@incollection{WittSchubert, author = {Witt, Ulrich and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Verhaltens{\"o}konomische und Evolutorische Perspektiven auf Konsumentensouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t und Wohlfahrt}, series = {Die Grenzen der Konsumentensouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t}, booktitle = {Die Grenzen der Konsumentensouver{\"a}nit{\"a}t}, publisher = {Metropolis-Verl.}, address = {Marburg}, isbn = {978-3-7316-1000-7}, pages = {251 -- 273}, language = {de} } @misc{WittSchubert, author = {Witt, Ulrich and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How much do we need to know about Risk Preferences?}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {19}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {3}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-008-9044-6}, pages = {203 -- 225}, language = {en} } @misc{SchwuchowTridimas, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C. and Tridimas, George}, title = {The political economy of Solon's law against neutrality in civil wars}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {192}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, issn = {1573-7101}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8}, pages = {249 -- 272}, abstract = {In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon's law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon's ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.}, language = {en} } @book{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {V{\"o}lkerrecht als Restriktion f{\"u}r das Handeln von Regierungen: Diplomatie durch Zwang und internationales {\"o}ffentliches Luftrecht}, publisher = {Springer Gabler}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-07782-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-07782-2}, pages = {261 S.}, abstract = {Ausgehend von einer ausf{\"u}hrlichen Darstellung der Entwicklungslinien des V{\"o}lkerrechts analysiert S{\"o}ren C. Schwuchow die Entstehung von Jurisdiktionskonflikten im internationalen Luftraum vor dem Hintergrund rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen sowie der strategischen Interessen der Staaten. Grundlage ist die Annahme, dass manche Regierungen „Kanonenbootdiplomatie" im Luftraum betreiben, indem sie {\"u}ber umstrittenen Territorien gezielt Abfangman{\"o}ver provozieren, um die eigene Konfliktbereitschaft zu signalisieren. Der Autor analysiert modelltheoretisch die strategische Interdependenz der Staaten und {\"u}berpr{\"u}ft sie empirisch. Er liefert so einen Beitrag zum besseren Verst{\"a}ndnis der Bestimmungsgr{\"u}nde staatlicher Außenpolitik sowie der Ausgestaltung des V{\"o}lkerrechts.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Military Spending and Inequality in Autocracies: A Simple Model}, series = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1554-8597}, doi = {10.1515/peps-2018-0025}, pages = {5}, abstract = {In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator's own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime's rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society's institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schwuchow, author = {Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption}, series = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {55}, journal = {European Journal of Law and Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {0929-1261}, doi = {10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x}, pages = {469 -- 509}, abstract = {We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens' wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization's higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Role Models that make you unhappy: Light Paternalism, Social Learning and Welfare}, series = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, volume = {9}, journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1744-1382}, doi = {10.1017/S1744137413000015}, pages = {131 -- 159}, language = {en} } @misc{SchubertCordes, author = {Schubert, Christian and Cordes, Christian}, title = {Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {18}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-9966}, doi = {10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z}, pages = {35 -- 62}, language = {en} } @book{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Die rechtliche Steuerung des urbanen Wandels: Eine konstitutionen{\"o}konomische Untersuchung}, publisher = {Mohr Siebeck}, address = {T{\"u}bingen}, isbn = {978-3-16-148858-0}, pages = {XI, 356}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {A contractarian view on institutional evolution}, series = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, booktitle = {Evolution and Design of Institutions}, editor = {Schubert, Christian and Wangenheim, Georg von}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-37531-3}, pages = {149 -- 179}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {The pitfalls of Darwinian "progress": a comment on "Evolvability and progress in evolutionary economics" by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin}, series = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of Bioeconomics}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6989}, doi = {10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0}, pages = {325 -- 328}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Politische Implikationen der Verhaltens{\"o}konomik}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, volume = {42}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, number = {2}, issn = {0340-1650}, pages = {84 -- 89}, language = {de} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {How to evaluate creative destruction: Reconstructing Schumpeter's approach}, series = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {37}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1464-3545}, doi = {10.1093/cje/bes055}, pages = {227 -- 250}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Is Novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {3}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-011-0257-x}, pages = {585 -- 619}, language = {en} } @misc{Schubert, author = {Schubert, Christian}, title = {Pursuing Happiness}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {65}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {2}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00537.x}, pages = {245 -- 261}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchwuchow, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schwuchow, S{\"o}ren C.}, title = {Die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Eine kritische Diskussion}, series = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {70}, journal = {ORDO : Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, number = {1}, issn = {0048-2129}, doi = {10.1515/ordo-2020-0019}, pages = {340 -- 371}, abstract = {Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie ver{\"o}ffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu st{\"a}rken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung f{\"u}r diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelst{\"a}ndisch gepr{\"a}gten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die F{\"a}higkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungstr{\"a}ger, die in der Realit{\"a}t kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative w{\"u}rde in einer R{\"u}ckbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gew{\"a}hrleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensit{\"a}t, bestehen.}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {5}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y}, pages = {1399 -- 1414}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral Political Economy: Ein neues Forschungsfeld}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : (WiSt)}, volume = {43}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : (WiSt)}, number = {12}, doi = {10.15358/0340-1650_2014_12_658}, pages = {658 -- 662}, abstract = {Das Forschungsgebiet der Politischen {\"O}konomik kon- zentrierte sich bisher vor allem darauf, das {\"o}konomi- sche Verhaltensmodell rational-eigeninteressierten Handelns auf den Forschungsgegenstand der Politik anzuwenden. Mit der empirischen Verhaltens{\"o}konomik gera- ten aber strikte Annahmen individueller Rationalit{\"a}t zu- nehmend in die Kritik. Dazu kommt, dass die Anreiz- strukturen gerade bei kollektivem Handeln in der Politik nicht daf{\"u}r sprechen, dass Menschen individuellen Aufwand betreiben, um vollst{\"a}ndig rational zu handeln. Deshalb ist die Anwendung verhaltens{\"o}konomischer Ans{\"a}tze auf diesem Gebiet besonders vielversprechend.}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachPamp, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Pamp, Oliver}, title = {Finanzpolitik}, series = {Politik und Wirtschaft. Ein integratives Kompendium}, booktitle = {Politik und Wirtschaft. Ein integratives Kompendium}, editor = {Mause, Karsten and M{\"u}ller, Christian and Schubert, Klaus}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-06476-1}, pages = {267 -- 296}, language = {de} }