014_12_658 VL - 43 IS - 12 SP - 658 EP - 662 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Unvollständige Rationalität ist keine hinreichende Begründung für paternalistisches Eingreifen T2 - Wirtschaftsdienst Y1 - 2014 SN - 1613-978X VL - 94 IS - 11 SP - 778 EP - 781 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Die Politische Ökonomie des Entscheidungsdesigns: Kann Paternalismus liberal sein? T2 - Zeitschrift für Politik N2 - Das Konzept des sogenannten "liberalen" oder "libertären" Paternalismus wird in der akademischen Debatte zunehmend kontrovers diskutiert und findet gleichzeitig immer mehr das Interesse politischer Praktiker. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass es sich beim neuen Paternalismus nicht um ein liberales Konzept handelt. Zunächst wird in einer kurzen theoriegeschichtlichen Zusammenfassung gezeigt, welchen Weg die Ökonomik von traditionellen homo oeconomicus zur modernen Verhaltensökonomik zurückgelegt hat und wieso aus dieser heutigen Perspektive die Frage nach der Effizienz paternalistischer Intervent ionen naheliegend ist. Darauf aufbauend werden grundsätzliche Probleme paternalistischer Ansät ze diskutiert und es wird gezeigt, dass diese Ansätze mit zwei fundamentalen Eigenschaften einer liberalen Politik nicht vereinbar sind, nämlich dem Respekt für die Autonomie heterogener Individuen und der Offenheit für ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Wandel. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0044-3360-2015-1-66 SN - 0044-3360 VL - 62 IS - 1 SP - 67 EP - 84 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - "Für Ökonomen muss alles auf eine einzige Leinwand passen" Interview mit Geoffrey Brennan T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik Y1 - 2014 SN - 1465-6493 VL - 15 IS - 4 SP - 334 EP - 345 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Goldschmidt, Nils ED - Kolev, Stefan ED - Zweynert, Joachim T1 - Politisch-ökonomische Implikationen der Verhaltensökonomik: eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme und einige Ansätze zu Alternativen T2 - Neue Ordnungsökonomik KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Soziale Marktwirtschaft KW - Ordoliberalismus Y1 - 2016 SN - 978-3-16-152994-8 SN - 3-16-152994-4 SP - 153 EP - 174 PB - Mohr Siebeck CY - Tübingen ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Klinck, Fabian ED - Riesenhuber, Karl T1 - Verbraucherleitbilder aus ökonomischer Sicht T2 - Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplinäre und europäische Perspektiven Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-11-036339-5 SP - 53 EP - 72 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Backhaus, Jürgen G. T1 - Path-dependent rule evolution T2 - Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Wentzel, Dirk T1 - Die Wettbewerbsintensität auf dem Nachrichtenmarkt und die Offenheit kollektiver Lernprozesse T2 - Medienökonomik - Theoretische Grundlagen und ordnungspolitische Gestaltungsalternativen KW - Bildung KW - Fernsehen KW - Film KW - Massenmedien KW - Medien KW - Medienökonomie KW - Medienwirtschaft KW - Zeitung KW - Förderung KW - Telekommunikation KW - Ordnungspolitik KW - Wettbewerb KW - Gestaltung KW - Konferenzschrift KW - Kooperation KW - Qualität KW - Regulation KW - Theorie KW - Wirkung KW - Öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk KW - Europäische Union KW - Deutschland Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-8282-0437-9 SP - 101 EP - 122 PB - Lucius & Lucius CY - Stuttgart ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Schubert, Christian ED - Wangenheim, Georg von T1 - Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions T2 - The Evolution and Design of Institutions Y1 - 2006 SN - 9-78-0-415-37531-3 SP - 123 EP - 143 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Eger, Thomas ED - Apolte, Thomas T1 - Demokratische Strukturen und Einbindung in internationale Netzwerke als Voraussetzung für politische Reformen T2 - Voraussetzungen für grundlegende institutionelle Reformen Y1 - 2006 SN - 978-3-428-12062-8 SN - 3-428-12062-0 SP - 77 EP - 115 PB - Duncker & Humblot CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Schaltegger, Christoph A. ED - Schaltegger, Stefan T1 - Begünstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und -diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey Y1 - 2004 SN - 3-7281-2939-1 SP - 259 EP - 277 PB - vdf Hochschulverl. CY - Zürich ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco ED - Ebner, Alexander ED - Fornahl, Dirk T1 - Vielfalt in der Wirtschaftspolitik: Die Dahrendorf-Hypothese aus ökonomischer Sicht T2 - Institutioneller Wandel, Marktprozesse und dynamische Wirtschaftspolitik Y1 - 2004 SN - 3-89518-468-3 SP - 403 EP - 418 PB - Metropolis CY - Marburg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco T1 - Institutioneller Wandel in der EU: Der Fall der Osterweiterung T2 - Perspektiven des Wandels - Evolutorische Ökonomik in der Anwendung Y1 - 2002 SN - 3-89518-369-5 SN - 978-3-89518-369-0 SP - 373 EP - 413 PB - Metropolis CY - Marburg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Moss, Laurence S. T1 - New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective T2 - The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World Y1 - 2002 SN - 0-631-23497-7 SN - 0-631-23496-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1536-7150.00156 N1 - Reprint aus dem American Journal of Economics and Sociology SP - 193 EP - 214 PB - Blackwell Publishers CY - Malden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Büstorf, Guido ED - Cantner, Uwe ED - Hanusch, Horst ED - Huttner, Michael ED - Lorenz, Hans-Walter ED - Rahmeyer, Fritz T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies Y1 - 2013 SN - 978-3-319-01495-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8 N1 - Nachdruck des gleichnamigen Beitrages aus dem Journal of Evolutionary Economics SP - 187 EP - 207 PB - Springer CY - New York, NY [u.a.] ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Bremsen gegen EU-Zentralisierungsprozesse? Ökonomische Perspektiven T2 - Welche Chancen hat Subsidiarität in Europa? Y1 - 2014 SN - 978-3-86950-301-1 PB - Verlagsanstalt Handwerk CY - Düsseldorf ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan T1 - Die deutsche Schuldenbremse - ein institutioneller Fortschritt? T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) KW - Schuldenschranke (Nulldefizit) KW - Öffentliche Schulden KW - Public dept KW - Haushaltskonsolidierung KW - Fiscal consolidation KW - Finanzverfassung KW - Fiscal constitution KW - Verfassungsreform KW - Constitutional reform KW - Finanzbeziehungen KW - Fiscal relations KW - Finanzreform KW - Fiscal reform KW - Wirkungsanalyse KW - Impact assessment KW - Deutschland KW - Germany Y1 - 2009 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 38 IS - 10 SP - 512 EP - 518 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Das Finanzierungssystem der EU und die Nettozahlerdebatte T2 - Wirtschaftsdienst N2 - Die deutsche Nettozahlerposition innerhalb der EU wird in der öffentlichen Meinung häufig kritisch beurteilt. Wie funktioniert das Finanzierungssystem der EU? Worauf lässt sich die Auszahlungsstruktur zurückführen? Ist der Nutzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft allein anhand der Zahlungsströme zu messen? Y1 - 2007 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-007-0618-0 SN - 0043-6275 SN - 1613-978X VL - 87 IS - 2 SP - 114 EP - 120 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Ebner, Alexander ED - Heine, Klaus ED - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Öffentliches Unternehmertum und die Ökonomik der Reform T2 - Innovation zwischen Markt und Staat - Die institutionelle Dynamik wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-3-8329-2880-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845205694-2 SP - 117 EP - 133 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ET - 1. Auflage ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Marciano, Alain ED - Rosselin, Jean-Michel T1 - Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations T2 - Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-1-84720-126-3 SP - 192 EP - 220 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Effizienzgewinn oder Risiko: Eine Frage der Abwägung im Einzelfall T2 - ifo-Schnelldienst Y1 - 2006 SN - 0018-974X VL - 59 IS - 24 SP - 13 EP - 16 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Respektiert eine Politik des weichen Paternalismus die Autonomie individueller Konsumenten? Gutachten im Auftrag von Prometheus - das Freiheitsinstitut gGmbH, Berlin Y1 - 2016 PB - Fakultät für Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikroökonomie CY - Cottbus-Senftenberg ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Burret, Heiko A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Umsetzung des Fiskalpakts im Euro-Raum : Expertise im Auftrag des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Y1 - 2013 UR - http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/download/publikationen/arbeitspapier_08_2013.pdf PB - Statistisches Bundesamt CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Université Aix-Marseille Y1 - 2007 PB - Univ. CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Staatlicher Paternalismus durch nicht-staatliche Akteure: zum Beispiel die Marktwächter T2 - Verbraucherthemen im Visier Y1 - 2016 SN - 978-3-944610-28-3 SP - 20 EP - 21 PB - Novo Argumente Verlag CY - Frankfurt am Main ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2012 UR - http://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/taxation_in_europe_2012_-_iref_yearbook.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2011 UR - http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.irefeurope.org/ContentPages/2515413947.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2010 PB - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales CY - Marseille ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands T2 - Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2008 PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Armutszuwanderung und Transfersysteme T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) Y1 - 2014 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 43 IS - 2 SP - 63 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Brennstäbe für den Bundeshaushalt? T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) Y1 - 2010 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 39 IS - 10 SP - 473 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Ebner, Alexander: Innovation zwischen Markt und Staat : zur institutionellen Dynamik des wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerbs. - Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2008 JF - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Y1 - 2008 IS - 25.08.2008 SP - S. 10 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Köhler, Ekkehard T1 - Zurück zum Rubikon: Wie der Primat der Politik in der Eurozone wieder dauerhaft hergestellt werden kann T2 - Badische Zeitung Y1 - 2012 IS - 23.08.2012 ER -