@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues}, series = {Public Finance and Management}, volume = {12}, journal = {Public Finance and Management}, number = {4}, issn = {1523-9721}, pages = {368 -- 400}, abstract = {This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.}, language = {en} } @misc{BjornskovDreherFischeretal., author = {Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina and Schnellenbach, Jan and Gehring, Kai}, title = {Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {91}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017}, pages = {75 -- 92}, abstract = {We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making?}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {17}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {1}, issn = {1573-698}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Path-dependent rule evolution}, series = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions}, series = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9-78-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {123 -- 143}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective}, series = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, booktitle = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, editor = {Moss, Laurence S.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, address = {Malden}, isbn = {0-631-23497-7}, doi = {10.1111/1536-7150.00156}, pages = {193 -- 214}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachBaskaranFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, booktitle = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, editor = {B{\"u}storf, Guido and Cantner, Uwe and Hanusch, Horst and Huttner, Michael and Lorenz, Hans-Walter and Rahmeyer, Fritz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {New York, NY [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-319-01495-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8}, pages = {187 -- 207}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales}, address = {Marseille}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSavioz, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Savioz, Marcel}, title = {Gebhard Kirchg{\"a}ssner, 60 Years On}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {144}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, pages = {393 -- 399}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {German Federalism at the Crossroads: Renegotiating the Allocation of Competencies in a New Financial Environment}, series = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, booktitle = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, editor = {Eccleston, Richard and Krever, Richard}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham, UK}, isbn = {978-1-78471-777-3}, pages = {147 -- 172}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {48}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011}, pages = {40 -- 53}, abstract = {Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.}, language = {en} } @misc{GrossPitsoulis, author = {Groß, Steffen and Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"The Other Side of the Argument": Isaiah Berlin versus F.A. von Hayek on Liberty, Public Policies and the Market}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {26}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {4}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-015-9193-3}, pages = {475 -- 494}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models}, series = {Journal of Business Economics}, volume = {84}, journal = {Journal of Business Economics}, number = {9}, issn = {1861-8928}, doi = {10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0}, pages = {1237 -- 1259}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On the Behavioural Political Economy of Regulating Fake News}, series = {Ordo - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {68}, journal = {Ordo - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, issn = {2366-0481}, pages = {197 -- 219}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Sovereignty in a Globalised World: The Pressure of European Fiscal Governance on Domestic Public Finance}, series = {Comparing Fiscal Federalism}, booktitle = {Comparing Fiscal Federalism}, editor = {Valdesalici, Alice and Palermo, Francesco}, publisher = {Brill-Martinus Nijhoff}, address = {Leiden}, isbn = {978-90-04-34095-4}, pages = {328 -- 346}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Can Cultural Property Protection Be an Effective Counter-Terrorism Instrument?}, series = {The Journal of Art Crime}, volume = {19}, journal = {The Journal of Art Crime}, issn = {1947-5926}, pages = {47 -- 59}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Military Spending and Inequality in Autocracies: A Simple Model}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2018-0025}, pages = {5}, abstract = {In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator's own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime's rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society's institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Evolving Hierarchical Preferences and Behavioral Economic Policies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {178}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1/2}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0607-4}, pages = {31 -- 52}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {5}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y}, pages = {1399 -- 1414}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {On the Regulation of the International Exchange of Cultural Property}, series = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {70}, journal = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, number = {1}, issn = {0048-2129}, pages = {166 -- 187}, abstract = {With its foundation in 1945, UNESCO declared as its main purpose the promotion of international cultural exchange1. A number of legal instruments (Conventions, Recommendations and Declarations) should duly help to substantiate that general purpose and make it work in practice. In this process, the regulation of the international exchange of cultural property plays a key role. However, the proper regulation of cultural property exchange has been a highly controversial issue. This paper focus on UNESCO's guiding ideas and conceptions of cultural property, international exchange and regulation. The central question is: Are the regulations codified in UNESCO's Conventions and Recommendations helpful in encouraging international cultural exchange or are we faced, due to the neglect of private agents and the roles they play in cultural exchange, with some sort of one-sided regulation running counter to that aim? The author argues that UNESCO's legal instruments are driven by and express a strong anti-private and anti-market bias, which produce problematic economic incentives in the art and antiquities world to the disadvantage of the international exchange of cultural property.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchwuchowTridimas, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C. and Tridimas, George}, title = {The political economy of Solon's law against neutrality in civil wars}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {192}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8}, pages = {249 -- 272}, abstract = {In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon's law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon's ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Concept of Ordnungspolitik: Rule-Based Economic Policy-Making from the Perspective of the Freiburg School}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {195}, journal = {Public Choice}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00903-z}, pages = {283 -- 300}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Behavioral Economics Perspective on the Entrepreneurial State and Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy}, series = {Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy}, booktitle = {Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy}, editor = {Henrekson, Magnus and Sandstr{\"o}m, Christian and Stenkula, Mikael}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {9783031491955}, issn = {1572-1922}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-49196-2_4}, pages = {61 -- 76}, abstract = {It is argued that the concepts of mission-oriented innovation policy and also of the entrepreneurial state will lead to the implementation of policies that are highly vulnerable to behavioral biases and the inefficient use of heuristics. In political practice, we can therefore not expect efficient mission-oriented policies. In particular, I argue that missions as a political commitment mechanism intended to devote massive resources to a specific cause will often only work if biases like the availability bias and loss aversion are deliberately used in order to secure voter consent. Furthermore, I also argue that the argument used by Mazzucato (Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. London: Penguin UK, 2021) herself also contains several behavioral biases.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Public entrepreneurship in economic evolution}, series = {Routledge handbook of evolutionary economics}, booktitle = {Routledge handbook of evolutionary economics}, editor = {Dopfer, Kurt and Nelson, Richard R. and Potts, Jason and Pyka, Andreas}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {New York}, isbn = {9780367025687}, pages = {402 -- 410}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {55}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x}, pages = {469 -- 509}, abstract = {We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens' wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization's higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On the reform of fiscal rules in the European Union : what has been achieved, and how did we get here?}, series = {Economist's voice}, journal = {Economist's voice}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin ; Boston, Massachusetts}, issn = {1553-3832}, doi = {10.1515/ev-2024-0060}, abstract = {In April 2024, the European Union has reformed its set of fiscal rules, aimed at securing sustainable public finances in its member countries. In this paper, we discuss the pathway towards reform and highlight the main characteristics of the reformed set of rules. It is argued that, relative to the original proposals by the Commission, the rules have improved. However, the numerical safeguards may be circumvented to some extent. In sum, there remains plenty of discretionary leeway for a conflict-averse Commission to appease non-compliant member countries.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Revisiting the tension between classical liberalism and the welfare state}, series = {Journal of Contextual Economics}, volume = {139}, journal = {Journal of Contextual Economics}, number = {2-4}, issn = {2568-7603}, doi = {10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365}, pages = {365 -- 384}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, Soeren C.}, title = {Extractive politics, redistribution, and war : on the rationality of kleptocratic mismanagement}, series = {Defence and peace economics}, volume = {36}, journal = {Defence and peace economics}, number = {5}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {London ; Abingdon}, issn = {1024-2694}, doi = {10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389}, pages = {683 -- 705}, abstract = {We study a model on the impact of vertical inequality on autocrats' exploitation of societal wealth and their intended risk of war. Using a general equilibrium model, we demonstrate that autocrats are willing to use the military for redistribution when it increases their share of the rents. They are also willing to harm the economy to deter external threats and are most powerful for extreme un-/equal distributions. These findings offer interesting interpretations. Firstly, even in the absence of external military threats, some autocrats maintain large armies for redistribution, depending on the level of inequality. Secondly, not too low inequality can benefit ordinary citizens. Thirdly, kleptocratic mismanagement is not necessarily an unintended side effect of shameless self-enrichment, but rather a rationally chosen governance to deter too large military threats. This policy could prevent hostilities, but ruins the economy, destroying a society's wealth. The latter causes ordinary citizens to favor war since the autocrat would then lose their grip at home. These results help to explain why some autocrats maintain excessively large armies, while others stifle their economies, and yet others are drawn into wars.}, language = {en} }