TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas T1 - The state of affairs in BGP security: A survey of attacks and defenses T2 - Computer Communications Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2018.04.013 SN - 0140-3664 VL - 124 SP - 45 EP - 60 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Moreno, José Miguel A1 - Pastrana, Sergio A1 - Reelfs, Jens Helge A1 - Vallina, Pelayo A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Smaragdakis, Georgios A1 - Hohlfeld, Oliver A1 - Vallina-Rodriguez, Narseo A1 - Tapiador, Juan T1 - Reviewing War: Unconventional User Reviews as a Side Channel to Circumvent Information Controls N2 - During the first days of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s media regulator blocked access to many global social media platforms and news sites, including Twitter, Facebook, and the BBC. To bypass the information controls set by Russian authorities, pro-Ukrainian groups explored unconventional ways to reach out to the Russian population, such as posting war-related content in the user reviews of Russian business available on Google Maps or Tripadvisor. This paper provides a first analysis of this new phenomenon by analyzing the creative strategies to avoid state censorship. Specifically, we analyze reviews posted on these platforms from the beginning of the conflict to September 2022. We measure the channeling of war messages through user reviews in Tripadvisor and Google Maps, as well as in VK, a popular Russian social network. Our analysis of the content posted on these services reveals that users leveraged these platforms to seek and exchange humanitarian and travel advice, but also to disseminate disinformation and polarized messages. Finally, we analyze the response of platforms in terms of content moderation and their impact. KW - Side Channels KW - Disinformation KW - Propaganda KW - User-Generated Content KW - Russia KW - Ukraine KW - Tripadvisor KW - Google Maps KW - VKontakte Y1 - 2023 UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.00598 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.00598 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Buscemi, Alessio A1 - Turcanu, Ion A1 - Castignani, German A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Shin, Kang G. T1 - A Survey on Controller Area Network Reverse Engineering T2 - IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials N2 - Controller Area Network (CAN) is a masterless serial bus designed and widely used for the exchange of mission and time-critical information within commercial vehicles. In-vehicle communication is based on messages sent and received by Electronic Control Units (ECUs) connected to this serial bus network. Although unencrypted, CAN messages are not easy to interpret. In fact, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) attempt to achieve security through obscurity by encoding the data in their proprietary format, which is kept secret from the general public. As a result, the only way to obtain clear data is to reverse engineer CAN messages. Driven by the need for in-vehicle message interpretation, which is highly valuable in the automotive industry, researchers and companies have been working to make this process automated, fast, and standardized. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of the state of the art and summarize the major advances in CAN bus reverse engineering. We are the first to provide a taxonomy of CAN tokenization and translation techniques. Based on the reviewed literature, we highlight an important issue: the lack of a public and standardized dataset for the quantitative evaluation of translation algorithms. In response, we define a complete set of requirements for standardizing the data collection process. We also investigate the risks associated with the automation of CAN reverse engineering, in particular with respect to the security network and the safety and privacy of drivers and passengers. Finally, we discuss future research directions in CAN reverse engineering. KW - Can bus KW - reverse engineering KW - security KW - connected Vechiles Y1 - 2023 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10092880 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2023.3264928 SN - 1553-877X VL - 25 IS - 3,3 SP - 1445 EP - 1481 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Alexandrova, Marharyta A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Security and Performance Implications of BGP Rerouting-resistant Guard Selection Algorithms for Tor T2 - Computers and Security N2 - Tor is the most popular anonymization network with millions of daily users. This makes it an attractive target for attacks, e.g., by malicious autonomous systems (ASs) performing active routing attacks to become man in the middle and deanonymize users. It was shown that the number of such malicious ASs is significantly larger than previously expected due to the lack of security guarantees in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In response, recent works suggest alternative Tor path selection methods preferring Tor nodes with higher resilience to active BGP attacks. In this work, we analyze the implications of such proposals and demonstrate that two state-of-the-art path selection methods, namely Counter-RAPTOR and DPSelect, are not as secure as thought before. First, we show that DPSelect achieves only one third of its originally claimed resilience and, thus, is not as resilient as widely accepted. Second, we reveal that the resilience to active BGP attacks on the way back, i.e., from the first anonymization node to a given Tor user, provided by both methods is significantly lower than on the forward path. Beside their lower resilience in specific cases, we show that for particular users the usage of Counter-RAPTOR and DPSelect also leads to leakage of user’s location. Furthermore, we uncover the performance implications of both methods and identify scenarios where their usage leads to significant performance bottlenecks. Finally, we propose a new metric to quantify the user’s location leakage by path selection. Using this metric and performing large-scale analysis, we show to which extent a malicious Tor middle node can fingerprint the user’s location and the confidence it can achieve. Our findings shed light on the implications of path selection methods on the users’ anonymity and the need for further research. KW - BGP routing attacks KW - Tor KW - Onion routing KW - Privacy KW - Traffic analysis Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103374 SN - 1872-6208 SN - 0167-4048 VL - 132 ER -