@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Evolving Hierarchical Preferences and Behavioral Economic Policies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {178}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1/2}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0607-4}, pages = {31 -- 52}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {German Federalism at the Crossroads: Renegotiating the Allocation of Competencies in a New Financial Environment}, series = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, booktitle = {The Future of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Age of Austerity}, editor = {Eccleston, Richard and Krever, Richard}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham, UK}, isbn = {978-1-78471-777-3}, pages = {147 -- 172}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {48}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011}, pages = {40 -- 53}, abstract = {Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {69}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {1}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/kykl.12106}, pages = {135 -- 156}, abstract = {Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.}, language = {en} } @misc{BaskaranFeldSchnellenbach, author = {Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis}, series = {Economic Inquiry}, volume = {54}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, number = {3}, issn = {1465-7295}, doi = {10.1111/ecin.12331}, pages = {1445 -- 1463}, abstract = {The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Does Classical Liberalism Imply an Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making?}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {17}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {1}, issn = {1573-698}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} } @misc{GrossPitsoulis, author = {Groß, Steffen and Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"The Other Side of the Argument": Isaiah Berlin versus F.A. von Hayek on Liberty, Public Policies and the Market}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {26}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {4}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-015-9193-3}, pages = {475 -- 494}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchwuchow, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Coercion, credibility, and mid-air interceptions of military planes}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {20}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2014-0040}, pages = {697 -- 707}, abstract = {Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Path-dependent rule evolution}, series = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1}, language = {en} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {The Power of "Mapping the Territory". Why Economists Should Become More Aware of the Performative Powers of their Models}, series = {Journal of Business Economics}, volume = {84}, journal = {Journal of Business Economics}, number = {9}, issn = {1861-8928}, doi = {10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0}, pages = {1237 -- 1259}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {The pitfalls of Darwinian "progress": a comment on "Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics" by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6989}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0}, pages = {325 -- 328}, language = {en} } @misc{BjornskovDreherFischeretal., author = {Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina and Schnellenbach, Jan and Gehring, Kai}, title = {Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {91}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017}, pages = {75 -- 92}, abstract = {We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachBaskaranFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, booktitle = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, editor = {B{\"u}storf, Guido and Cantner, Uwe and Hanusch, Horst and Huttner, Michael and Lorenz, Hans-Walter and Rahmeyer, Fritz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {New York, NY [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-319-01495-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8}, pages = {187 -- 207}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {How to evaluate creative destruction: Reconstructing Schumpeter's approach}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {37}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bes055}, pages = {227 -- 250}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Role Models that make you unhappy: Light Paternalism, Social Learning and Welfare}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {9}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137413000015}, pages = {131 -- 159}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchnellenbach, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing}, series = {Research Policy}, volume = {41}, journal = {Research Policy}, number = {8}, issn = {0048-7333}, doi = {10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005}, pages = {1440 -- 1447}, abstract = {The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an "as is" review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues}, series = {Public Finance and Management}, volume = {12}, journal = {Public Finance and Management}, number = {4}, issn = {1523-9721}, pages = {368 -- 400}, abstract = {This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.}, language = {en} }