@misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {159}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4}, pages = {435 -- 455}, abstract = {We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Path-dependent rule evolution}, series = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_362-1}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {The pitfalls of Darwinian "progress": a comment on "Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics" by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6989}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0}, pages = {325 -- 328}, language = {en} } @misc{BjornskovDreherFischeretal., author = {Bj{\o}rnskov, Christian and Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina and Schnellenbach, Jan and Gehring, Kai}, title = {Inequality and Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {91}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.017}, pages = {75 -- 92}, abstract = {We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachBaskaranFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, booktitle = {The Two Sides of Innovation: Creation and Destruction in the Evolution of Capitalist Economies}, editor = {B{\"u}storf, Guido and Cantner, Uwe and Hanusch, Horst and Huttner, Michael and Lorenz, Hans-Walter and Rahmeyer, Fritz}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {New York, NY [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-319-01495-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-01496-8}, pages = {187 -- 207}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2013 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {How to evaluate creative destruction: Reconstructing Schumpeter's approach}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {37}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bes055}, pages = {227 -- 250}, language = {en} } @misc{PitsoulisSchnellenbach, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Property Rights and Incentives in Academic Publishing}, series = {Research Policy}, volume = {41}, journal = {Research Policy}, number = {8}, issn = {0048-7333}, doi = {10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.005}, pages = {1440 -- 1447}, abstract = {The peer review system in academic publishing performs two important functions by screening a manuscript for its quality, and by helping to further improve an author's work. However, it often fails to perform these functions in a satisfactory manner. We argue that property rights theory can be fruitfully applied to understand these shortcomings, and to develop reform proposals. The present paper discusses the incentive-problems in journal peer review from an institutional economics perspective, arguing that the incentives of both authors and reviewers to fully exploit a manuscript's potential depend on their property rights. Based on this theory of peer review, we argue that the recent proposal of an "as is" review policy combined with increased accountability of referees can be expected to result in a higher efficiency of peer review.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues}, series = {Public Finance and Management}, volume = {12}, journal = {Public Finance and Management}, number = {4}, issn = {1523-9721}, pages = {368 -- 400}, abstract = {This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbachBaskaran, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan and Baskaran, Thushyanthan}, title = {Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0936-9937}, pages = {563 -- 583}, abstract = {We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Paternalism}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001}, pages = {266 -- 277}, abstract = {This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2012 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Is Novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-011-0257-x}, pages = {585 -- 619}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Pursuing Happiness}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {65}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {2}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00537.x}, pages = {245 -- 261}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Research}, series = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, volume = {29}, journal = {Environment and Planning - Government and Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1472-3425}, doi = {10.1068/c1054r}, pages = {224 -- 243}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer both a broad survey of the literature on fiscal federalism and long-run economic performance, and a detailed report of some of our own recent studies in this field. We look at the difference between study types (cross-country versus single-country studies), and at the relevance of the broader institutional framework into which fiscal decentralization is embedded. We also look into structural change and intergovernmental transfers as a detailed mechanism through which federalism may have an impact on aggregate economic performance.It turns out that fiscal decentralization has no robust effect on growth, but the evidence hints at a positive effect on overall productivity, conditional on the broader institutional framework.}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2011 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales}, address = {Marseille}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSavioz, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Savioz, Marcel}, title = {Gebhard Kirchg{\"a}ssner, 60 Years On}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {144}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, pages = {393 -- 399}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2009 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, editor = {Garello, Pierre}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments?}, series = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {228}, journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.990268}, pages = {372 -- 393}, abstract = {A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.}, language = {en} } @misc{FeldSchalteggerSchnellenbach, author = {Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {On Government Centralisation and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {52}, journal = {European Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1873-572X}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.05.005}, pages = {611 -- 645}, abstract = {Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens' fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2008 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institute for Research on Economic and Fiscal Issues}, address = {Paris}, language = {en} } @misc{WittSchubert, author = {Witt, Ulrich and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How much do we need to know about Risk Preferences?}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {19}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {3}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-008-9044-6}, pages = {203 -- 225}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy}, series = {Homo Oeconomicus}, volume = {24}, journal = {Homo Oeconomicus}, number = {1}, issn = {0943-0180}, pages = {21 -- 45}, abstract = {It is proposed that a more accurate prediction of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between psychological costs, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. A formal concept of legitimacy of public policies is introduced and it is shown that legitimacy influences evasion activity.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Public Entrepreneurship and the Economics of Reform}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137407000641}, pages = {183 -- 202}, abstract = {Public entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the outcome of the activities of a Schumpeterian political innovator. However, empirical research suggests that changes to a more efficient economic policy, even if it is known and technically easy to implement, are usually delayed. This is difficult to reconcile with Schumpeterian notions of public entrepreneurship. In this paper, it is argued that the attempt to transfer a Schumpeterian approach to the public sector is fundamentally flawed. Institutional checks and balances that characterise most modern liberal democracies make the strategy of bold leadership an unlikely choice for an incumbent. If change occurs, it occurs normally as a response to the fact that the status quo has become untenable. From a normative point of view, it is argued that if public entrepreneurship nevertheless occurs, it will often be associated with unwanted consequences. A dismantling of formal institutional checks and balances is therefore not reasonable.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Political Institutions and Policy Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulations}, series = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, booktitle = {Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach}, editor = {Marciano, Alain and Rosselin, Jean-Michel}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84720-126-3}, pages = {192 -- 220}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {18}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z}, pages = {35 -- 62}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Still a Director's Law? The Political Economy of Income Redistribution: Research Report im Auftrag des Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales, Universit{\´e} Aix-Marseille}, publisher = {Univ.}, address = {Heidelberg}, pages = {57}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {A contractarian view on institutional evolution}, series = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {149 -- 179}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: A survey of the literature}, series = {Regional Studies}, volume = {40}, journal = {Regional Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {0034-3404}, doi = {10.1080/00343400600632739}, pages = {375 -- 395}, abstract = {D{\"o}ring T. and Schnellenbach J. (2006) What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: a survey of the literature, Regional Studies 40, 375-395. Modern (endogenous) growth theory tells us that knowledge is crucial for the sustained growth of high-income economies. Against this background, the paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical findings highlighting the question of how geographically limited knowledge diffusion can help to explain clusters of regions with persistently different levels of growth. It discusses this topic in two steps. First, the theoretical concept of knowledge spillovers is outlined by discussing the different types of knowledge, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers, and the geographical mechanisms and structural conditions of knowledge diffusion. Second, it analyses the empirical evidence concerning the theoretical propositions.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {17}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1043-4062}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-0001-y}, pages = {117 -- 132}, abstract = {An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {129}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3/4}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9}, pages = {301 -- 313}, abstract = {Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Gradualism and Public Entrepreneurship in the Evolution of Formal Institutions}, series = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {The Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9-78-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {123 -- 143}, language = {en} } @misc{OPUS4-9676, title = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {XII, 214}, language = {en} } @incollection{OPUS4-9678, title = {Hayek and the Evolution of Designed Institutions: A critical assessment}, series = {Entrepreneurship, money and coordination : Hayek's theory of cultural evolution}, booktitle = {Entrepreneurship, money and coordination : Hayek's theory of cultural evolution}, editor = {Backhaus, J{\"u}rgen G.}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {1-84542-130-2}, pages = {107 -- 130}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Model Uncertainty and the Rationality of Economic Policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {1}, issn = {0936-9937}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-004-0231-y}, pages = {101 -- 116}, abstract = {This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Dahrendorf hypothesis and its implications for (the theory of) economic policy-making}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {6}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bei086}, pages = {997 -- 1009}, abstract = {The sociologist R. Dahrendorf has recently suggested that there is no and there ought to be no convergence of economic policies towards some common ideal model. On the contrary, he states that 'diversity is […] at the very heart of a world that has abandoned the need for closed, encompassing systems'. It is shown in this paper that the Dahrendorf hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with orthodox economic approaches to economic policy-making. A perspective on policy-making that introduces either fundamental uncertainty or endogenous policy preferences or both is, however, shown to be consistent with the Dahrendorf hypothesis.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {17}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {1}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1023/A:1026389926709}, pages = {97 -- 115}, abstract = {In contrast to the contractarian approach to constitutional economics, we follow Voigt (1999) in assuming that constitutional rules are closely connected to informal institutions and that their evolution is a matter of interest group activity and implicit re-interpretation. We add to this the assumption of theoretical uncertainty of individuals regarding the working properties of constitutional rules. Collective learning processes are considered as the third driving force of constitutional evolution, and at the same time as the source of path-dependencies which allow suboptimal constitutions to persist. Finally, it is argued that direct legislation offers more protection than a written fiscal constitution.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective, and a Proposal for an Extension of the Research Agenda}, series = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, volume = {61}, journal = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, number = {1}, issn = {0002-9246}, pages = {193 -- 214}, abstract = {New Political Economy has something very important in common with welfare economics: its focus on static, technical efficiency criteria to judge the rationality of a social, political or economic order. This often leads theorists to perceive their objects of research as well-defined problems to which clear-cut solutions can be found and prescribed as policy proposals, addressed at the policymaker or the democratic sovereign. This perspective frequently excludes important empirical phenomena from the research agenda. Although, for example, certain well-defined informational asymmetries are frequently modeled, fundamental knowledge problems such as ignorance of the true model of the economy are usually ignored. In the present paper, this approach is criticized from a Hayekian point of view, with an emphasis on the problems of "scientism" (i.e., the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences) and irremediably imperfect knowledge, troubling both the agents in the theoretical model and the theorist. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated with two examples that an extension of Public Choice's research agenda along Hayekian lines may be fruitful, because it leads to a fresh perception even of such problems that already have been extensively researched within the traditional framework.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective}, series = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, booktitle = {The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essays from Around the World}, editor = {Moss, Laurence S.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, address = {Malden}, isbn = {0-631-23497-7}, doi = {10.1111/1536-7150.00156}, pages = {193 -- 214}, language = {en} }