TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Flashback on Control Logic Injection Attacks against Programmable Logic Controllers T2 - Automation N2 - Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) make up a substantial part of critical infrastructures (CIs) and industrial control systems (ICSs). They are programmed with a control logic that defines how to drive and operate critical processes such as nuclear power plants, petrochemical factories, water treatment systems, and other facilities. Unfortunately, these devices are not fully secure and are prone to malicious threats, especially those exploiting vulnerabilities in the control logic of PLCs. Such threats are known as control logic injection attacks. They mainly aim at sabotaging physical processes controlled by exposed PLCs, causing catastrophic damage to target systems as shown by Stuxnet. Looking back over the last decade, many research endeavors exploring and discussing these threats have been published. In this article, we present a flashback on the recent works related to control logic injection attacks against PLCs. To this end, we provide the security research community with a new systematization based on the attacker techniques under three main attack scenarios. For each study presented in this work, we overview the attack strategies, tools, security goals, infected devices, and underlying vulnerabilities. Based on our analysis, we highlight the current security challenges in protecting PLCs from such severe attacks and suggest security recommendations for future research directions. KW - industrial control system KW - programmable logic controller KW - control logic injection attack KW - program injection KW - program modification Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/automation3040030 SN - 2673-4052 VL - 3 IS - 4 SP - 596 EP - 621 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Control Injection Attack against S7 PLCs -Manipulating the Decompiled Code T2 - IECON 2021 – 47th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-0256-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/IECON48115.2021.9589721 SN - 2577-1647 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - You Are What You Attack: Breaking the Cryptographically-Protected S7 Protocol T2 - 19th International Conference on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS), (2023) N2 - S7 protocol defines an appropriate format for exchanging messages between SIMATIC S7 PLCs and their corresponding engineering software i.e., TIA Portal. Recently, Siemens has provided its newer PLC models and their proprietary S7 protocols with a very developed and sophisticated integrity check mechanism to protect them from various exploits e.g., replay attacks. This paper addresses exactly this point, and investigates the security of the most developed integrity check mechanism that the newest S7CommPlus protocol version implements. Our results showed that the latest S7 PLC models as well as their related protocols are still vulnerable. We found that adversaries can manipulate two hashes that play a significant role in generating keys and bytes for the encryption processes implemented in the S7CommPlus protocol. This allows to reproduce S7 packets and conduct several attacks that eventually impact the operation of the target PLC and the entire physical process it controls. To validate our findings, we test all the attack scenarios presented in this work on a cryptographically protected S7 PLC from the 1500 family which uses the S7CommPlusV3 protocol. KW - Protocols KW - Process control KW - S7 Protocol KW - Industrial Control Systems Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-6654-6432-1 SN - 978-1-6654-6433-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/WFCS57264.2023.10144251 SN - 2835-8414 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Amogbonjaye, Samuel A1 - Urrego, Diego A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Stealthy False Command Injection Attack on Modbus based SCADA Systems T2 - 20th Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC), (2023) N2 - Modbus is a widely-used industrial protocol in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for different purposes such as controlling remote devices, monitoring physical processes, data acquisition, etc. Unfortunately, such a protocol lacks security means i.e., authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. This has exposed industrial plants using the Modbus protocol and made them attractive to malicious adversaries who could perform various kinds of cyber-attacks causing significant consequences as Stuxnet showed. In this paper, we exploit the insecurity of the Modbus protocol and perform a stealthy false command injection scenario concealing our injection from the SCADA operator. Our attack approach is comprised of two main phases: 1) Pre-attack phase (offline) where an attacker sniffs, collects and stores sufficient valid request-response pairs in a database, 2) Attack phase (online) where the attacker performs false command injection and conceals his injection by replaying a valid response from his database upon each request sent from the HMI user. Such a scenario is quite severe and might cause disastrous damages in SCADA systems and critical infrastructures if it is successfully implemented by malicious adversaries. Finally, we suggest some appropriate mitigation solutions to prevent such a serious threat. KW - Performance evaluation KW - SCADA systems KW - Command Injection Attacks KW - Industrial plants Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-6654-9734-3 SN - 978-1-6654-9735-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC51644.2023.10059804 SN - 2331-9860 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Security of Programmable Logic Controllers and Related Systems: Today and Tomorrow T2 - IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society N2 - Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are indispensable in critical infrastructures and industrial control systems. The increasing demand for enhanced cost-effectiveness and production efficiency has driven automation manufacturers to integrate PLC-based applications and systems with external networks, such as Internet. Unfortunately, this connectivity has exposed systems to potential malicious attacks from motivated adversaries. Addressing this pressing issue necessitates a comprehensive summary of ongoing research related to PLCs and their related systems. This summary should classify these systems based on disclosed vulnerabilities, potential threats, and proposed security solutions, catering to both scientists and industrial engineers. While several recent surveys have reviewed and discussed PLC security and related topics, they often fell short of covering all essential aspects comprehensively. Furthermore, prior surveys tended to focus on analyzing vulnerabilities at the system level, overlooking the vulnerabilities specific to PLCs themselves. Consequently, their findings failed to effectively secure current operational systems or propose improved solutions for future PLC designs. In this article, we bridge this research gap by providing a detailed review of all aspects concerning the security of PLCs and related systems. This includes vulnerabilities, potential attacks, and security solutions including digital forensics. We aim to offer a precise analysis, addressing the shortcomings of previous studies. Finally, we conclude this article by presenting our recommendations tailored for PLC manufacturers, researchers, and engineers. We hope that these recommendations will contribute to the development of more secure PLCs in the future. KW - Digital forensics KW - Programmable logic devices KW - Cyberattacks KW - Cybersecurity KW - Microprogramming Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/OJIES.2023.3335976 SN - 2644-1284 IS - 4 SP - 659 EP - 693 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - No Attacks Are Available: Securing the OpenPLC and Related Systems T2 - 8th GI/ACM Workshop on Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS WS 2023), 2085 (2023) N2 - The use of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) expands in industrial domains, which makes ensuring the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) become paramount. The OpenPLC project, the first open-source initiative, provides flexible and cost-effective PLC solutions to build up affordable test-beds, as well as conduct experiments and academic researches. This project has wildly grown in the last few years, thus it is essential to address the most emerging security challenges it encounters. This paper introduces a new OpenPLC architecture, called OpenPLC Aqua, provided with a set of security solutions designed specifically to overcome the vulnerabilities that the current OpenPLC versions are prone to. The new OpenPLC architecture includes four security features: 1) user credentials encryption, securing the Webserver, Whitelisting and secure SSL/TLS communication channel. The OpenPLC Aqua software was tested against several attack scenarios, that were feasible against the old OpenPLC versions. Our experimental results showed our enhanced OpenPLC software is secure and resistant against several attack scenarios e.g., authentication, injection, Man-in-the-Middle and replay attacks. The OpenPLC Aqua is publicly available and a proof of concept demo is also published with this paper. KW - OpenPLC KW - Seucrity Solutions KW - Industrial Control Systems KW - Mitigation Solutions Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24570.47043 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Langendörfer, Peter A1 - Kornemann, Stephan A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Hermann, Erik T1 - Information Security: The Cornerstone for Surviving the Digital Wild T2 - The Future of Smart Production for SMEs: A Methodological and Practical Approach Towards Digitalization in SMEs N2 - In this chapter we are discussing the very basics in the sense of how to prepare your company with respect to security. The essential issues are a proper information security governance framework that takes into account the managerial and organizational issues as well as proper technical means. For the latter we introduce network separation as this is one of the prime means to protect your production network from network based attacks. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-031-15428-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15428-7_29 SP - 335 EP - 341 PB - Springer International Publishing CY - Cham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Good Night, and Good Luck: A Control Logic Injection Attack on OpenPLC T2 - Proc. 49th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society (IECON 2023), (2023) Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32913.20321 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Patil, Nitin Sanjay A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Beyond the lens: false data injection attacks on IIoT-cameras through MQTT manipulation T2 - 2024 7th Conference on Cloud and Internet of Things (CIoT) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CIoT63799.2024.10757025 SP - 1 EP - 7 PB - IEEE ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Patil, Nitin Sanjay A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Hacking the backbone : shell reverse attacks on IIoT systems T2 - 21st International Conference on Embedded Wireless Systems and Networks (EWSN) N2 - As Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems expand , they face growing risks from complex cyber threats, including reverse shell attacks. These attacks exploit IIoT vulnerabilities, allowing unauthorized remote access and endangering industrial operations. This paper explores reverse shell attacks, where adversaries trick operators into unwittingly installing malware on IIoT devices. This malware then establishes hidden connections to the attacker's server, bypassing traditional firewalls. Exploiting command injection vulnerabilities on IIoT servers facilitates the deployment of reverse shell scripts, granting attackers persistent and covert system access. Our research focuses on IIoT device authentication, identifying weak credentials and using brute force attacks for initial access. We also demonstrate deploying Python-based reverse shell payloads via the SFTP protocol, creating lasting connections to the attacker's server. Through experiments with the Fischertechnik Learning Factory 4.0, we show how reverse shell payloads disrupt operations, enabling unauthorized commands and data theft. To counter these threats, we advocate for robust security measures like network segmentation, rigorous patch management, and advanced intrusion detection systems. All our attack codes and a proof-of-concept are publicly accessible. Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.23097.79207 SP - 1 EP - 7 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Silent sabotage : a stealthy control logic injection in IIoT systems T2 - 5th Silicon Valley Cybersecurity Conference (SVCC 2024) Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/SVCC61185.2024.10637363 SP - 1 EP - 8 PB - IEEE CY - New York ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Investigating the security of OpenPLC : vulnerabilities, attacks, and mitigation solutions T2 - IEEE Access Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3356051 SN - 2169-3536 VL - 12 SP - 11561 EP - 11583 PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Fully-Blind False Data Injection on PROFINET I/O Systems T2 - 2021 IEEE 30th International Symposium on Industrial Electronics (ISIE) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-7281-9024-2 SN - 978-1-7281-9023-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIE45552.2021.9576496 SN - 2163-5145 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Patch Now and Attack Later - Exploiting S7 PLCs by Time-Of-Day Block T2 - 2021 4th IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-6654-3045-6 SN - 978-1-7281-6207-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPS49255.2021.9468226 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A Stealth Program Injection Attack against S7-300 PLCs T2 - 2021 22nd IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT) Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-7281-5731-3 SN - 978-1-7281-5730-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIT46573.2021.9453483 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A New Injection Threat on S7-1500 PLCs - Disrupting the Physical Process Offline T2 - IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/OJIES.2022.3151528 SN - 2644-1284 IS - 3 SP - 146 EP - 162 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - No Need to be Online to Attack - Exploiting S7-1500 PLCs by Time-Of-Day Block T2 - Proc. 28th International Conference on Information, Communication and Automation Technologies (ICAT 2022), arajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16-18 June 2022 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-1-6654-6692-9 SN - 978-1-6654-6691-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAT54566.2022.9811147 SN - 2643-1858 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Langendörfer, Peter ED - Jasperneite, Jürgen ED - Lohweg, Volker T1 - A Remote Attack Tool on Siemens S7-300 Controllers: Practical Report T2 - Kommunikation und Bildverarbeitung in der Automation : Ausgewählte Beiträge der Jahreskolloquien KommA und BVAu 2020 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-662-64282-5 SN - 978-3-662-64283-2 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64283-2_1 SN - 2522-8579 SP - 3 EP - 21 PB - Springer Vieweg CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Amogbonjaye, Samuel A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - Pirates of the MQTT : raiding IIoT systems with a rogue client T2 - 2024 8th Cyber Security in Networking Conference (CSNet) N2 - The integration of MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems enhances operational efficiency but introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly through rogue MQTT clients. These clients exploit MQTT weaknesses to disrupt industrial processes and compromise data integrity. This paper examines the impact of rogue MQTT client attacks, demonstrated through a detailed case study using the Fischertechnik Lernfabrik 4.0. We highlight how attackers can exploit MQTT's inherent vulnerabilities, including anonymous connections and message retention, to inject false data and interfere with operations. To address these risks, we propose several mitigation strategies: implementing fine-grained authorization for topic access control, enhancing replay attack protection with Message Authentication Code (MAC), employing mutual TLS (mTLS) for secure client authentication, and incorporating real-time client activity monitoring and anomaly detection. These measures aim to bolster IIoT system security, mitigate potential disruptions, and maintain operational integrity. Our findings and recommendations contribute to advancing security practices in MQTT-based IIoT environments. All attack codes and a proof-of-concept are ublicly available. KW - Rogue Client KW - MQTT Protocol KW - Cyberattacks KW - Cybersecurity Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/CSNet64211.2024.10851733 SP - 248 EP - 253 PB - IEEE CY - Piscataway, NJ ER - TY - GEN A1 - Alsabbagh, Wael A1 - Kim, Chaerin A1 - Langendörfer, Peter T1 - A payload of lies : false data injection attacks on MQTT-based IIoT systems T2 - IECON 2024 - 50th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society : proceedings N2 - In the ever-evolving landscape of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), security emerges as a critical concern. This paper delves into the realm of False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) within MQTT-based IIoT systems, specifically targeting the publisher-subscriber model. Our exploration unveils two distinct attack scenarios that exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in the communication fabric. In the first scenario, we demonstrate the potential chaos wrought by sending false data to subscribers, manipulating their perception and inducing actions that align with the attacker’s whims. The second scenario ventures into the heart of the publisher, where the attacker injects false data – deceptive status updates from other publishers e.g., Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). The repercussions ripple through the entire industrial process, impacting operations based on fraudulent information. This showcases the cascading effects of FDIAs, illustrating the profound threat they pose to the reliability and integrity of IIoT systems. For real-world attack scenarios, Our attacks were conducted on a small MQTT-based IIoT system, using the Fischertechnik Lernfabrik 4.0 9V factory. Finally, we proposes mitigation solutions to safeguard IIoT systems from the far-reaching consequences of false data manipulation. Our attack codes as well as a proof-of-concept are publicly available for further research. KW - FDIAs KW - IIoT KW - IoT KW - MQTT Protocol Y1 - 2024 SN - 978-1-6654-6454-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1109/IECON55916.2024.10905487 SP - 1 EP - 8 PB - IEEE CY - Piscataway, NJ ER -