TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Klinck, Fabian ED - Riesenhuber, Karl T1 - Verbraucherleitbilder aus ökonomischer Sicht T2 - Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplinäre und europäische Perspektiven Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-11-036339-5 SP - 53 EP - 72 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Backhaus, Jürgen G. T1 - Path-dependent rule evolution T2 - Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Schubert, Christian ED - Wangenheim, Georg von T1 - Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions T2 - The Evolution and Design of Institutions Y1 - 2006 SN - 9-78-0-415-37531-3 SP - 123 EP - 143 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Schaltegger, Christoph A. ED - Schaltegger, Stefan T1 - Begünstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und -diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey Y1 - 2004 SN - 3-7281-2939-1 SP - 259 EP - 277 PB - vdf Hochschulverl. CY - Zürich ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Moss, Laurence S. T1 - New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective T2 - The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World Y1 - 2002 SN - 0-631-23497-7 SN - 0-631-23496-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1536-7150.00156 N1 - Reprint aus dem American Journal of Economics and Sociology SP - 193 EP - 214 PB - Blackwell Publishers CY - Malden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Büstorf, Guido ED - Cantner, Uwe ED - Hanusch, Horst ED - Huttner, Michael ED - Lorenz, Hans-Walter ED - Rahmeyer, Fritz T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies Y1 - 2013 SN - 978-3-319-01495-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8 N1 - Nachdruck des gleichnamigen Beitrages aus dem Journal of Evolutionary Economics SP - 187 EP - 207 PB - Springer CY - New York, NY [u.a.] ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Ebner, Alexander ED - Heine, Klaus ED - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Öffentliches Unternehmertum und die Ökonomik der Reform T2 - Innovation zwischen Markt und Staat - Die institutionelle Dynamik wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-3-8329-2880-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845205694-2 SP - 117 EP - 133 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ET - 1. Auflage ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Marciano, Alain ED - Rosselin, Jean-Michel T1 - Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations T2 - Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-1-84720-126-3 SP - 192 EP - 220 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Alm, James ED - Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ED - Torgler, Benno T1 - Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance T2 - Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance N2 - This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity. KW - tax compliance KW - tax morale KW - tax evasion KW - reciprocity Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-0-415-57698-7 SN - 0-415-57698-9 SP - 56 EP - 73 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2012 UR - http://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/taxation_in_europe_2012_-_iref_yearbook.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER -