@misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Wohlwollendes Anschubsen? Liberaler Paternalismus und seine Nebenwirkungen}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {12}, journal = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {4}, issn = {1465-6493}, pages = {445 -- 459}, abstract = {In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter {\"u}berzeugt sind, die Qualit{\"a}t der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu k{\"o}nnen. Nach einem {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber die verhaltens{\"o}konomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-{\"o}konomischen Implikationen diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ans{\"a}tze selbst Entscheidungen h{\"a}ufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualit{\"a}t individueller Entscheidungen h{\"o}chst zweifelhaft ist.}, language = {de} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Neuordnung der Bund-L{\"a}nder-Finanzbeziehungen: {\"o}konomische Perspektiven}, series = {Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschl{\"u}sse}, booktitle = {Verhandlungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages : Hannover 2014, Bd. 2,1. Sitzungsberichte - Referate und Beschl{\"u}sse}, publisher = {Beck}, address = {M{\"u}nchen}, isbn = {978-3-406-66238-6}, pages = {M11 -- M65}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Der griechische Bailout und seine institutionellen Folgen}, series = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, volume = {63}, journal = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, number = {11}, issn = {2199-4455}, pages = {3 -- 6}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Steuerehrlichkeit als reziprokes Handeln}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Risk, Fraud \& Compliance}, volume = {6}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Risk, Fraud \& Compliance}, number = {3}, issn = {1867-8394}, pages = {106 -- 110}, abstract = {Die neuere {\"o}konomische Forschung zur Steuerehrlichkeit geht nicht mehr davon aus, dass lediglich Steuerlasten und Strafandrohungen das Verhalten von Steuerzahlern bestimmen. Vielmehr wird ber{\"u}cksichtigt, dass Steuerzahler in gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen stehen, die Einfluss auf ihre Steuerehrlichkeit haben. In diesem Beitrag werden zentrale Ergebnisse der Literatur kurz pr{\"a}sentiert und Anregungen f{\"u}r eine effiziente Politik der Steuerdurchsetzung formuliert.}, language = {de} }