@misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Is Novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-011-0257-x}, pages = {585 -- 619}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Pursuing Happiness}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {65}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {2}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00537.x}, pages = {245 -- 261}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Four Budget Deficit Theories in One Model}, language = {en} } @misc{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {The egalitarian battlefield: Reflections on the origins of majority rule in archaic Greece}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Consumer Choice: Income, Tastes, and Prices}, abstract = {Wolfram Demonstrations Project}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales}, address = {Marseille}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSavioz, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Savioz, Marcel}, title = {Gebhard Kirchg{\"a}ssner, 60 Years On}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {144}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, pages = {393 -- 399}, language = {en} } @incollection{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {The Legacy of Open Thought}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Capturing Four Budget Deficit Theories in a Simple Graphical Model}, series = {SSRN eLibrary}, journal = {SSRN eLibrary}, pages = {10}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit}, series = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, booktitle = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, pages = {12}, language = {en} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion}, series = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, booktitle = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, editor = {Shinnick, Edward and Pickhardt, Michael}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84844-079-1}, pages = {43 -- 62}, language = {en} }