@misc{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {Vertreibung und Diplomatie: Hintergr{\"u}nde und Umdeutungen des griechisch-t{\"u}rkischen >Bev{\"o}lkerungsaustauschs< von 1923}, language = {de} } @incollection{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Zur Interdependenz von Defiziten und Kapitalsteuerwettbewerb}, series = {Chancen und Risiken f{\"u}r die Soziale Marktwirtschaft im internationalen Wettbewerb der Wirtschaftssysteme}, booktitle = {Chancen und Risiken f{\"u}r die Soziale Marktwirtschaft im internationalen Wettbewerb der Wirtschaftssysteme}, editor = {Seliger, Bernhard and Sepp, J{\"u}ri and Wrobel, Ralph}, publisher = {Lang}, address = {Frankfurt/M. [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3-631-60503-5}, pages = {317 -- 340}, language = {de} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Warum sich {\"O}konomen (wieder) mit Philosophie besch{\"a}ftigen sollten - und Philosophen (wieder) mit {\"O}konomie}, series = {ORDO - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, volume = {61}, journal = {ORDO - Jahrbuch f{\"u}r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, issn = {2366-0481}, pages = {75 -- 94}, language = {de} } @misc{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Die Lausitz und ihre Perspektive(n) - eine institutionen{\"o}konomische Betrachtung}, series = {Letopis : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r sorbische Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur}, volume = {57}, journal = {Letopis : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r sorbische Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur}, number = {2}, issn = {0943-2787}, pages = {31 -- 40}, language = {de} } @incollection{Gross, author = {Groß, Steffen}, title = {Sinnfundament Heimat: Warum Menschen einer Heimat existentiell bed{\"u}rfen : ein Beitrag aus Sicht der Kulturanthropologie}, series = {Domownja, Heimat : sorbische/wendische Perspektiven auf die Lausitz}, booktitle = {Domownja, Heimat : sorbische/wendische Perspektiven auf die Lausitz}, editor = {Norberg, Madlena}, publisher = {Univ.-Verl.}, address = {Potsdam}, isbn = {978-3-86956-022-9}, pages = {44 -- 51}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachFeldSchaltegger, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P. and Schaltegger, Christoph A.}, title = {The Impact of Referendums on the Centralization of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach}, series = {Economics of Governance}, volume = {11}, journal = {Economics of Governance}, number = {1}, issn = {1435-8131}, doi = {10.1007/s10101-009-0063-1}, pages = {3 -- 26}, abstract = {The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance}, series = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, booktitle = {Developing Alternative Frameworks Explaining Tax Compliance}, editor = {Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Torgler, Benno}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-415-57698-7}, pages = {56 -- 73}, abstract = {This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Current Issues in Tax Policy in Germany and the Netherlands}, series = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, booktitle = {Taxation in Europe 2010 : the yearly report on the evolution of European tax systems}, publisher = {Institut de Recherches Economiques et Fiscales}, address = {Marseille}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Brennst{\"a}be f{\"u}r den Bundeshaushalt?}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, volume = {39}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, number = {10}, issn = {0340-1650}, pages = {473}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Der griechische Bailout und seine institutionellen Folgen}, series = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, volume = {63}, journal = {ifo-Schnelldienst}, number = {11}, issn = {2199-4455}, pages = {3 -- 6}, language = {de} }