<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<export-example>
  <doc>
    <id>24755</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2019</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>2</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName>IEEE Press</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2019-11-25</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (Poster) (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-7281-2700-2</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-7281-2701-9</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888029</identifier>
    <identifier type="url">https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888029</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2643-3303</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">1092-1648</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jan</firstName>
      <lastName>Pennekamp</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Katrin</firstName>
      <lastName>Willhöft</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jens</firstName>
      <lastName>Hiller</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Sebastian</firstName>
      <lastName>Reuter</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wladimir</firstName>
      <lastName>De la Cadena</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Asya</firstName>
      <lastName>Mitseva</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Martin</firstName>
      <lastName>Henze</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Thomas</firstName>
      <lastName>Engel</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Klaus</firstName>
      <lastName>Wehrle</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Andriy</firstName>
      <lastName>Panchenko</lastName>
    </author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1205">FG IT-Sicherheit</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>24757</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2019</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>12</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName>IEEE Press</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2019-11-25</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments</title>
    <abstract language="eng">An increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-toend security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Proceedings of the 27th annual IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (IEEE ICNP 2019), Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 2019</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-7281-2700-2</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-7281-2701-9</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888033</identifier>
    <identifier type="url">https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8888033</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">2643-3303</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">1092-1648</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jens</firstName>
      <lastName>Hiller</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Katrin</firstName>
      <lastName>Willhöft</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jan</firstName>
      <lastName>Pennekamp</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Markus</firstName>
      <lastName>Dahlmanns</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Martin</firstName>
      <lastName>Henze</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Andriy</firstName>
      <lastName>Panchenko</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Klaus</firstName>
      <lastName>Wehrle</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Routing, Internet of Things, Protocols, Cryptography, Servers</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1205">FG IT-Sicherheit</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>24760</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2019</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>2533</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>2535</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName>ACM Press</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>New York</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2019-11-25</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95% to less than 35% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">CCS '19 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security , London, UK, November 11 - 15, 2019.</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-4503-6747-9</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1145/3319535.3363249</identifier>
    <identifier type="url">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3319535.3363249</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wladimir</firstName>
      <lastName>De La Cadena</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Katrin</firstName>
      <lastName>Willhöft</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Asya</firstName>
      <lastName>Mitseva</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jan</firstName>
      <lastName>Pennekamp</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jens</firstName>
      <lastName>Hiller</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Fabian</firstName>
      <lastName>Lanze</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Thomas</firstName>
      <lastName>Engel</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Klaus</firstName>
      <lastName>Wehrle</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Andriy</firstName>
      <lastName>Panchenko</lastName>
    </author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1205">FG IT-Sicherheit</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>26290</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2020</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>1971</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>1985</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName>Association for Computing Machinery</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>New York</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2020-11-11</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Website fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the&#13;
content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing&#13;
patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By&#13;
collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node — one of the&#13;
weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor — a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only.&#13;
To limit the exposure of Tor users to WFP, we propose novel&#13;
lightweight WFP defenses, TrafficSliver, which successfully counter&#13;
today’s WFP classifiers with reasonable bandwidth and latency&#13;
overheads and, thus, make them attractive candidates for adoption&#13;
in Tor. Through user-controlled splitting of traffic over multiple&#13;
Tor entry nodes, TrafficSliver limits the data a single entry node&#13;
can observe and distorts repeatable traffic patterns exploited by&#13;
WFP attacks.We first propose a network-layer defense, in which we&#13;
apply the concept of multipathing entirely within the Tor network.&#13;
We show that our network-layer defense reduces the accuracy from&#13;
more than 98% to less than 16% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks&#13;
without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. We further&#13;
suggest an elegant client-side application-layer defense, which is&#13;
independent of the underlying anonymization network. By sending&#13;
single HTTP requests for different web objects over distinct Tor&#13;
entry nodes, our application-layer defense reduces the detection&#13;
rate of WFP classifiers by almost 50 percentage points. Although it&#13;
offers lower protection than our network-layer defense, it provides&#13;
a security boost at the cost of a very low implementation overhead and is fully compatible with today's Tor network.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">CCS '20: Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, October 2020</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-4503-7089-9</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1145/3372297.3423351</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Wladimir</firstName>
      <lastName>De la Cadena</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Katrin</firstName>
      <lastName>Willhöft</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Asya</firstName>
      <lastName>Mitseva</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jens</firstName>
      <lastName>Hiller</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jan</firstName>
      <lastName>Pennekamp</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Sebastian</firstName>
      <lastName>Reuter</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Julian</firstName>
      <lastName>Filter</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Thomas</firstName>
      <lastName>Engel</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Klaus</firstName>
      <lastName>Wehrle</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Andriy</firstName>
      <lastName>Panchenko</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Traffic Analysis</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Website Fingerprinting</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Privacy</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Anonymous Communication</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Onion Routing</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Web Privacy</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1205">FG IT-Sicherheit</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>26875</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2019</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>9</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName>IEEE</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2021-01-25</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">The Case for Session Sharing: Relieving Clients from TLS Handshake Overheads</title>
    <abstract language="eng">In recent years, the amount of traffic protected&#13;
with Transport Layer Security (TLS) has significantly increased&#13;
and new protocols such as HTTP/2 and QUIC further foster&#13;
this emerging trend. However, protecting traffic with TLS has&#13;
significant impacts on network entities. While the restrictions for&#13;
middleboxes have been extensively studied, addressing the impact&#13;
of TLS on clients and servers has been mostly neglected so far.&#13;
Especially mobile clients in emerging 5G and IoT deployments&#13;
suffer from significantly increased latency, traffic, and energy&#13;
overheads when protecting traffic with TLS. In this paper,&#13;
we address this emerging topic by thoroughly analyzing the&#13;
impact of TLS on clients and servers and derive opportunities&#13;
for significantly decreasing latency of TLS communication and&#13;
downsizing TLS management traffic, thereby also reducing TLSinduced&#13;
server load. We propose a protocol compatible redesign&#13;
of TLS session management to use these opportunities and&#13;
showcase their potential based on mobile device traffic and mobile&#13;
web-browsing traces. These show promising potentials for latency&#13;
improvements by up to 25.8% and energy savings of up to 26.3%.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">2019 IEEE 44th LCN Symposium on Emerging Topics in Networking (LCN Symposium), 14-17 Oct. 2019, Osnabrück, Germany</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-7281-2561-9</identifier>
    <identifier type="url">https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9000667</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/LCNSymposium47956.2019.9000667</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-7281-2562-6</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jens</firstName>
      <lastName>Hiller</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Katrin</firstName>
      <lastName>Willhöft</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Martin</firstName>
      <lastName>Henze</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Torsten</firstName>
      <lastName>Zimmermann</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Oliver</firstName>
      <lastName>Hohlfeld</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Klaus</firstName>
      <lastName>Wehrle</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>TLS Performance, Efficient Secure Communication, TLS Session Resumption, Network Security, Security and Privacy, Mobile Networking, 5G and IoT</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1203">FG Rechnernetze und Kommunikationssysteme</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>30140</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2021</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>4</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject_ref</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2023-01-23</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Demo: Traffic Splitting for Tor – A Defense against Fingerprinting Attacks</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks on the anonymity network Tor have become ever more effective. Furthermore, research discovered that proposed defenses are insufficient or cause high overhead. In previous work, we presented a new WFP defense for Tor that incorporates multipath transmissions to repel malicious Tor nodes from conducting WFP attacks. In this demo, we showcase the operation of our traffic splitting defense by visually illustrating the underlying Tor multipath transmission using LED-equipped Raspberry Pis.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Conference on Networked Systems 2021 (NetSys 2021)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="issn">1863-2122</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.14279/tuj.eceasst.80.1151.1128</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BTU">an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Fprofil">4 Künstliche Intelligenz und Sensorik / Artificial Intelligence and Sensor Technology</enrichment>
    <author>
      <firstName>Sebastian</firstName>
      <lastName>Reuter</lastName>
    </author>
    <submitter>
      <firstName>Katrin</firstName>
      <lastName>Willhöft</lastName>
    </submitter>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jens</firstName>
      <lastName>Hiller</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Jan</firstName>
      <lastName>Pennekamp</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Andriy</firstName>
      <lastName>Panchenko</lastName>
    </author>
    <author>
      <firstName>Klaus</firstName>
      <lastName>Wehrle</lastName>
    </author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Onion Routing; Website Fingerprinting; Multipath Traffic; Privacy</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="1205">FG IT-Sicherheit</collection>
  </doc>
</export-example>
