TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. T1 - The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach T2 - Economics of Governance N2 - The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution. KW - Centralisation KW - Direct democracy KW - Representative democracy KW - Public good provision Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1 SN - 1435-8131 VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 26 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Université Aix-Marseille Y1 - 2007 PB - Univ. CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. ED - Marciano, Alain ED - Rosselin, Jean-Michel T1 - Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations T2 - Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-1-84720-126-3 SP - 192 EP - 220 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies T2 - Public Choice N2 - We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. KW - Redistribution KW - Formal institutions KW - Fiscal decentralization KW - Presidential and parliamentary regimes KW - Electoral systems Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 159 IS - 3 SP - 435 EP - 455 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Optionen für eine Reform des deutschen Finanzausgleichs T2 - Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen Y1 - 2012 VL - 13 SP - 90 EP - 109 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schaltegger, Christoph A. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland T2 - European Economic Review N2 - Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities. KW - Centralization KW - Fiscal federalism KW - Fiscal referendums Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005 SN - 1873-572X VL - 52 IS - 4 SP - 611 EP - 645 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: ökonomische Perspektiven T2 - Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschlüsse Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-406-66238-6 SP - M11 EP - M65 PB - Beck CY - München ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. T1 - Mehr Autonomie für die Bundesländer: Ansatzpunkte zu einer grundlegenden Reform der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen T2 - ifo-Schnelldienst N2 - Lars P. Feld, Universität Freiburg und Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Jan Schnellenbach, Walter-Eucken-Institut, Freiburg, und Universität Heidelberg, formulieren einen Reformvorschlag, der den Finanzausgleich in seiner Gesamtheit deutlich anreizorientierter ausgestaltet. Y1 - 2014 VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 32 EP - 36 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Savioz, Marcel T1 - Gebhard Kirchgässner, 60 Years On T2 - Public Choice Y1 - 2010 SN - 1573-7101 VL - 144 IS - 3-4 SP - 393 EP - 399 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Feld, Lars P. A1 - Schnellenbach, Jan T1 - Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research T2 - Environment and Planning – Government and Policy N2 - In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework. KW - fiscal federalism KW - fiscal decentralization KW - growth KW - economic performance Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1068/c1054r SN - 1472-3425 VL - 29 IS - 2 SP - 224 EP - 243 ER -