@incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"Prinzipal-Agent-Beziehung"}, language = {de} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"Handlung"}, language = {de} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"Interesse"}, language = {de} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"Kooperation"}, language = {de} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"Konflikt"}, language = {de} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {"Planung"}, language = {de} } @misc{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {Meinungsepidemien: Zur mathematischen Modellierung politischer Kommunikationsprozesse}, series = {Forum der Forschung}, journal = {Forum der Forschung}, number = {21}, issn = {0947 - 6989}, pages = {41 -- 46}, language = {de} } @inproceedings{PitsoulisSiebel, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios and Siebel, Jens Peter}, title = {Stubborn Conservatives, Tax Competition and Strategic Deficit}, series = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, booktitle = {Papers and Proceedings of the Third Panhellenic Conference on International Political Economy, Athen, 2008}, pages = {12}, language = {en} } @incollection{Pitsoulis, author = {Pitsoulis, Athanassios}, title = {A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion}, series = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, booktitle = {The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance}, editor = {Shinnick, Edward and Pickhardt, Michael}, publisher = {Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {978-1-84844-079-1}, pages = {43 -- 62}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Rational Ignorance Is Not Bliss: When Do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Political Experiments?}, series = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {228}, journal = {Journal of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.990268}, pages = {372 -- 393}, abstract = {A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. Often, an analogy between market competition as a discovery procedure and political competition is used to corroborate this argument. We argue that political learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues, if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. We show that factor mobility does have the potential to endogenously disturb equilibria on regional markets for political theories, and therefore does provide for improved political learning processes compared to unitary systems. But the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature. In particular, collective learning may occur in the relatively efficient region, while the status quo may be fortified in the relatively inefficient region.}, language = {en} }