@misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @misc{MarkwardtSchnellenbachTitzeetal., author = {Markwardt, Gunther and Schnellenbach, Jan and Titze, Mirko and Zundel, Stefan}, title = {Umsetzung der Hilfen f{\"u}r die Flankierung des Kohleausstiegs in der brandenburgischen Lausitz: eine Zwischenbilanz}, series = {ifo Dresden berichtet}, volume = {22}, journal = {ifo Dresden berichtet}, number = {3}, issn = {0945-5922}, pages = {12 -- 18}, language = {de} } @techreport{BurretSchnellenbach, author = {Burret, Heiko and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Umsetzung des Fiskalpakts im Euro-Raum : Expertise im Auftrag des Sachverst{\"a}ndigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung}, publisher = {Statistisches Bundesamt}, address = {Wiesbaden}, pages = {65}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Unvollst{\"a}ndige Rationalit{\"a}t ist keine hinreichende Begr{\"u}ndung f{\"u}r paternalistisches Eingreifen}, series = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, volume = {94}, journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst}, number = {11}, issn = {1613-978X}, pages = {778 -- 781}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Un{\"u}bersichtlich, widerspr{\"u}chlich, wenig zielgerichtet: Entlastungspakete ohne Gesamtkonzept}, series = {ifo Schnelldienst}, volume = {75}, journal = {ifo Schnelldienst}, number = {11}, issn = {2199-4455}, pages = {10 -- 13}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Verbraucherleitbilder aus {\"o}konomischer Sicht}, series = {Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplin{\"a}re und europ{\"a}ische Perspektiven}, booktitle = {Verbraucherleitbilder - Interdisziplin{\"a}re und europ{\"a}ische Perspektiven}, editor = {Klinck, Fabian and Riesenhuber, Karl}, publisher = {de Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-11-036339-5}, pages = {53 -- 72}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Verhaltens{\"o}konomik}, series = {Staatslexikon, Band 5. Schule-virtuelle Realit{\"a}t}, booktitle = {Staatslexikon, Band 5. Schule-virtuelle Realit{\"a}t}, editor = {Oberreuter, Heinrich}, edition = {8., v{\"o}llig neu bearbeitete Auflage}, publisher = {Herder}, address = {Freiburg}, isbn = {978-3-451-37515-6}, pages = {1375 -- 1377}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Verhaltens{\"o}konomische Theorie der Politik und die Robustheit politischer Institutionen}, series = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, volume = {43}, journal = {List-Forum f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik}, number = {3}, issn = {2364-3943}, pages = {197 -- 219}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vielfalt in der Wirtschaftspolitik: Die Dahrendorf-Hypothese aus {\"o}konomischer Sicht}, series = {Institutioneller Wandel, Marktprozesse und dynamische Wirtschaftspolitik}, booktitle = {Institutioneller Wandel, Marktprozesse und dynamische Wirtschaftspolitik}, editor = {Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco and Ebner, Alexander and Fornahl, Dirk}, publisher = {Metropolis}, address = {Marburg}, isbn = {3-89518-468-3}, pages = {403 -- 418}, language = {de} }