@techreport{BergerMarkwardtSchnellenbach, author = {Berger, Wolfram and Markwardt, Gunther and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Entwicklung eines Indikatorensystems f{\"u}r die unternehmerische Leistungsf{\"a}higkeit des Lausitzer Mittelstandes}, publisher = {Wirtschaftsregion Lausitz GmbH}, address = {Cottbus}, pages = {129}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Lobbyismus aus der Perspektive der verhaltens{\"o}konomischen Theorie der Politik}, series = {Handbuch Lobbyismus}, booktitle = {Handbuch Lobbyismus}, editor = {Mause, Karsten and Polk, Andreas}, publisher = {Springer VS}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-32324-0}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-32324-0_5-1}, pages = {20}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {The Concept of Ordnungspolitik: Rule-Based Economic Policy-Making from the Perspective of the Freiburg School}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {195}, journal = {Public Choice}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00903-z}, pages = {283 -- 300}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Leistung und Schule: eine {\"o}konomische Perspektive}, series = {Transformation der Leistung in Schule und Bildungsmedien}, booktitle = {Transformation der Leistung in Schule und Bildungsmedien}, editor = {Becker, Janina and Tribukait, Maren and Weich, Andreas}, publisher = {V\&R Unipress}, address = {G{\"o}ttingen}, isbn = {978-3-8471-1643-1}, doi = {10.14220/9783737016438.141}, pages = {141 -- 152}, language = {de} } @techreport{MarkwardtRettigSchnellenbachetal., author = {Markwardt, Gunther and Rettig, Julia and Schnellenbach, Jan and Titze, Mirko and Zundel, Stefan}, title = {Im Osten was Neues? Strukturwandel in der Lausitz: eine Zwischenbilanz.}, publisher = {BTU}, address = {Cottbus}, pages = {55}, language = {de} } @techreport{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Wachstum statt Stagflation: Vorschl{\"a}ge f{\"u}r eine R{\"u}ckkehr zur Angebotspolitik}, pages = {26}, language = {de} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {55}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x}, pages = {469 -- 509}, abstract = {We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens' wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization's higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BergerMarkwardtRettigetal., author = {Berger, Wolfram and Markwardt, Gunther and Rettig, Julia and Schnellenbach, Jan and Titze, Mirko and Zundel, Stefan}, title = {Engpass Arbeitsmarkt? Chance und Risiko f{\"u}r den Strukturwandel in der brandenburgischen Lausitz}, publisher = {BTU}, address = {Cottbus}, pages = {54}, language = {de} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, Soeren C.}, title = {Extractive politics, redistribution, and war : on the rationality of kleptocratic mismanagement}, series = {Defence and peace economics}, volume = {36}, journal = {Defence and peace economics}, number = {5}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {London ; Abingdon}, issn = {1024-2694}, doi = {10.1080/10242694.2024.2385389}, pages = {683 -- 705}, abstract = {We study a model on the impact of vertical inequality on autocrats' exploitation of societal wealth and their intended risk of war. Using a general equilibrium model, we demonstrate that autocrats are willing to use the military for redistribution when it increases their share of the rents. They are also willing to harm the economy to deter external threats and are most powerful for extreme un-/equal distributions. These findings offer interesting interpretations. Firstly, even in the absence of external military threats, some autocrats maintain large armies for redistribution, depending on the level of inequality. Secondly, not too low inequality can benefit ordinary citizens. Thirdly, kleptocratic mismanagement is not necessarily an unintended side effect of shameless self-enrichment, but rather a rationally chosen governance to deter too large military threats. This policy could prevent hostilities, but ruins the economy, destroying a society's wealth. The latter causes ordinary citizens to favor war since the autocrat would then lose their grip at home. These results help to explain why some autocrats maintain excessively large armies, while others stifle their economies, and yet others are drawn into wars.}, language = {en} }