TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Sensitivity of Standard Library Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks in IHP 250 nm Technology T2 - Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6947-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134146 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Pérez, Eduardo A1 - Mahadevaiah, Mamathamba Kalishettyhalli A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Wenger, Christian A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Evaluation of the Sensitivity of RRAM Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks T2 - EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2020), Special Session: Architecture and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-7281-9535-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00047 SN - 978-1-7281-9536-0 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sorge, Roland A1 - Schaeffner, Jan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Radiation-Hard Registers T2 - Proc. 24th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2021), Special Session: Architectures and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA), 371 Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2106.07271 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Schaeffner, Jan A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klein, Dominik A1 - Freud, Sven A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Stealth attacks on PCBs: an experimental plausibility analysis T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR61664.2024.10679465 SP - 905 EP - 912 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Optical Fault Injection Attacks: Single-Mode versus Multi-Mode Laser T2 - Proc. 33rd Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-33-23 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Laser Fault Injection Attacks against IHP Chips T2 - Proc. 32. Crypto-Day Matters 2021, (2021) Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/cdm-2021-32-22 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Pérez, Eduardo A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Katzer, Jens A1 - Schäffner, Jan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Sensitivity of HfO2-based RRAM Cells to Laser Irradiation T2 - Microprocessors and Microsystems Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2021.104376 SN - 0141-9331 IS - 87 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya ED - Kotulski, Zbigniew T1 - Horizontal attack against EC kP accelerator under laser illumination T2 - Electronics N2 - Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator, while using different equipment for the measurement of its power traces, i.e., we performed the measurements using a current probe from Riscure and a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy, with an attack success of 70% and 90%, respectively. Our experiments showed that laser illumination increased the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption, but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks changed insignificantly. After applying 100% of the laser beam output power and illuminating the smallest area of 143 µm² , we observed an offset of 17 mV in the measured trace. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power, as well as concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current, can significantly improve the attack’s success. The attacks exploiting the Static Current under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel, and their potential has not yet been fully investigated. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in downscaling technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future. KW - Power analysis KW - Dynamic power KW - Static leakage power KW - Laser illumination Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14102072 SN - 2079-9292 VL - 14 IS - 10 SP - 1 EP - 21 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Sensitivity of logic cells to laser fault injections : an overview of experimental results for IHP technologies T2 - IEEE transactions on device and materials reliability N2 - In this work, we provide an overview of our front-side Fault Injection (FI) experiments with different logic cells manufactured in two IHP BiCMOS technologies using Riscure equipment for laser FIs. We were able to inject faults into different types of cells including standard library cells as well as into two types of radiation tolerant flip-flops. Experimenting with radiation-tolerant flip-flops faults were injected illuminating areas with PMOS transistors in OFF state. We determined the cells areas, which were sensitive to the laser FI attacks. Only few works discussed this aspect in the past determining NMOS transistors as the sensitive part of the logic cells. Knowledge about the areas which are sensitive to the laser FI attacks can be generalized experimenting with other technologies and used in future by designers to implement corresponding countermeasure(s) at the initial stage of chip development. KW - Laser fault injection attack KW - Radiation tolerant cells KW - Cell’s sensitive area Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/TDMR.2025.3596380 SN - 1530-4388 SN - 1558-2574 VL - 25 IS - 3 SP - 410 EP - 423 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Case study : horizontal side-channel analysis attack against elliptic curve scalar multiplication accelerator under laser illumination T2 - 2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) N2 - Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks was changed insignificantly. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power and concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current can improve the attack success significantly. The horizontal attacks against public key cryptosystems exploiting the Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel and their potential is not investigated yet. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in scaled technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future. KW - Security KW - Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) KW - Laser illumination KW - Power consumption KW - Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI) attacks Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963958 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER -