TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - POSTER: Fingerprinting Tor Hidden Services T2 - In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '16). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA Y1 - 2016 SN - 978-1-4503-4139-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2989054 SP - 1766 EP - 1768 PB - ACM CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas T1 - The state of affairs in BGP security: A survey of attacks and defenses T2 - Computer Communications Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2018.04.013 SN - 0140-3664 VL - 124 SP - 45 EP - 60 ER - TY - GEN A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Kaiser, Daniel A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas ED - Foley, Simon N. T1 - Analysis of Multi-path Onion Routing-based Anonymization Networks T2 - Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXXIII : 33rd Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Conference, DBSec 2019, Charleston, SC, USA, July 15–17, 2019, Proceedings Y1 - 2019 UR - https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-030-22479-0 SN - 978-3-030-22478-3 SN - 978-3-030-22479-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22479-0_13 SN - 0302-9743 SN - 1611-3349 SP - 240 EP - 258 PB - Springer CY - Frankfurt am Main ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Reuter, Sebastian A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing T2 - Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (Poster) (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019 N2 - Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888029 SN - 978-1-7281-2700-2 SN - 978-1-7281-2701-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888029 SN - 2643-3303 SN - 1092-1648 PB - IEEE Press ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Panchenko, Andriy ED - Reinhardt, Delphine ED - Langweg, Hanno ED - Witt, Bernhard C. ED - Fischer, Mathias T1 - Analyzing PeerFlow - A Bandwidth Estimation System for Untrustworthy Environments T2 - Sicherheit 2020 : Sicherheit, Schutz und Zuverlässigkeit ; Konferenzband der 10. Jahrestagung des Fachbereichs Sicherheit der Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI) ; 17.- 20. März 2020 in Göttingen Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-88579-695-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.18420/sicherheit2020_02 SP - 29 EP - 40 PB - Gesellschaft für Informatik CY - Bonn ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Aleksandrova, Marharyta A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Security and Performance Implications of BGP Rerouting-resistant Guard Selection Algorithms for Tor T2 - ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection : 35th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2020, Maribor, Slovenia, September 21–23, 2020 Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-030-58201-2 SN - 978-3-030-58200-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58201-2_15 SN - 1868-4238 SN - 1868-422X SP - 219 EP - 233 PB - Springer CY - Cham ER - TY - GEN A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Reuter, Sebastian A1 - Filter, Julian A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting T2 - CCS '20: Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, October 2020 N2 - Website fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node — one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor — a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only. To limit the exposure of Tor users to WFP, we propose novel lightweight WFP defenses, TrafficSliver, which successfully counter today’s WFP classifiers with reasonable bandwidth and latency overheads and, thus, make them attractive candidates for adoption in Tor. Through user-controlled splitting of traffic over multiple Tor entry nodes, TrafficSliver limits the data a single entry node can observe and distorts repeatable traffic patterns exploited by WFP attacks.We first propose a network-layer defense, in which we apply the concept of multipathing entirely within the Tor network. We show that our network-layer defense reduces the accuracy from more than 98% to less than 16% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. We further suggest an elegant client-side application-layer defense, which is independent of the underlying anonymization network. By sending single HTTP requests for different web objects over distinct Tor entry nodes, our application-layer defense reduces the detection rate of WFP classifiers by almost 50 percentage points. Although it offers lower protection than our network-layer defense, it provides a security boost at the cost of a very low implementation overhead and is fully compatible with today's Tor network. KW - Traffic Analysis KW - Website Fingerprinting KW - Privacy KW - Anonymous Communication KW - Onion Routing KW - Web Privacy Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-4503-7089-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3423351 SP - 1971 EP - 1985 PB - Association for Computing Machinery CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - De la Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Kaiser, Daniel A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas T1 - Out-of-the-box Multipath TCP as a Tor Transport Protocol: Performance and Privacy Implications T2 - 2020 IEEE 19th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA), 24-27 Nov. 2020, Cambridge, MA, USA Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-7281-8326-8 SN - 978-1-7281-8327-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA51143.2020.9306702 SN - 2643-7929 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Lohmöller, Johannes A1 - Ziemann, Torsten A1 - Hoerchner, Carl A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of Webpages T2 - Proceedings of the 28th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2021), Seoul, Virtual Event, South Korea, November 2021 Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-4503-8454-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485347 SP - 2411 EP - 2413 PB - ACM Press CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Knabe, Sara T1 - WhisperChord: Scalable and Secure Node Discovery for Overlay Networks T2 - IEEE 46th Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN), Edmonton, AB, Canada , 4-7 Oct. 2021 N2 - Node discovery is a fundamental service for any overlay network, including anonymization networks. Although anonymization and node discovery are two disjoint services, the node discovery has a direct impact on the anonymization. Centralized methods require a trusted third party, limit the network scalability, and are vulnerable to intersection (statistical disclosure) attacks. Therefore, several distributed node discovery methods were proposed to meet the security requirements of anonymization networks through additional structures within Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). However, they require a high management overhead, a strict cooperation between nodes, and are susceptible to active and passive attacks.We propose WhisperChord—an alternative distributed node discovery approach, which incorporates gossiping into structured overlays. WhisperChord is based on a Chord DHT and neither creates any additional structures within the DHT nor requires any trusted third party. Via simulations, we show that our method provides superior protection against active attacks than prior methods and can effectively thwart information leakages. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-1886-7 SN - 978-1-6654-4800-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN52139.2021.9525008 SN - 0742-1303 SP - 170 EP - 177 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Ziemann, Torsten A1 - Hering, Till T1 - GuardedGossip: Secure and Anonymous Node Discovery in Untrustworthy Networks T2 - Security and Privacy in Communication Networks : 17th EAI International Conference, SecureComm 2021, Virtual Event, September 6–9, 2021, Proceedings, Part I N2 - Node discovery is a fundamental service for any overlay network. It is a particular challenge to provide unbiased discovery in untrustworthy environments, e.g., anonymization networks. Although a major line of research focused on solving this problem, proposed methods have been shown to be vulnerable either to active attacks or to leak routing information, both threatening the anonymity of users. In response, we propose GuardedGossip—a novel gossip-based node discovery protocol—that achieves an unbiased random node discovery in a fully-decentralized and highly-scalable fashion. It is built on top of a Chord distributed hash table (DHT) and relies on witness nodes and bound checks to resist active attacks. To limit routing information leakages, GuardedGossip uses gossiping to create uncertainty in the process of node discovery. By incorporating the principles of DHTs with the unstructured nature of gossiping in a subtle way, we profit from the strengths of both techniques while carefully mitigating their shortcomings. We show that GuardedGossip provides a sufficient level of security for users even if 20% of the participating nodes are malicious. Concurrently, our system scales gracefully and provides an adequate overhead for its security and privacy benefits. KW - Node lookup KW - DHT KW - Tor KW - Onion routing KW - Anonymity Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-3-030-90018-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90019-9_7 SN - 1867-8211 SP - 123 EP - 143 PB - Springer CY - Cham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Reuter, Sebastian A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Demo: Traffic Splitting for Tor – A Defense against Fingerprinting Attacks T2 - Conference on Networked Systems 2021 (NetSys 2021) N2 - Website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks on the anonymity network Tor have become ever more effective. Furthermore, research discovered that proposed defenses are insufficient or cause high overhead. In previous work, we presented a new WFP defense for Tor that incorporates multipath transmissions to repel malicious Tor nodes from conducting WFP attacks. In this demo, we showcase the operation of our traffic splitting defense by visually illustrating the underlying Tor multipath transmission using LED-equipped Raspberry Pis. KW - Onion Routing; Website Fingerprinting; Multipath Traffic; Privacy Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.14279/tuj.eceasst.80.1151.1128 SN - 1863-2122 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Alexandrova, Marharyta A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Security and Performance Implications of BGP Rerouting-resistant Guard Selection Algorithms for Tor T2 - Computers and Security N2 - Tor is the most popular anonymization network with millions of daily users. This makes it an attractive target for attacks, e.g., by malicious autonomous systems (ASs) performing active routing attacks to become man in the middle and deanonymize users. It was shown that the number of such malicious ASs is significantly larger than previously expected due to the lack of security guarantees in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In response, recent works suggest alternative Tor path selection methods preferring Tor nodes with higher resilience to active BGP attacks. In this work, we analyze the implications of such proposals and demonstrate that two state-of-the-art path selection methods, namely Counter-RAPTOR and DPSelect, are not as secure as thought before. First, we show that DPSelect achieves only one third of its originally claimed resilience and, thus, is not as resilient as widely accepted. Second, we reveal that the resilience to active BGP attacks on the way back, i.e., from the first anonymization node to a given Tor user, provided by both methods is significantly lower than on the forward path. Beside their lower resilience in specific cases, we show that for particular users the usage of Counter-RAPTOR and DPSelect also leads to leakage of user’s location. Furthermore, we uncover the performance implications of both methods and identify scenarios where their usage leads to significant performance bottlenecks. Finally, we propose a new metric to quantify the user’s location leakage by path selection. Using this metric and performing large-scale analysis, we show to which extent a malicious Tor middle node can fingerprint the user’s location and the confidence it can achieve. Our findings shed light on the implications of path selection methods on the users’ anonymity and the need for further research. KW - BGP routing attacks KW - Tor KW - Onion routing KW - Privacy KW - Traffic analysis Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103374 SN - 1872-6208 SN - 0167-4048 VL - 132 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Bartsch, Witali A1 - Gope, Prosanta A1 - Kavun, Elif A1 - Millwood, Owen A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Pasikhani, Aryan A1 - Polian, Ilia T1 - Design Rationale for Symbiotically Secure Key Management Systems in IoT and Beyond T2 - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy ICISSP - Volume 1 N2 - The overwhelmingly widespread use of Internet of Things (IoT) in different application domains brought not only benefits, but, alas, security concerns as a result of the increased attack surface and vectors. One of the most critical mechanisms in IoT infrastructure is key management. This paper reflects on the problems and challenges of existing key management systems, starting with the discussion of a recent real-world attack. We identify and elaborate on the drawbacks of security primitives based purely on physical variations and – after highlighting the problems of such systems – continue on to deduce an effective and cost-efficient key management solution for IoT systems extending the symbiotic security approach in a previous work. The symbiotic architecture combines software, firmware, and hardware resources for secure IoT while avoiding the traditional scheme of static key storage and generating entropy for key material on-the-fly via a combination of a Physical Unclonable Func tion (PUF) and pseudo-random bits pre-populated in firmware. KW - Secure Processor Architecture KW - Secure IoT KW - Hardware Fingerprinting KW - PUFs KW - Attack-Resilient Hardware Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-989-758-624-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5220/0011726900003405 SN - 2184-4356 SP - 583 EP - 591 PB - SciTePress ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Analysis of Fingerprinting Techniques for Tor Hidden Services T2 - WPES '17 Proceedings of the 2017 on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, Dallas, Texas, USA, October 2017 Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-4503-5175-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3139550.3139564 SP - 165 EP - 175 PB - ACM CY - New York, NY ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Zinnen, Andreas A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale T2 - Proceedings of the 23rd Internet Society (ISOC) Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2016), San Diego, USA, February 2016 Y1 - 2016 SN - 1-891562-41-X PB - Internet Society CY - Reston, VA ER - TY - GEN A1 - Moreno, José Miguel A1 - Pastrana, Sergio A1 - Reelfs, Jens Helge A1 - Vallina, Pelayo A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Smaragdakis, Georgios A1 - Hohlfeld, Oliver A1 - Vallina-Rodriguez, Narseo A1 - Tapiador, Juan T1 - Reviewing War: Unconventional User Reviews as a Side Channel to Circumvent Information Controls N2 - During the first days of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s media regulator blocked access to many global social media platforms and news sites, including Twitter, Facebook, and the BBC. To bypass the information controls set by Russian authorities, pro-Ukrainian groups explored unconventional ways to reach out to the Russian population, such as posting war-related content in the user reviews of Russian business available on Google Maps or Tripadvisor. This paper provides a first analysis of this new phenomenon by analyzing the creative strategies to avoid state censorship. Specifically, we analyze reviews posted on these platforms from the beginning of the conflict to September 2022. We measure the channeling of war messages through user reviews in Tripadvisor and Google Maps, as well as in VK, a popular Russian social network. Our analysis of the content posted on these services reveals that users leveraged these platforms to seek and exchange humanitarian and travel advice, but also to disseminate disinformation and polarized messages. Finally, we analyze the response of platforms in terms of content moderation and their impact. KW - Side Channels KW - Disinformation KW - Propaganda KW - User-Generated Content KW - Russia KW - Ukraine KW - Tripadvisor KW - Google Maps KW - VKontakte Y1 - 2023 UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.00598 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.00598 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Thierse, Paul A1 - Hoffmann, Harald A1 - Er, Devran A1 - Panchenko, Andriy ED - Katsikas, Sokratis T1 - Challenges and Pitfalls in Generating Representative ICS Datasets in Cyber Security Research T2 - Computer Security, ESORICS 2022 International Workshops CyberICPS 2022, SECPRE 2022, SPOSE 2022, CPS4CIP 2022, CDT&SECOMANE 2022, EIS 2022, and SecAssure 2022 Copenhagen, Denmark, September 26–30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-031-25459-8 SN - 978-3-031-25460-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25460-4_22 SP - 379 EP - 397 PB - Springer International Publishing CY - Cham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Zinnen, Andreas A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - CUMUL & Co: High-Impact Artifacts for Website Fingerprinting Research T2 - 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2022), Austin, Texas, USA, December 5-9, 2022. N2 - Anonymous communication on the Internet is about hiding the relationship between communicating parties. At NDSS ’16, we presented a new website fingerprinting approach, CUMUL, that utilizes novel features and a simple yet powerful algorithm to attack anonymization networks such as Tor. Based on pattern observation of data flows, this attack aims at identifying the content of encrypted and anonymized connections. Apart from the feature generation and the used classifier, we also provided a large dataset to the research community to study the attack at Internet scale. In this paper, we emphasize the impact of our artifacts by analyzing publications referring to our work with respect to the dataset, feature extraction method, and source code of the implementation. Based on this data, we draw conclusions about the impact of our artifacts on the research field and discuss their influence on related cybersecurity topics. Overall, from 393 unique citations, we discover more than 130 academic references that utilize our artifacts, 61 among them are highly influential (according to SemanticScholar), and at least 43 are from top-ranked security venues. This data underlines the significant relevance and impact of our work as well as of our artifacts in the community and beyond. KW - Traffic Analysis;Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy Y1 - 2022 UR - https://www.acsac.org/2022/program/artifacts_competition/ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Hohlfeld, Oliver A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - Hi Doppelgänger: Towards Detecting Manipulation in News Comments T2 - Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW '19 Companion), 4th Workshop on Computational Methods in Online Misbehavior (CyberSafety '19), May 13–17, 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-1-4503-6675-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3308560.3316496 SP - 197 EP - 205 PB - ACM CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Dahlmanns, Markus A1 - Henze, Martin A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Wehrle, Klaus T1 - Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments T2 - Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019 N2 - An increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-toend security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices. KW - Routing, Internet of Things, Protocols, Cryptography, Servers Y1 - 2019 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888033 SN - 978-1-7281-2700-2 SN - 978-1-7281-2701-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888033 SN - 2643-3303 SN - 1092-1648 PB - IEEE Press ER - TY - GEN A1 - De La Cadena, Wladimir A1 - Mitseva, Asya A1 - Pennekamp, Jan A1 - Hiller, Jens A1 - Lanze, Fabian A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Wehrle, Klaus A1 - Panchenko, Andriy T1 - POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting T2 - CCS '19 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security , London, UK, November 11 - 15, 2019. N2 - Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95% to less than 35% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3319535.3363249 SN - 978-1-4503-6747-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363249 SP - 2533 EP - 2535 PB - ACM Press CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Buscemi, Alessio A1 - Turcanu, Ion A1 - Castignani, German A1 - Panchenko, Andriy A1 - Engel, Thomas A1 - Shin, Kang G. T1 - A Survey on Controller Area Network Reverse Engineering T2 - IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials N2 - Controller Area Network (CAN) is a masterless serial bus designed and widely used for the exchange of mission and time-critical information within commercial vehicles. In-vehicle communication is based on messages sent and received by Electronic Control Units (ECUs) connected to this serial bus network. Although unencrypted, CAN messages are not easy to interpret. In fact, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) attempt to achieve security through obscurity by encoding the data in their proprietary format, which is kept secret from the general public. As a result, the only way to obtain clear data is to reverse engineer CAN messages. Driven by the need for in-vehicle message interpretation, which is highly valuable in the automotive industry, researchers and companies have been working to make this process automated, fast, and standardized. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of the state of the art and summarize the major advances in CAN bus reverse engineering. We are the first to provide a taxonomy of CAN tokenization and translation techniques. Based on the reviewed literature, we highlight an important issue: the lack of a public and standardized dataset for the quantitative evaluation of translation algorithms. In response, we define a complete set of requirements for standardizing the data collection process. We also investigate the risks associated with the automation of CAN reverse engineering, in particular with respect to the security network and the safety and privacy of drivers and passengers. Finally, we discuss future research directions in CAN reverse engineering. KW - Can bus KW - reverse engineering KW - security KW - connected Vechiles Y1 - 2023 UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10092880 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2023.3264928 SN - 1553-877X VL - 25 IS - 3,3 SP - 1445 EP - 1481 PB - IEEE ER -