TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schwuchow, Sören C. T1 - Die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Eine kritische Diskussion T2 - ORDO : Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft N2 - Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie veröffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu stärken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung für diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelständisch geprägten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die Fähigkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungsträger, die in der Realität kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative würde in einer Rückbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gewährleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensität, bestehen. KW - Industriepolitik KW - Innovationspolitik KW - Nationale Industriestrategie KW - Strukturwandel KW - nationale Champions KW - Innovation Policy KW - Structural Change KW - National Champions Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2020-0019 SN - 0048-2129 VL - 70 IS - 1 SP - 340 EP - 371 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Behavioral political economy: A survey T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research. KW - Behavioral political economy KW - Rational irrationality KW - Cognitive biases KW - Social norms KW - Voting KW - Paternalism Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 40 IS - B SP - 395 EP - 417 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y SN - 1432-1386 SN - 0936-9937 VL - 29 IS - 5 SP - 1399 EP - 1414 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Schubert, Christian T1 - Behavioral Political Economy: Ein neues Forschungsfeld T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : (WiSt) N2 - Das Forschungsgebiet der Politischen Ökonomik kon- zentrierte sich bisher vor allem darauf, das ökonomi- sche Verhaltensmodell rational-eigeninteressierten Handelns auf den Forschungsgegenstand der Politik anzuwenden. Mit der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik gera- ten aber strikte Annahmen individueller Rationalität zu- nehmend in die Kritik. Dazu kommt, dass die Anreiz- strukturen gerade bei kollektivem Handeln in der Politik nicht dafür sprechen, dass Menschen individuellen Aufwand betreiben, um vollständig rational zu handeln. Deshalb ist die Anwendung verhaltensökonomischer Ansätze auf diesem Gebiet besonders vielversprechend. KW - Politische Ökonomik KW - Public Choice KW - Verhaltensökonomik KW - Rationalität KW - Wählerverhalten Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650_2014_12_658 VL - 43 IS - 12 SP - 658 EP - 662 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Pamp, Oliver ED - Mause, Karsten ED - Müller, Christian ED - Schubert, Klaus T1 - Finanzpolitik T2 - Politik und Wirtschaft. Ein integratives Kompendium Y1 - 2018 SN - 978-3-658-06476-1 SP - 267 EP - 296 PB - Springer CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Köhler, Ekkehard T1 - Zurück zum Rubikon: Wie der Primat der Politik in der Eurozone wieder dauerhaft hergestellt werden kann T2 - Badische Zeitung Y1 - 2012 IS - 23.08.2012 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Kliemt, Hartmut T1 - Pro & Contra: Sollte Sterbehilfe in Deutschland erlaubt sein? T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650-2018-4-38 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 47 IS - 4 SP - 38 EP - 39 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. T1 - The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach T2 - Economics of Governance N2 - The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution. KW - Centralisation KW - Direct democracy KW - Representative democracy KW - Public good provision Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1 SN - 1435-8131 VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 26 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Savioz, Marcel T1 - Gebhard Kirchgässner, 60 Years On T2 - Public Choice Y1 - 2010 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 144 IS - 3-4 SP - 393 EP - 399 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan T1 - Die deutsche Schuldenbremse - ein institutioneller Fortschritt? T2 - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) KW - Schuldenschranke (Nulldefizit) KW - Öffentliche Schulden KW - Public dept KW - Haushaltskonsolidierung KW - Fiscal consolidation KW - Finanzverfassung KW - Fiscal constitution KW - Verfassungsreform KW - Constitutional reform KW - Finanzbeziehungen KW - Fiscal relations KW - Finanzreform KW - Fiscal reform KW - Wirkungsanalyse KW - Impact assessment KW - Deutschland KW - Germany Y1 - 2009 SN - 0340-1650 VL - 38 IS - 10 SP - 512 EP - 518 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Schaltegger, Christoph A. ED - Schaltegger, Stefan T1 - Begünstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und -diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey Y1 - 2004 SN - 3-7281-2939-1 SP - 259 EP - 277 PB - vdf Hochschulverl. CY - Zürich ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Das Finanzierungssystem der EU und die Nettozahlerdebatte T2 - Wirtschaftsdienst N2 - Die deutsche Nettozahlerposition innerhalb der EU wird in der öffentlichen Meinung häufig kritisch beurteilt. Wie funktioniert das Finanzierungssystem der EU? Worauf lässt sich die Auszahlungsstruktur zurückführen? Ist der Nutzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft allein anhand der Zahlungsströme zu messen? Y1 - 2007 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-007-0618-0 SN - 0043-6275 SN - 1613-978X VL - 87 IS - 2 SP - 114 EP - 120 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Marciano, Alain ED - Rosselin, Jean-Michel T1 - Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations T2 - Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-1-84720-126-3 SP - 192 EP - 220 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Mehr Autonomie für die Bundesländer: Ansatzpunkte zu einer grundlegenden Reform der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen T2 - ifo-Schnelldienst N2 - Lars P. Feld, Universität Freiburg und Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Jan Schnellenbach, Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Universität Heidelberg, formulieren einen Reformvorschlag, der den Finanzausgleich in seiner Gesamtheit deutlich anreizorientierter ausgestaltet. Y1 - 2014 VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 32 EP - 36 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Effizienzgewinn oder Risiko: Eine Frage der Abwägung im Einzelfall T2 - ifo-Schnelldienst Y1 - 2006 SN - 0018-974X VL - 59 IS - 24 SP - 13 EP - 16 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Optionen für eine Reform des deutschen Finanzausgleichs T2 - Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen Y1 - 2012 VL - 13 SP - 90 EP - 109 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: ökonomische Perspektiven T2 - Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschlüsse Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-406-66238-6 SP - M11 EP - M65 PB - Beck CY - München ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Eger, Thomas ED - Apolte, Thomas T1 - Demokratische Strukturen und Einbindung in internationale Netzwerke als Voraussetzung für politische Reformen T2 - Voraussetzungen für grundlegende institutionelle Reformen Y1 - 2006 SN - 978-3-428-12062-8 SN - 3-428-12062-0 SP - 77 EP - 115 PB - Duncker & Humblot CY - Berlin ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Université Aix-Marseille Y1 - 2007 PB - Univ. CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Borchard, Michael A1 - Doering, Detmar A1 - Freytag, Andreas A1 - Habermann, Gerd A1 - Hagen, Albrecht von der A1 - Hasse, Rolf A1 - Horn, Karen A1 - Kolev, Stefan A1 - Köster, Thomas A1 - Roth, Steffen J. A1 - Starbatty, Joachim A1 - Wilde, Martin A1 - Wohlgemuth, Michael T1 - Wirtschaftsverfassung statt Wirtschaftsregierung, Frankfurter Aufruf für eine ordnungspolitische Weichenstellung in Europa T2 - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Y1 - 2012 IS - 22.06.2012 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Bjørnskov, Christian A1 - Dreher, Axel A1 - Fischer, Justina T1 - Glück trotz Ungleichheit T2 - Welt am Sonntag Y1 - 2011 UR - https://www.welt.de/print/wams/wirtschaft/article12975065/Glueck-trotz-Ungleichheit.html IS - 27.03.2011 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Baskaran, Thushyanthan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Büstorf, Guido ED - Cantner, Uwe ED - Hanusch, Horst ED - Huttner, Michael ED - Lorenz, Hans-Walter ED - Rahmeyer, Fritz T1 - Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions T2 - The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies Y1 - 2013 SN - 978-3-319-01495-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8 N1 - Nachdruck des gleichnamigen Beitrages aus dem Journal of Evolutionary Economics SP - 187 EP - 207 PB - Springer CY - New York, NY [u.a.] ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy T2 - Journal of Evolutionary Economics N2 - This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing. KW - Economic policy KW - Model uncertainty KW - Collective beliefs KW - Collective learning Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y SN - 0936-9937 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 101 EP - 116 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan T2 - Constitutional Political Economy N2 - An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer. KW - Tax evasion KW - Tax morale KW - Cognitive dissonance KW - Informal institutions KW - H26 KW - Z13 Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-0001-y SN - 1043-4062 VL - 17 IS - 2 SP - 117 EP - 132 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity T2 - Public Choice N2 - Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach. KW - Terrorism KW - Deterrence KW - Reciprocity KW - Anti-terrorism policies Y1 - 2006 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/25487598 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 129 IS - 3/4 SP - 301 EP - 313 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective, and a Proposal for an Extension of the Research Agenda T2 - The American Journal of Economics and Sociology N2 - New Political Economy has something very important in common with welfare economics: its focus on static, technical efficiency criteria to judge the rationality of a social, political or economic order. This often leads theorists to perceive their objects of research as well-defined problems to which clear-cut solutions can be found and prescribed as policy proposals, addressed at the policymaker or the democratic sovereign. This perspective frequently excludes important empirical phenomena from the research agenda. Although, for example, certain well-defined informational asymmetries are frequently modeled, fundamental knowledge problems such as ignorance of the true model of the economy are usually ignored. In the present paper, this approach is criticized from a Hayekian point of view, with an emphasis on the problems of "scientism" (i.e., the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences) and irremediably imperfect knowledge, troubling both the agents in the theoretical model and the theorist. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated with two examples that an extension of Public Choice's research agenda along Hayekian lines may be fruitful, because it leads to a fresh perception even of such problems that already have been extensively researched within the traditional framework. Y1 - 2002 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/3487744 SN - 0002-9246 SN - 1536-7150 VL - 61 IS - 1 SP - 193 EP - 214 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain T2 - European Journal of Law and Economics N2 - In contrast to the contractarian approach to constitutional economics, we follow Voigt (1999) in assuming that constitutional rules are closely connected to informal institutions and that their evolution is a matter of interest group activity and implicit re-interpretation. We add to this the assumption of theoretical uncertainty of individuals regarding the working properties of constitutional rules. Collective learning processes are considered as the third driving force of constitutional evolution, and at the same time as the source of path-dependencies which allow suboptimal constitutions to persist. Finally, it is argued that direct legislation offers more protection than a written fiscal constitution. KW - positive constitutional economics KW - collective learning KW - path-dependent rule-evolution Y1 - 2004 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026389926709 SN - 0929-1261 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 97 EP - 115 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - The Dahrendorf hypothesis and its implications for (the theory of) economic policy-making T2 - Cambridge Journal of Economics N2 - The sociologist R. Dahrendorf has recently suggested that there is no and there ought to be no convergence of economic policies towards some common ideal model. On the contrary, he states that ‘diversity is […] at the very heart of a world that has abandoned the need for closed, encompassing systems’. It is shown in this paper that the Dahrendorf hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with orthodox economic approaches to economic policy-making. A perspective on policy-making that introduces either fundamental uncertainty or endogenous policy preferences or both is, however, shown to be consistent with the Dahrendorf hypothesis. Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bei086 SN - 1464-3545 VL - 29 IS - 6 SP - 997 EP - 1009 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy T2 - Homo Oeconomicus N2 - It is proposed that a more accurate prediction of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between psychological costs, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. A formal concept of legitimacy of public policies is introduced and it is shown that legitimacy influences evasion activity. KW - Tax evasion KW - Tax morale KW - economics and psychology KW - political legitimacy Y1 - 2007 SN - 0943-0180 VL - 24 IS - 1 SP - 21 EP - 45 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Public Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Reform T2 - Journal of Institutional Economics N2 - Public entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the outcome of the activities of a Schumpeterian political innovator. However, empirical research suggests that changes to a more efficient economic policy, even if it is known and technically easy to implement, are usually delayed. This is difficult to reconcile with Schumpeterian notions of public entrepreneurship. In this paper, it is argued that the attempt to transfer a Schumpeterian approach to the public sector is fundamentally flawed. Institutional checks and balances that characterise most modern liberal democracies make the strategy of bold leadership an unlikely choice for an incumbent. If change occurs, it occurs normally as a response to the fact that the status quo has become untenable. From a normative point of view, it is argued that if public entrepreneurship nevertheless occurs, it will often be associated with unwanted consequences. A dismantling of formal institutional checks and balances is therefore not reasonable. KW - public entrepreneurship KW - political innovation KW - reform processes KW - Schumpeterian political economy Y1 - 2007 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137407000641 SN - 1744-1382 VL - 3 IS - 2 SP - 183 EP - 202 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments? T2 - Journal of Economics and Statistics N2 - A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region. KW - Policy decentralisation KW - fiscal competition KW - model uncertainty KW - collective learning Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990268 SN - 0021-4027 VL - 228 IS - 4 SP - 372 EP - 393 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues T2 - Public Finance and Management N2 - This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints. KW - net wealth tax KW - wealth KW - inequality KW - redistribution Y1 - 2012 SN - 1523-9721 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 368 EP - 400 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Neuer Paternalismus und individuelle Rationalität: eine ordnungsökonomische Perspektive T2 - List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik N2 - In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur strang etabliert, der neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo dell vollständiger Rationalität, die von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus, dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden. Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen Paternalismus mit den ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen tensouveränität und der Bürgersouveränität kollidieren. KW - Paternalismus KW - Ordnungsökonomik KW - Verhaltensökonomik Y1 - 2014 SN - 0937-0862 VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 239 EP - 257 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making? T2 - Journal of Bioeconomics N2 - This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans. KW - Classical liberalism KW - Evolution KW - Darwinism KW - Economic policy KW - Cultural evolution KW - Institutional evolution Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6 SN - 1573-698 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 70 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Wohlwollendes Anschubsen? Liberaler Paternalismus und seine Nebenwirkungen T2 - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik N2 - In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter überzeugt sind, die Qualität der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu können. Nach einem Überblick über die verhaltensökonomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-ökonomischen Implikationen diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ansätze selbst Entscheidungen häufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualität individueller Entscheidungen höchst zweifelhaft ist. KW - Paternalismus KW - inkonsistente Präferenzen KW - expressives Verhalten Y1 - 2011 SN - 1465-6493 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 445 EP - 459 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms. KW - Libertarian paternalism KW - Soft paternalism KW - Social norms KW - Informal institutions KW - Behavioral political economics KW - Sour grapes KW - Expressive behavior Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 28 IS - 2 SP - 266 EP - 277 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism T2 - Kyklos N2 - Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12106 SN - 1467-6435 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 135 EP - 156 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Klinck, Fabian ED - Riesenhuber, Karl T1 - Verbraucherleitbilder aus ökonomischer Sicht T2 - Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplinäre und europäische Perspektiven Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-11-036339-5 SP - 53 EP - 72 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Backhaus, Jürgen G. T1 - Path-dependent rule evolution T2 - Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Schubert, Christian ED - Wangenheim, Georg von T1 - Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions T2 - The Evolution and Design of Institutions Y1 - 2006 SN - 9-78-0-415-37531-3 SP - 123 EP - 143 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Moss, Laurence S. T1 - New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective T2 - The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World Y1 - 2002 SN - 0-631-23497-7 SN - 0-631-23496-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1536-7150.00156 N1 - Reprint aus dem American Journal of Economics and Sociology SP - 193 EP - 214 PB - Blackwell Publishers CY - Malden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Ebner, Alexander ED - Heine, Klaus ED - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Öffentliches Unternehmertum und die Ökonomik der Reform T2 - Innovation zwischen Markt und Staat - Die institutionelle Dynamik wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-3-8329-2880-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845205694-2 SP - 117 EP - 133 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ET - 1. Auflage ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Alm, James ED - Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ED - Torgler, Benno T1 - Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance T2 - Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance N2 - This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity. KW - tax compliance KW - tax morale KW - tax evasion KW - reciprocity Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-0-415-57698-7 SN - 0-415-57698-9 SP - 56 EP - 73 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Unvollständige Rationalität ist keine hinreichende Begründung für paternalistisches Eingreifen T2 - Wirtschaftsdienst Y1 - 2014 SN - 1613-978X VL - 94 IS - 11 SP - 778 EP - 781 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Respektiert eine Politik des weichen Paternalismus die Autonomie individueller Konsumenten? Gutachten im Auftrag von Prometheus - das Freiheitsinstitut gGmbH, Berlin Y1 - 2016 PB - Fakultät für Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikroökonomie CY - Cottbus-Senftenberg ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Von der Schuldenbremse zur Sparregel: Ansätze zu einer regelgebundenen Haushaltskonsolidierung Y1 - 2013 PB - Liberales Institut CY - Berlin ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Herrscht am Markt Gerechtigkeit, wenn alle gleich viel bekommen? T2 - Schwäbische Zeitung Y1 - 2013 IS - 19. Juni 2013 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Haushaltskonsolidierung: Je schneller, desto besser T2 - Handelsblatt Y1 - 2013 SN - 0017-7296 IS - 26. März 2013 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2012 UR - http://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/taxation_in_europe_2012_-_iref_yearbook.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan ED - Garello, Pierre T1 - Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany T2 - Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems Y1 - 2011 UR - http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.irefeurope.org/ContentPages/2515413947.pdf PB - Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues CY - Paris ER -