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  <doc>
    <id>29700</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2022</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>596</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>621</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue>4</issue>
    <volume>3</volume>
    <type>articler</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-11-11</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">A Flashback on Control Logic Injection Attacks against Programmable Logic Controllers</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) make up a substantial part of critical infrastructures (CIs) and industrial control systems (ICSs). They are programmed with a control logic that defines how to drive and operate critical processes such as nuclear power plants, petrochemical factories, water treatment systems, and other facilities. Unfortunately, these devices are not fully secure and are prone to malicious threats, especially those exploiting vulnerabilities in the control logic of PLCs. Such threats are known as control logic injection attacks. They mainly aim at sabotaging physical processes controlled by exposed PLCs, causing catastrophic damage to target systems as shown by Stuxnet. Looking back over the last decade, many research endeavors exploring and discussing these threats have been published. In this article, we present a flashback on the recent works related to control logic injection attacks against PLCs. To this end, we provide the security research community with a new systematization based on the attacker techniques under three main attack scenarios. For each study presented in this work, we overview the attack strategies, tools, security goals, infected devices, and underlying vulnerabilities. Based on our analysis, we highlight the current security challenges in protecting PLCs from such severe attacks and suggest security recommendations for future research directions.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Automation</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="issn">2673-4052</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.3390/automation3040030</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.import.date">2022-12-07T10:11:03+00:00</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">sword</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.import.user">deepgreen</enrichment>
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    <enrichment key="opus.import.checksum">9125af4f144e2c02a3d6f43a16f08bb4</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wael</firstName>
      <lastName>Alsabbagh</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>industrial control system</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>programmable logic controller</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>control logic injection attack</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>program injection</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>program modification</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
    <collection role="Import" number="import">Import</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32629</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>7</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Coarse-Grained Control Flow Integrity Check for Processors with Sliding Register Windows</title>
    <parentTitle language="eng">12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154928</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-2291-0</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-2290-3</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2637-9511</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Kai</firstName>
      <lastName>Lehniger</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Marcin</firstName>
      <lastName>Aftowicz</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Mario</firstName>
      <lastName>Schölzel</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32631</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>6</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Novel Approach to a Plant Inspired Distributed Security Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Energy efficiency is a key factor for the longevity of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Most representatives of the plants have evolved to be highly energy-efficient in their survival strategies, despite their limited resources. Plants have to deal with a variety of threats originating from different herbivores and microbial pathogens while handling a number of abiotic stress factors. For plants and WSNs, different defence mechanisms impose different fitness costs and therefore the costs and benefits have to be well-balanced. This way, plants are able to not only conquer a large variety of different attacks but also handle several different simultaneous attacks adequately. To react early and adapt to upcoming threats, plants within a network are capable of signalling each other within a certain distance about ongoing attacks. The biological strategies of plants in terms of signalling and defence, as well as their energy and resource limitations, share significant similarities with WSNs. This study aims to explore these similarities and demonstrates the correspondence between the biological concepts and WSNs. Additionally, we present a novel approach to enhancing security in WSNs through a cooperative distributed security scheme inspired by key factors of plant defence mechanisms, with the goal of reducing the energy constraints and maximising the longevity of the network.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO), Budva, Montenegro, 2023</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154949</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-2291-0</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-2290-3</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2637-9511</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Benjamin</firstName>
      <lastName>Förster</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Thomas</firstName>
      <lastName>Hinze</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Wireless sensor networks</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Pathogens</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Embedded computing</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Cyber-physical systems</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32632</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>8</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName>IEEE</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">You Are What You Attack: Breaking the Cryptographically-Protected S7 Protocol</title>
    <abstract language="eng">S7 protocol defines an appropriate format for exchanging messages between SIMATIC S7 PLCs and their corresponding engineering software i.e., TIA Portal. Recently, Siemens has provided its newer PLC models and their proprietary S7 protocols with a very developed and sophisticated integrity check mechanism to protect them from various exploits e.g., replay attacks. This paper addresses exactly this point, and investigates the security of the most developed integrity check mechanism that the newest S7CommPlus protocol version implements. Our results showed that the latest S7 PLC models as well as their related protocols are still vulnerable. We found that adversaries can manipulate two hashes that play a significant role in generating keys and bytes for the encryption processes implemented in the S7CommPlus protocol. This allows to reproduce S7 packets and conduct several attacks that eventually impact the operation of the target PLC and the entire physical process it controls. To validate our findings, we test all the attack scenarios presented in this work on a cryptographically protected S7 PLC from the 1500 family which uses the S7CommPlusV3 protocol.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">19th International Conference on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS), (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/WFCS57264.2023.10144251</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-6654-6432-1</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-6654-6433-8</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2835-8414</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wael</firstName>
      <lastName>Alsabbagh</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Protocols</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Process control</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>S7 Protocol</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Industrial Control Systems</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32637</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>9</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">A Stealthy False Command Injection Attack on Modbus based SCADA Systems</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Modbus is a widely-used industrial protocol in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for different purposes such as controlling remote devices, monitoring physical processes, data acquisition, etc. Unfortunately, such a protocol lacks security means i.e., authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. This has exposed industrial plants using the Modbus protocol and made them attractive to malicious adversaries who could perform various kinds of cyber-attacks causing significant consequences as Stuxnet showed. In this paper, we exploit the insecurity of the Modbus protocol and perform a stealthy false command injection scenario concealing our injection from the SCADA operator. Our attack approach is comprised of two main phases: 1) Pre-attack phase (offline) where an attacker sniffs, collects and stores sufficient valid request-response pairs in a database, 2) Attack phase (online) where the attacker performs false command injection and conceals his injection by replaying a valid response from his database upon each request sent from the HMI user. Such a scenario is quite severe and might cause disastrous damages in SCADA systems and critical infrastructures if it is successfully implemented by malicious adversaries. Finally, we suggest some appropriate mitigation solutions to prevent such a serious threat.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">20th Consumer Communications &amp; Networking Conference (CCNC), (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/CCNC51644.2023.10059804</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-6654-9734-3</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-6654-9735-0</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2331-9860</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wael</firstName>
      <lastName>Alsabbagh</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Samuel</firstName>
      <lastName>Amogbonjaye</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Diego</firstName>
      <lastName>Urrego</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Performance evaluation</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>SCADA systems</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Command Injection Attacks</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Industrial plants</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32603</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>4</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-24</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Vulnerability of Atomic Patterns to Simple SCA</title>
    <abstract language="eng">In this work we discuss the vulnerability of atomic pattern algorithms for elliptic curve point multiplication against simple side-channel analysis attacks using our own implementation as an example. One of the assumptions, on which the atomicity principle is based, is the indistinguishability of operations with different registers, i.e. storing of the data into two different registers cannot be distinguished if their old and new data values are the same. But before the data can be stored in a register/block, this register/block has to be addressed for storing the data. Different registers/blocks have different addresses. The key-dependent addressing of registers/blocks is an inherent feature of the binary kP algorithms and allows to reveal the key k. In our work we demonstrated it. This means that the main assumption, that addressing of different registers/blocks is an indistinguishable operation, may no longer be applied when realizing kP implementations, at least not for hardware implementations.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">19th IEEE East-West Design &amp; Test Symposium (EWDTS 2023), (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-1484-7</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2472-761X</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/EWDTS59469.2023.10297074</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Ievgen</firstName>
      <lastName>Kabin</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Zoya</firstName>
      <lastName>Dyka</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Elliptic curves</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>NIST</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Elliptic curve cryptography</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Atomicity principle</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Side-channel Analysis (SCA)</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Simple Power Analysis (SPA)</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Horizontal attacks</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Address-bit attacks</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32606</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>181</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>182</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>image</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-24</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Machine Learning based Real Time Detection of Freezing of Gait of Parkinson Patients Running on a Body Worn Device</title>
    <abstract language="eng">For those who have Parkinson's disease, one of the most incapacitating symptoms is Freezing of Gait (FOG). Gait impairment and disruptions limit everyday activities and reduce quality of daily life along with the increase in the risk of falling [1]. Thanks to recent advancement in embedded electronics and sensors as well as their adaptation in the wearable device market, low power devices are becoming more and more capable running neural networks. This enables researchers to implement complex models on wearable devices that capture and analyze sensor data to detect FOGin real-time.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">IEEE/ACM international conference on Connected Health: Applications, Systems and Engineering Technologies (CHASE 2023), 181 (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-4007-0102-3</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2832-2975</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1145/3580252.3589423</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Ali</firstName>
      <lastName>Haddadi Esfahani</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Oliver</firstName>
      <lastName>Maye</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Max</firstName>
      <lastName>Frohberg</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Maria</firstName>
      <lastName>Speh</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Michael</firstName>
      <lastName>Jöbges</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Parkinson's disease</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Wearable computers</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Neural networks</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Machine learning</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Real-time systems</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32609</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>12</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-24</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">No Attacks Are Available: Securing the OpenPLC and Related Systems</title>
    <abstract language="eng">The use of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) expands in industrial domains, which makes ensuring the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) become paramount. The OpenPLC project, the first open-source initiative, provides flexible and cost-effective PLC solutions to build up affordable test-beds, as well as conduct experiments and academic researches. This project has wildly grown in the last few years, thus it is essential to address the most emerging security challenges it encounters. This paper introduces a new OpenPLC architecture, called OpenPLC Aqua, provided with a set of security solutions designed specifically to overcome the vulnerabilities that the current OpenPLC versions are prone to. The new OpenPLC architecture includes four security features: 1) user credentials encryption, securing the Webserver, Whitelisting and secure SSL/TLS communication channel. The OpenPLC Aqua software was tested against several attack scenarios, that were feasible against the old OpenPLC versions. Our experimental results showed our enhanced OpenPLC software is secure and resistant against several attack scenarios e.g., authentication, injection, Man-in-the-Middle and replay attacks. The OpenPLC Aqua is publicly available and a proof of concept demo is also published with this paper.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">8th GI/ACM Workshop on Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS WS 2023), 2085 (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.13140/RG.2.2.24570.47043</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wael</firstName>
      <lastName>Alsabbagh</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Chaerin</firstName>
      <lastName>Kim</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>OpenPLC</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Seucrity Solutions</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Industrial Control Systems</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Mitigation Solutions</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32614</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>6</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
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    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-24</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Successful Simple Side Channel Analysis: Vulnerability of an Atomic Pattern kP Algorithm Implemented with a Constant Time Crypto Library to Simple Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks</title>
    <parentTitle language="eng">12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO 2023), 167 (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10154940</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-2291-0</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-2290-3</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2637-9511</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Alkistis</firstName>
      <lastName>Sigourou</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Ievgen</firstName>
      <lastName>Kabin</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Nicolas</firstName>
      <lastName>Sklavos</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Zoya</firstName>
      <lastName>Dyka</lastName>
    </author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>32615</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2023</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>6</pageNumber>
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    <publisherName/>
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    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2024-01-24</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Randomized Addressing Countermeasures are Inefficient against Address-Bit SCA</title>
    <parentTitle language="eng">IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR 2023), 580 (2023)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224968</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-1170-9</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">979-8-3503-1171-6</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Publikationsweg">Open Access</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Ievgen</firstName>
      <lastName>Kabin</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Elisabeth</firstName>
      <lastName>Vogel</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Zoya</firstName>
      <lastName>Dyka</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Peter</firstName>
      <lastName>Langendörfer</lastName>
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    <collection role="institutes" number="1222">FG Systeme</collection>
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