TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - POSTER: Fingerprinting Tor Hidden Services T2 - In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '16). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA Y1 - 2016 SN - 978-1-4503-4139-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2989054 SP - 1766 EP - 1768 PB - ACM CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Reuter, Sebastian A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing T2 - Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (Poster) (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019 N2 - Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888029 SN - 978-1-7281-2700-2 SN - 978-1-7281-2701-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888029 SN - 2643-3303 SN - 1092-1648 PB - IEEE Press ER -