@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {129}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3/4}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9}, pages = {301 -- 313}, abstract = {Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions}, series = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9-78-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {123 -- 143}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {18}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z}, pages = {35 -- 62}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy}, series = {Homo Oeconomicus}, volume = {24}, journal = {Homo Oeconomicus}, number = {1}, issn = {0943-0180}, pages = {21 -- 45}, abstract = {It is proposed that a more accurate prediction of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between psychological costs, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. A formal concept of legitimacy of public policies is introduced and it is shown that legitimacy influences evasion activity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Public Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Reform}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137407000641}, pages = {183 -- 202}, abstract = {Public entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the outcome of the activities of a Schumpeterian political innovator. However, empirical research suggests that changes to a more efficient economic policy, even if it is known and technically easy to implement, are usually delayed. This is difficult to reconcile with Schumpeterian notions of public entrepreneurship. In this paper, it is argued that the attempt to transfer a Schumpeterian approach to the public sector is fundamentally flawed. Institutional checks and balances that characterise most modern liberal democracies make the strategy of bold leadership an unlikely choice for an incumbent. If change occurs, it occurs normally as a response to the fact that the status quo has become untenable. From a normative point of view, it is argued that if public entrepreneurship nevertheless occurs, it will often be associated with unwanted consequences. A dismantling of formal institutional checks and balances is therefore not reasonable.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit}, series = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, booktitle = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, pages = {12}, language = {en} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion}, series = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, booktitle = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, editor = {Shinnick, Edward and Pickhardt, Michael}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84844-079-1}, pages = {43 -- 62}, language = {en} } @article{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Political and Economic Effects of Tax Competition and Deficits}, language = {en} }