@incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions}, series = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9-78-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {123 -- 143}, language = {en} } @misc{OPUS4-9676, title = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {XII, 214}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy}, series = {Homo Oeconomicus}, volume = {24}, journal = {Homo Oeconomicus}, number = {1}, issn = {0943-0180}, pages = {21 -- 45}, abstract = {It is proposed that a more accurate prediction of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between psychological costs, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. A formal concept of legitimacy of public policies is introduced and it is shown that legitimacy influences evasion activity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Public Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Reform}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137407000641}, pages = {183 -- 202}, abstract = {Public entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the outcome of the activities of a Schumpeterian political innovator. However, empirical research suggests that changes to a more efficient economic policy, even if it is known and technically easy to implement, are usually delayed. This is difficult to reconcile with Schumpeterian notions of public entrepreneurship. In this paper, it is argued that the attempt to transfer a Schumpeterian approach to the public sector is fundamentally flawed. Institutional checks and balances that characterise most modern liberal democracies make the strategy of bold leadership an unlikely choice for an incumbent. If change occurs, it occurs normally as a response to the fact that the status quo has become untenable. From a normative point of view, it is argued that if public entrepreneurship nevertheless occurs, it will often be associated with unwanted consequences. A dismantling of formal institutional checks and balances is therefore not reasonable.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {18}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z}, pages = {35 -- 62}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit}, series = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, booktitle = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, pages = {12}, language = {en} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion}, series = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, booktitle = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, editor = {Shinnick, Edward and Pickhardt, Michael}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84844-079-1}, pages = {43 -- 62}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments?}, series = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {228}, journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.990268}, pages = {372 -- 393}, abstract = {A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.}, language = {en} }