Dokument-ID Dokumenttyp Verfasser/Autoren Herausgeber Haupttitel Abstract Auflage Verlagsort Verlag Erscheinungsjahr Seitenzahl Schriftenreihe Titel Schriftenreihe Bandzahl ISBN Quelle der Hochschulschrift Konferenzname Quelle:Titel Quelle:Jahrgang Quelle:Heftnummer Quelle:Erste Seite Quelle:Letzte Seite URN DOI Abteilungen OPUS4-15983 misc Feld, Lars P.; Schnellenbach, Jan Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. 20 Public Choice 159 3 435 455 10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4 FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik OPUS4-15995 misc Pitsoulis, Athanassios; Schwuchow, Sören C. Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory. 10 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 20 4 697 707 10.1515/peps-2014-0040 FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik OPUS4-18117 Teil eines Buches Schnellenbach, Jan Backhaus, Jürgen G. Path-dependent rule evolution Heidelberg Springer Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1 FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik OPUS4-20524 misc Groß, Steffen The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models 22 Journal of Business Economics 84 9 1237 1259 10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0 FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik