TY - CHAP A1 - Sojka, A. A1 - Piotrowski, Krzysztof A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Symbiosis on a Lightweight ECC Security and Distributed Shared Memory in Wireless Sensor Networks Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Stecklina, Oliver A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Menzel, Hannes T1 - Towards a Secure Address Space Separation for Low Power Sensor Nodes Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Stecklina, Oliver A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Ubiquitous Computing Asks for Ubiquitous Line of Defense Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Ortmann, Steffen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Telemedicine System for Improved Rehabilitation of Stroke Patients Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Ortmann, Steffen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - The Impact of Social Networks on User Privacy - What Social Networks Really Learn about their Users Y1 - 2011 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Jenihhin, Maksim A1 - Hamdioui, Said A1 - Sonza-Reorda, Matteo A1 - Krstic, Milos A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Sauer, Christian A1 - Klotz, Anton A1 - Hübner, Michael A1 - Nolte, Jörg A1 - Vierhaus, Heinrich Theodor A1 - Selimis, Georgions A1 - Alexandrescu, Dan A1 - Taouil, Mottaqiallah A1 - Schrijen, Geert-Jan A1 - Sterpone, Luca A1 - Squillero, Giovanni A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Raik, Jaan T1 - RESCUE: Interdependent Challenges of Reliability, Security and Quality in Nanoelectronic Systems T2 - ArXiv.org Y1 - 2019 UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.01561 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Sensitivity of Standard Library Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks in IHP 250 nm Technology T2 - Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6947-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134146 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Natarov, Roman A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Maksymyuk, O. A1 - Iegorova, O. A1 - Krishtal, Oleg A. A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Resilience Aspects in Distributed Wireless Electroencephalographic Sampling T2 - 2020 9th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6947-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134157 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Pérez, Eduardo A1 - Mahadevaiah, Mamathamba Kalishettyhalli A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Wenger, Christian A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Evaluation of the Sensitivity of RRAM Cells to Optical Fault Injection Attacks T2 - EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2020), Special Session: Architecture and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-7281-9535-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00047 SN - 978-1-7281-9536-0 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Vogel, Elisabeth A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - No Resilience without Security T2 - International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-Things (CPS & IoT 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6950-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134179 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Natarov, Roman A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Bohovyk, R. A1 - Fedoriuk, M. A1 - Isaev, Dmytro S. A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Maksymyuk, O. A1 - Krishtal, Oleg A. A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Artefacts in EEG Signals Epileptic Seizure Prediction using Edge Devices T2 - International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-Things (CPS & IoT 2020) Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-6949-1 SN - 978-1-7281-6950-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO49872.2020.9134076 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Flashback on Control Logic Injection Attacks against Programmable Logic Controllers T2 - Automation N2 - Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) make up a substantial part of critical infrastructures (CIs) and industrial control systems (ICSs). They are programmed with a control logic that defines how to drive and operate critical processes such as nuclear power plants, petrochemical factories, water treatment systems, and other facilities. Unfortunately, these devices are not fully secure and are prone to malicious threats, especially those exploiting vulnerabilities in the control logic of PLCs. Such threats are known as control logic injection attacks. They mainly aim at sabotaging physical processes controlled by exposed PLCs, causing catastrophic damage to target systems as shown by Stuxnet. Looking back over the last decade, many research endeavors exploring and discussing these threats have been published. In this article, we present a flashback on the recent works related to control logic injection attacks against PLCs. To this end, we provide the security research community with a new systematization based on the attacker techniques under three main attack scenarios. For each study presented in this work, we overview the attack strategies, tools, security goals, infected devices, and underlying vulnerabilities. Based on our analysis, we highlight the current security challenges in protecting PLCs from such severe attacks and suggest security recommendations for future research directions. KW - industrial control system KW - programmable logic controller KW - control logic injection attack KW - program injection KW - program modification Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/automation3040030 SN - 2673-4052 VL - 3 IS - 4 SP - 596 EP - 621 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Control Injection Attack against S7 PLCs -Manipulating the Decompiled Code T2 - IECON 2021 – 47th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-0256-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/IECON48115.2021.9589721 SN - 2577-1647 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sorge, Roland A1 - Schaeffner, Jan A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Radiation-Hard Registers T2 - Proc. 24th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design (DSD 2021), Special Session: Architectures and Hardware for Security Applications (AHSA), 371 Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2106.07271 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Klann, Dan A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Fast Dual-Field ECDSA Accelerator with Increased Resistance against Horizontal SCA Attacks T2 - 2021 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-0285-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR51186.2021.9527912 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kuba, Michael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Octopuses: Biological Facts and Technical Solutions T2 - 2021 10th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-2989-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO52532.2021.9459727 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Lehniger, Kai A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Schölzel, Mario A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Coarse-Grained Control Flow Integrity Check for Processors with Sliding Register Windows T2 - 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-2291-0 SN - 979-8-3503-2290-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154928 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - GPS-Spoofing Attack Detection Mechanism for UAV Swarms T2 - 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-2290-3 SN - 979-8-3503-2291-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154998 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Förster, Benjamin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Hinze, Thomas T1 - Novel Approach to a Plant Inspired Distributed Security Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks T2 - 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO), Budva, Montenegro, 2023 N2 - Energy efficiency is a key factor for the longevity of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Most representatives of the plants have evolved to be highly energy-efficient in their survival strategies, despite their limited resources. Plants have to deal with a variety of threats originating from different herbivores and microbial pathogens while handling a number of abiotic stress factors. For plants and WSNs, different defence mechanisms impose different fitness costs and therefore the costs and benefits have to be well-balanced. This way, plants are able to not only conquer a large variety of different attacks but also handle several different simultaneous attacks adequately. To react early and adapt to upcoming threats, plants within a network are capable of signalling each other within a certain distance about ongoing attacks. The biological strategies of plants in terms of signalling and defence, as well as their energy and resource limitations, share significant similarities with WSNs. This study aims to explore these similarities and demonstrates the correspondence between the biological concepts and WSNs. Additionally, we present a novel approach to enhancing security in WSNs through a cooperative distributed security scheme inspired by key factors of plant defence mechanisms, with the goal of reducing the energy constraints and maximising the longevity of the network. KW - Wireless sensor networks KW - Pathogens KW - Embedded computing KW - Cyber-physical systems Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-2291-0 SN - 979-8-3503-2290-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154949 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - You Are What You Attack: Breaking the Cryptographically-Protected S7 Protocol T2 - 19th International Conference on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS), (2023) N2 - S7 protocol defines an appropriate format for exchanging messages between SIMATIC S7 PLCs and their corresponding engineering software i.e., TIA Portal. Recently, Siemens has provided its newer PLC models and their proprietary S7 protocols with a very developed and sophisticated integrity check mechanism to protect them from various exploits e.g., replay attacks. This paper addresses exactly this point, and investigates the security of the most developed integrity check mechanism that the newest S7CommPlus protocol version implements. Our results showed that the latest S7 PLC models as well as their related protocols are still vulnerable. We found that adversaries can manipulate two hashes that play a significant role in generating keys and bytes for the encryption processes implemented in the S7CommPlus protocol. This allows to reproduce S7 packets and conduct several attacks that eventually impact the operation of the target PLC and the entire physical process it controls. To validate our findings, we test all the attack scenarios presented in this work on a cryptographically protected S7 PLC from the 1500 family which uses the S7CommPlusV3 protocol. KW - Protocols KW - Process control KW - S7 Protocol KW - Industrial Control Systems Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-6654-6432-1 SN - 978-1-6654-6433-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/WFCS57264.2023.10144251 SN - 2835-8414 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Shamilyan, Oxana A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sudakov, Oleksandr A1 - Cherninskyi, Andrii A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Intelligence and Motion Models of Continuum Robots: an Overview T2 - IEEE Access N2 - Many technical solutions are bio-inspired. Octopus-inspired robotic arms belong to continuum robots which are used in minimally invasive surgery or for technical system restoration in areas difficult-to-access. Continuum robot missions are bounded with their motions, whereby the motion of the robots is controlled by humans via wireless communication. In case of a lost connection, robot autonomy is required. Distributed control and distributed decision-making mechanisms based on artificial intelligence approaches can be a promising solution to achieve autonomy of technical systems and to increase their resilience. However these methods are not well investigated yet. Octopuses are the living example of natural distributed intelligence but their learning and decision-making mechanisms are also not fully investigated and understood yet. Our major interest is investigating mechanisms of Distributed Artificial Intelligence as a basis for improving resilience of complex systems. We decided to use a physical continuum robot prototype that is able to perform some basic movements for our research. The idea is to research how a technical system can be empowered to combine movements into sequences of motions by itself. For the experimental investigations a suitable physical prototype has to be selected, its motion control has to be implemented and automated. In this paper, we give an overview combining different fields of research, such as Distributed Artificial Intelligence and continuum robots based on 98 publications. We provide a detailed description of the basic motion control models of continuum robots based on the literature reviewed, discuss different aspects of autonomy and give an overview of physical prototypes of continuum robots. KW - Robots KW - Artificial intelligence KW - Resilience KW - Continuum robots Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3286300 SN - 2169-3536 IS - 11 SP - 60988 EP - 61003 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Förster, Benjamin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Hinze, Thomas T1 - Determining Distributions of Security Means for Wireless Sensor Networks based on the Model of a Neighbourhood Watch T2 - arXiv N2 - Neighbourhood watch is a concept that allows a community to distribute a complex security task in between all members. Members of the community carry out individual security tasks to contribute to the overall security of it. It reduces the workload of a particular individual while securing all members and allowing them to carry out a multitude of security tasks. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of resource-constraint independent battery driven computers as nodes communicating wirelessly. Security in WSNs is essential. Without sufficient security, an attacker is able to eavesdrop the communication, tamper monitoring results or deny critical nodes providing their service in a way to cut off larger network parts. The resource-constraint nature of sensor nodes prevents them from running full-fledged security protocols. Instead, it is necessary to assess the most significant security threats and implement specialised protocols. A neighbourhood-watch inspired distributed security scheme for WSNs has been introduced by Langend\"orfer. Its goal is to increase the variety of attacks a WSN can fend off. A framework of such complexity has to be designed in multiple steps. Here, we introduce an approach to determine distributions of security means on large-scale static homogeneous WSNs. Therefore, we model WSNs as undirected graphs in which two nodes connected iff they are in transmission range. The framework aims to partition the graph into $n$ distinct security means resulting in the targeted distribution. The underlying problems turn out to be NP hard and we attempt to solve them using linear programs (LPs). To evaluate the computability of the LPs, we generate large numbers of random {\lambda}-precision unit disk graphs (UDGs) as representation of WSNs. For this purpose, we introduce a novel {\lambda}-precision UDG generator to model WSNs with a minimal distance in between nodes. Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2212.09050 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Amogbonjaye, Samuel A1 - Urrego, Diego A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Stealthy False Command Injection Attack on Modbus based SCADA Systems T2 - 20th Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC), (2023) N2 - Modbus is a widely-used industrial protocol in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for different purposes such as controlling remote devices, monitoring physical processes, data acquisition, etc. Unfortunately, such a protocol lacks security means i.e., authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. This has exposed industrial plants using the Modbus protocol and made them attractive to malicious adversaries who could perform various kinds of cyber-attacks causing significant consequences as Stuxnet showed. In this paper, we exploit the insecurity of the Modbus protocol and perform a stealthy false command injection scenario concealing our injection from the SCADA operator. Our attack approach is comprised of two main phases: 1) Pre-attack phase (offline) where an attacker sniffs, collects and stores sufficient valid request-response pairs in a database, 2) Attack phase (online) where the attacker performs false command injection and conceals his injection by replaying a valid response from his database upon each request sent from the HMI user. Such a scenario is quite severe and might cause disastrous damages in SCADA systems and critical infrastructures if it is successfully implemented by malicious adversaries. Finally, we suggest some appropriate mitigation solutions to prevent such a serious threat. KW - Performance evaluation KW - SCADA systems KW - Command Injection Attacks KW - Industrial plants Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-6654-9734-3 SN - 978-1-6654-9735-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC51644.2023.10059804 SN - 2331-9860 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Vulnerability of Atomic Patterns to Simple SCA T2 - 19th IEEE East-West Design & Test Symposium (EWDTS 2023), (2023) N2 - In this work we discuss the vulnerability of atomic pattern algorithms for elliptic curve point multiplication against simple side-channel analysis attacks using our own implementation as an example. One of the assumptions, on which the atomicity principle is based, is the indistinguishability of operations with different registers, i.e. storing of the data into two different registers cannot be distinguished if their old and new data values are the same. But before the data can be stored in a register/block, this register/block has to be addressed for storing the data. Different registers/blocks have different addresses. The key-dependent addressing of registers/blocks is an inherent feature of the binary kP algorithms and allows to reveal the key k. In our work we demonstrated it. This means that the main assumption, that addressing of different registers/blocks is an indistinguishable operation, may no longer be applied when realizing kP implementations, at least not for hardware implementations. KW - Elliptic curves KW - NIST KW - Elliptic curve cryptography KW - Atomicity principle KW - Side-channel Analysis (SCA) KW - Simple Power Analysis (SPA) KW - Horizontal attacks KW - Address-bit attacks Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-1484-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/EWDTS59469.2023.10297074 SN - 2472-761X ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Security of Programmable Logic Controllers and Related Systems: Today and Tomorrow T2 - IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society N2 - Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are indispensable in critical infrastructures and industrial control systems. The increasing demand for enhanced cost-effectiveness and production efficiency has driven automation manufacturers to integrate PLC-based applications and systems with external networks, such as Internet. Unfortunately, this connectivity has exposed systems to potential malicious attacks from motivated adversaries. Addressing this pressing issue necessitates a comprehensive summary of ongoing research related to PLCs and their related systems. This summary should classify these systems based on disclosed vulnerabilities, potential threats, and proposed security solutions, catering to both scientists and industrial engineers. While several recent surveys have reviewed and discussed PLC security and related topics, they often fell short of covering all essential aspects comprehensively. Furthermore, prior surveys tended to focus on analyzing vulnerabilities at the system level, overlooking the vulnerabilities specific to PLCs themselves. Consequently, their findings failed to effectively secure current operational systems or propose improved solutions for future PLC designs. In this article, we bridge this research gap by providing a detailed review of all aspects concerning the security of PLCs and related systems. This includes vulnerabilities, potential attacks, and security solutions including digital forensics. We aim to offer a precise analysis, addressing the shortcomings of previous studies. Finally, we conclude this article by presenting our recommendations tailored for PLC manufacturers, researchers, and engineers. We hope that these recommendations will contribute to the development of more secure PLCs in the future. KW - Digital forensics KW - Programmable logic devices KW - Cyberattacks KW - Cybersecurity KW - Microprogramming Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/OJIES.2023.3335976 SN - 2644-1284 IS - 4 SP - 659 EP - 693 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Haddadi Esfahani, Ali A1 - Maye, Oliver A1 - Frohberg, Max A1 - Speh, Maria A1 - Jöbges, Michael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Machine Learning based Real Time Detection of Freezing of Gait of Parkinson Patients Running on a Body Worn Device T2 - IEEE/ACM international conference on Connected Health: Applications, Systems and Engineering Technologies (CHASE 2023), 181 (2023) N2 - For those who have Parkinson's disease, one of the most incapacitating symptoms is Freezing of Gait (FOG). Gait impairment and disruptions limit everyday activities and reduce quality of daily life along with the increase in the risk of falling [1]. Thanks to recent advancement in embedded electronics and sensors as well as their adaptation in the wearable device market, low power devices are becoming more and more capable running neural networks. This enables researchers to implement complex models on wearable devices that capture and analyze sensor data to detect FOGin real-time. KW - Parkinson's disease KW - Wearable computers KW - Neural networks KW - Machine learning KW - Real-time systems Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-4007-0102-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3580252.3589423 SN - 2832-2975 SP - 181 EP - 182 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - No Attacks Are Available: Securing the OpenPLC and Related Systems T2 - 8th GI/ACM Workshop on Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS WS 2023), 2085 (2023) N2 - The use of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) expands in industrial domains, which makes ensuring the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) become paramount. The OpenPLC project, the first open-source initiative, provides flexible and cost-effective PLC solutions to build up affordable test-beds, as well as conduct experiments and academic researches. This project has wildly grown in the last few years, thus it is essential to address the most emerging security challenges it encounters. This paper introduces a new OpenPLC architecture, called OpenPLC Aqua, provided with a set of security solutions designed specifically to overcome the vulnerabilities that the current OpenPLC versions are prone to. The new OpenPLC architecture includes four security features: 1) user credentials encryption, securing the Webserver, Whitelisting and secure SSL/TLS communication channel. The OpenPLC Aqua software was tested against several attack scenarios, that were feasible against the old OpenPLC versions. Our experimental results showed our enhanced OpenPLC software is secure and resistant against several attack scenarios e.g., authentication, injection, Man-in-the-Middle and replay attacks. The OpenPLC Aqua is publicly available and a proof of concept demo is also published with this paper. KW - OpenPLC KW - Seucrity Solutions KW - Industrial Control Systems KW - Mitigation Solutions Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24570.47043 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Lehniger, Kai A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Window Canaries: Re-Thinking Stack Canaries for Architectures With Register Windows T2 - IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing N2 - his paper presents Window Canaries, a novel approach to Stack Canaries for architectures with a register window that protects return addresses and stack pointers without the need of adding additional instruction to each potentially vulnerable function. Instead, placement and check of the canary word is moved to window exception handlers that are responsible to handle register window overflows and underflows. The approach offers low performance overhead while guaranteeing that return addresses are protected by stack buffer overflows without relying on a heuristic that decides which functions to instrument. The contributions of this paper are a complete implementation of the approach for the Xtensa LX architecture with register window option as well as a performance evaluation and discussion of advantages and drawbacks. KW - Buffer overflows KW - Computer architecture KW - stack canaries KW - Xtensa architecture Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2022.3230748 SN - 1941-0018 SN - 1545-5971 VL - 20 IS - 6 SP - 4637 EP - 4647 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Kornemann, Stephan A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Hermann, Erik T1 - Information Security: The Cornerstone for Surviving the Digital Wild T2 - The Future of Smart Production for SMEs: A Methodological and Practical Approach Towards Digitalization in SMEs N2 - In this chapter we are discussing the very basics in the sense of how to prepare your company with respect to security. The essential issues are a proper information security governance framework that takes into account the managerial and organizational issues as well as proper technical means. For the latter we introduce network separation as this is one of the prime means to protect your production network from network based attacks. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-031-15428-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15428-7_29 SP - 335 EP - 341 PB - Springer International Publishing CY - Cham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Assafo, Maryam A1 - Lautsch, Martin A1 - Suawa, Priscile Fogou A1 - Jongmanns, Marcel A1 - Hübner, Michael A1 - Reichenbach, Marc A1 - Brockmann, Carsten A1 - Reinhardt, Denis A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - The ForTune Toolbox: Building Solutions for Condition-Based and Predictive Maintenance Focusing on Retrofitting Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-8007-6204-0 SN - 978-3-8007-6203-3 N1 - Poster, Tagungsband MikroSystemTechnik Kongress 2023, Dresden, 23. - 25. Oktober 2023 SP - S. 541 PB - VDE Verlag CY - Berlin ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Sklavos, Nicolas A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Successful Simple Side Channel Analysis: Vulnerability of an Atomic Pattern kP Algorithm Implemented with a Constant Time Crypto Library to Simple Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks T2 - 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2023), 167 (2023) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-2291-0 SN - 979-8-3503-2290-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154940 SN - 2637-9511 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Randomized Addressing Countermeasures are Inefficient against Address-Bit SCA T2 - IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR 2023), 580 (2023) Y1 - 2023 SN - 979-8-3503-1170-9 SN - 979-8-3503-1171-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224968 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Good Night, and Good Luck: A Control Logic Injection Attack on OpenPLC T2 - Proc. 49th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society (IECON 2023), (2023) Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32913.20321 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Lehniger, Kai A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Through the Window: Exploitation and Countermeasures of the ESP32 Register Window Overflow T2 - Future Internet N2 - With the increasing popularity of IoT (Internet-of-Things) devices, their security becomes an increasingly important issue. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities have been known for decades, but are still relevant, especially for embedded devices where certain security measures cannot be implemented due to hardware restrictions or simply due to their impact on performance. Therefore, many buffer overflow detection mechanisms check for overflows only before critical data are used. All data that an attacker could use for his own purposes can be considered critical. It is, therefore, essential that all critical data are checked between writing a buffer and its usage. This paper presents a vulnerability of the ESP32 microcontroller, used in millions of IoT devices, that is based on a pointer that is not protected by classic buffer overflow detection mechanisms such as Stack Canaries or Shadow Stacks. This paper discusses the implications of vulnerability and presents mitigation techniques, including a patch, that fixes the vulnerability. The overhead of the patch is evaluated using simulation as well as an ESP32-WROVER-E development board. We showed that, in the simulation with 32 general-purpose registers, the overhead for the CoreMark benchmark ranges between 0.1% and 0.4%. On the ESP32, which uses an Xtensa LX6 core with 64 general-purpose registers, the overhead went down to below 0.01%. A worst-case scenario, modeled by a synthetic benchmark, showed overheads up to 9.68%. KW - Xtensa KW - Buffer overflow KW - return-oriented prgramming Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15060217 SN - 1999-5903 VL - 15 IS - 6 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Non-Profiled Unsupervised Horizontal Iterative Attack against Hardware Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication Using Machine Learning T2 - Future Internet N2 - While IoT technology makes industries, cities, and homes smarter, it also opens the door to security risks. With the right equipment and physical access to the devices, the attacker can leverage side-channel information, like timing, power consumption, or electromagnetic emanation, to compromise cryptographic operations and extract the secret key. This work presents a side channel analysis of a cryptographic hardware accelerator for the Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication operation, implemented in a Field-Programmable Gate Array and as an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit. The presented framework consists of initial key extraction using a state-of-the-art statistical horizontal attack and is followed by regularized Artificial Neural Networks, which take, as input, the partially incorrect key guesses from the horizontal attack and correct them iteratively. The initial correctness of the horizontal attack, measured as the fraction of correctly extracted bits of the secret key, was improved from 75% to 98% by applying the iterative learning. KW - side channel analysis KW - machine learning KW - horizontal attack KW - non-profiled attack KW - FPGA KW - ASIC Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16020045 SN - 1999-5903 VL - 16 IS - 2 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Förster, Benjamin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Hinze, Thomas T1 - Determining Distributions of Security Means for WSNs Based on the Model of a Neighborhood Watch T2 - IEEE Access Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3404816 SN - 2169-3536 VL - 12 SP - 74343 EP - 74366 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ER - TY - GEN A1 - Aftowicz, Marcin A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Advantages of unsupervised learning analysis methods in single-trace SCA attacks T2 - Microprocessors and Microsystems Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2023.104994 SN - 0141-9331 VL - 105 PB - Elsevier BV ER - TY - GEN A1 - Lehniger, Kai A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - StackSpecter: detecting stack buffer overflows for the Xtensa architecture T2 - 2024 34th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ITNAC62915.2024.10815333 SP - 1 EP - 7 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Chitauro, Ronald A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Yener, Onur A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Out of distribution generalization: KPI vs spectrogram based jamming classification in 5G T2 - 2024 International Conference on Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks (SoftCOM) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.23919/SoftCOM62040.2024.10721712 SP - 1 EP - 6 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Patil, Nitin Sanjay A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Beyond the lens: false data injection attacks on IIoT-cameras through MQTT manipulation T2 - 2024 7th Conference on Cloud and Internet of Things (CIoT) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CIoT63799.2024.10757025 SP - 1 EP - 7 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Schaeffner, Jan A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Klein, Dominik A1 - Freud, Sven A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Stealth attacks on PCBs: an experimental plausibility analysis T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR61664.2024.10679465 SP - 905 EP - 912 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Patil, Nitin Sanjay A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Hacking the backbone : shell reverse attacks on IIoT systems T2 - 21st International Conference on Embedded Wireless Systems and Networks (EWSN) N2 - As Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems expand , they face growing risks from complex cyber threats, including reverse shell attacks. These attacks exploit IIoT vulnerabilities, allowing unauthorized remote access and endangering industrial operations. This paper explores reverse shell attacks, where adversaries trick operators into unwittingly installing malware on IIoT devices. This malware then establishes hidden connections to the attacker's server, bypassing traditional firewalls. Exploiting command injection vulnerabilities on IIoT servers facilitates the deployment of reverse shell scripts, granting attackers persistent and covert system access. Our research focuses on IIoT device authentication, identifying weak credentials and using brute force attacks for initial access. We also demonstrate deploying Python-based reverse shell payloads via the SFTP protocol, creating lasting connections to the attacker's server. Through experiments with the Fischertechnik Learning Factory 4.0, we show how reverse shell payloads disrupt operations, enabling unauthorized commands and data theft. To counter these threats, we advocate for robust security measures like network segmentation, rigorous patch management, and advanced intrusion detection systems. All our attack codes and a proof-of-concept are publicly accessible. Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.23097.79207 SP - 1 EP - 7 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Chitauro, Ronald A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Yener, Onur A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Real-time jamming detection, classification and logging using computer vision in 5G private networks T2 - 2024 19th International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems (ISWCS) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ISWCS61526.2024.10639080 SP - 1 EP - 6 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis-Aikaterini A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Static power consumption as a new side-channel analysis threat to elliptic curve cryptography implementations T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR61664.2024.10679507 SP - 884 EP - 889 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Assafo, Maryam A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Unsupervised and semisupervised machine learning frameworks for multiclass tool wear recognition T2 - IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/OJIES.2024.3455264 SN - 2644-1284 VL - 5 (2024) SP - 993 EP - 1010 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ER - TY - GEN A1 - Vogel, Elisabeth A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Enhancing Cyber-Resilience in Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems: A Methodical Approach T2 - Posters : iCCC2024 - iCampµs Cottbus Conference 2024-05-14 - 2024-05-16 Cottbus Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5162/iCCC2024/P10 SP - 146 EP - 149 PB - AMA Service GmbH CY - Von-Münchhausen-Str. 49, 31515 Wunstorf, Germany ER - TY - GEN A1 - Lehniger, Kai A1 - Raghunathan, Shuba Pradha A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - WindowGuardian: return address integrity for ESP32 microcontrollers with Xtensa Processors using AES and register Windows T2 - 2024 13th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO62516.2024.10577840 SP - 1 EP - 8 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mykytyn, Pavlo A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Towards secure and reliable heterogeneous real-time telemetry communication in autonomous UAV swarms T2 - Poster : iCCC2024 - iCampµs Cottbus Conference 2024-05-14 - 2024-05-16 Cottbus Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5162/iCCC2024/P15 SP - 222 EP - 225 PB - AMA Service GmbH CY - Von-Münchhausen-Str. 49, 31515 Wunstorf, Germany ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Silent sabotage : a stealthy control logic injection in IIoT systems T2 - 5th Silicon Valley Cybersecurity Conference (SVCC 2024) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/SVCC61185.2024.10637363 SP - 1 EP - 8 PB - IEEE CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Haddadi Esfahani, Ali A1 - Maye, Oliver A1 - Frohberg, Max A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Minimizing the latency of freezing of gait detection on wearable devices T2 - Vorträge : iCCC2024 - iCampµs Cottbus Conference 2024-05-14 - 2024-05-16 Cottbus Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5162/iCCC2024/2.2 SP - 49 EP - 52 PB - AMA Service GmbH CY - Von-Münchhausen-Str. 49, 31515 Wunstorf, Germany ER - TY - GEN A1 - Förster, Benjamin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Hinze, Thomas T1 - Security mean distribution in WSNs for cooperative schemes T2 - Vorträge : iCCC2024 - iCampµs Cottbus Conference 2024-05-14 - 2024-05-16 Cottbus Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5162/iCCC2024/1.2 SP - 38 EP - 41 PB - AMA Service GmbH CY - Von-Münchhausen-Str. 49, 31515 Wunstorf, Germany ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Investigating the security of OpenPLC : vulnerabilities, attacks, and mitigation solutions T2 - IEEE Access Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3356051 SN - 2169-3536 VL - 12 SP - 11561 EP - 11583 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ER -