TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Exploiting static power consumption in side-channel analysis T2 - 2024 IEEE 25th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS62223.2024.10534604 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya ED - Kotulski, Zbigniew T1 - Horizontal attack against EC kP accelerator under laser illumination T2 - Electronics N2 - Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator, while using different equipment for the measurement of its power traces, i.e., we performed the measurements using a current probe from Riscure and a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy, with an attack success of 70% and 90%, respectively. Our experiments showed that laser illumination increased the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption, but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks changed insignificantly. After applying 100% of the laser beam output power and illuminating the smallest area of 143 µm² , we observed an offset of 17 mV in the measured trace. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power, as well as concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current, can significantly improve the attack’s success. The attacks exploiting the Static Current under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel, and their potential has not yet been fully investigated. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in downscaling technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future. KW - Power analysis KW - Dynamic power KW - Static leakage power KW - Laser illumination Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14102072 SN - 2079-9292 VL - 14 IS - 10 SP - 1 EP - 21 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - GEN A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Brzozowski, Marcin A1 - Panic, Goran A1 - Calligaro, Cristiano A1 - Krstic, Milos A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter T1 - On the influence of cell libraries and other parameters to SCA resistance of crypto IP cores T2 - 2024 13th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO) N2 - The ever-growing complexity of modern systems as well as the shrinking time to market enforces the use of already designed hardware components i.e. hard and soft IP cores. The fact that also requirements with respect to security significantly increased and that side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks are meanwhile a well-known threat it is paramount to ensure SCA resistance of ASICs and FPGA implementations derived from cryptographic IP cores. This requires to evaluate this feature for each IP core and target technology even down to the level of the cell library. The experiments reported here clearly show that the three available cell libraries even though developed for the same 130nm technology of IHP exhibit different sensitivity to SCA attacks ranging from quite resistant to very vulnerable. KW - Cryptographic IP cores KW - Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) KW - Side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks KW - SCA resistance KW - Differential power analysis (DPA) KW - Horizontal attacks Y1 - 2024 SN - 979-8-3503-8756-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO62516.2024.10577776 SP - 1 EP - 5 PB - IEEE CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - On the SCA resistance of TMR-protected cryptographic designs T2 - Electronics N2 - The influence of redundant implementations on success of physical attacks against cryptographic devices is currently under-researched. This is especially an issue in application fields such as wearable health, industrial control systems and the like in which devices are accessible to potential attackers. This paper presents results of an investigation of the TMR application impact on the vulnerability of FPGA-based asymmetric cryptographic accelerators to side-channel analysis attacks. We implemented our cryptographic cores using full- and partial-TMR application approaches and experimentally conducted evaluation of their side-channel resistance. Our results reveal that TMR can significantly impact side-channel leakage, either increasing resistance by introducing noise or amplifying leakage depending on the part of the design where redundancy was applied. KW - Triple modular redundancy KW - TMR KW - Side-channel analysis attacks KW - SCA; Cryptographic hardware KW - FPGA security KW - Fault tolerance KW - Hardware redundancy KW - Physical attacks KW - Secure design KW - Elliptic curve cryptosystems Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14163318 SN - 2079-9292 VL - 14 IS - 16 SP - 1 EP - 15 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Impact of thermal effects on cryptographic resilience : a study of an ASIC implementation of the Montgomery ladder T2 - 2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) N2 - The side-channel attack resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms can vary significantly with operating parameters, such as operating voltage, clock frequency, temperature, etc. This study investigates the influence of temperature on the resilience of an ASIC implementation of the Montgomery ladder against SCA. We conducted a series of experiments to evaluate how varying temperature conditions impact the resistance of our ASIC to horizontal attacks. Our results reveal that in contrast to the state-of-the-art approach of increasing the operating temperature, operating under sub-zero temperatures can result in increased vulnerability to side-channel attacks compared to high temperature experiments. We present a detailed analysis of the thermal sensitivity of our ASIC, correlating specific temperature ranges with potential security degradation. KW - Side-channel analysis KW - SCA KW - Static power KW - Static current KW - Leakage current KW - Leakage current attacks KW - Leakage power analysis (LPA) KW - Attacks exploiting static current KW - Operating parameters KW - Thermal sensitivity horizontal attacks KW - ECC KW - Montgomery Ladder KW - Static current SCA Y1 - 2025 SN - 978-1-6654-7763-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963949 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis Aikaterini A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Li, Sze Hei A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Kabin, Ievgen T1 - Revisiting atomic patterns for elliptic curve scalar multiplication revealing inherent vulnerability to simple SCA T2 - 2025 12th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS) N2 - Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication, denoted as kP operation, is the basic operation in all Elliptic Curve-based cryptographic protocols. The atomicity principle and different atomic patterns for kP algorithms were proposed in the past as countermeasures against simple side-channel analysis. In this work, we investigated the resistance of a kP algorithm implemented in hardware using Longa’s atomic patterns. We analysed its simulated power trace. We show in the example of our kP implementation for the NIST EC P-256 that the field squaring operations are distinguishable from the field multiplications even if they are performed by the same field multiplier, due to the addressing of the second multiplicand. This inherent vulnerability of atomic patterns can be successfully exploited to reveal the scalar k. KW - Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) KW - kP KW - Atomic patterns KW - Simple Power Analysis (SPA) KW - Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks KW - Longa’s atomic patterns Y1 - 2025 SN - 979-8-3315-5276-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/NTMS65597.2025.11076762 SP - 252 EP - 258 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petryk, Dmytro A1 - Kabin, Ievgen A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Dyka, Zoya T1 - Case study : horizontal side-channel analysis attack against elliptic curve scalar multiplication accelerator under laser illumination T2 - 2025 IEEE 26th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS) N2 - Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks was changed insignificantly. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power and concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current can improve the attack success significantly. The horizontal attacks against public key cryptosystems exploiting the Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel and their potential is not investigated yet. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in scaled technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future. KW - Security KW - Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) KW - Laser illumination KW - Power consumption KW - Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI) attacks Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963958 SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sigourou, Alkistis Aikaterini A1 - Dyka, Zoya A1 - Langendoerfer, Peter A1 - Kabin, Ievgen T1 - Atomic patterns : field operation distinguishability on cryptographic ASICs T2 - 2025 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) N2 - Scalar multiplication kP is the most frequently attacked operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) protocols. To counter simple Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), the atomicity principle and various atomic block constructions have been proposed in the past. In this paper, we demonstrate that binary kP algorithms based on atomic patterns remain vulnerable to simple SCA, due to different energy consumption of the field multiplier while obtaining the second multiplicand for field multiplication or squaring operations. The reasons for this difference are the data-bit as well as the address-bit effects. Please note, this leakage does not depend on the multiplication formula used. We validate this vulnerability through experiments using Longa’s atomic patterns, revealing that such leakage significantly compromises the SCA resistance of numerous atomic implementations and facilitates potential key extraction. We conclude by providing some potential solutions to mitigate the revealed vulnerability. Y1 - 2025 SN - 979-8-3315-3591-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR64739.2025.11130154 SP - 990 EP - 995 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) CY - Piscataway, NJ ER -