@misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {"F{\"u}r {\"O}konomen muss alles auf eine einzige Leinwand passen" Interview mit Geoffrey Brennan}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {15}, journal = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {4}, issn = {1465-6493}, pages = {334 -- 345}, language = {de} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Behavioral Economics Perspective on the Entrepreneurial State and Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy}, series = {Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy}, booktitle = {Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy}, editor = {Henrekson, Magnus and Sandstr{\"o}m, Christian and Stenkula, Mikael}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {9783031491955}, issn = {1572-1922}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-49196-2_4}, pages = {61 -- 76}, abstract = {It is argued that the concepts of mission-oriented innovation policy and also of the entrepreneurial state will lead to the implementation of policies that are highly vulnerable to behavioral biases and the inefficient use of heuristics. In political practice, we can therefore not expect efficient mission-oriented policies. In particular, I argue that missions as a political commitment mechanism intended to devote massive resources to a specific cause will often only work if biases like the availability bias and loss aversion are deliberately used in order to secure voter consent. Furthermore, I also argue that the argument used by Mazzucato (Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. London: Penguin UK, 2021) herself also contains several behavioral biases.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism}, series = {Kyklos}, volume = {69}, journal = {Kyklos}, number = {1}, issn = {1467-6435}, doi = {10.1111/kykl.12106}, pages = {135 -- 156}, abstract = {Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {A note on the behavioral political economy of innovation policy}, series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, volume = {29}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, number = {5}, issn = {1432-1386}, doi = {10.1007/s00191-019-00625-y}, pages = {1399 -- 1414}, language = {en} } @misc{DoeringSchnellenbach, author = {D{\"o}ring, Thomas and Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany}, series = {Constitutional Political Economy}, volume = {22}, journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {1043-4062}, pages = {83 -- 102}, abstract = {This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Allokation}, series = {Staatslexikon, Band 1. ABC-Waffen - Ehrenamt}, booktitle = {Staatslexikon, Band 1. ABC-Waffen - Ehrenamt}, editor = {Oberreuter, Heinrich}, edition = {8., v{\"o}llig neu bearbeitete Auflage}, publisher = {Herder}, address = {Freiburg}, isbn = {978-3-451-37511-8}, pages = {116 -- 119}, language = {de} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {129}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3/4}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-006-9029-9}, pages = {301 -- 313}, abstract = {Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.}, language = {en} } @misc{Schnellenbach, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan}, title = {Armutszuwanderung und Transfersysteme}, series = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, volume = {43}, journal = {Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt)}, number = {2}, issn = {0340-1650}, pages = {63}, language = {de} } @incollection{SchnellenbachFeld, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Beg{\"u}nstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und -diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Ren{\´e} L. Frey}, booktitle = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik - Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Ren{\´e} L. Frey}, editor = {Schaltegger, Christoph A. and Schaltegger, Stefan}, publisher = {vdf Hochschulverl.}, address = {Z{\"u}rich}, isbn = {3-7281-2939-1}, pages = {259 -- 277}, language = {de} } @misc{SchnellenbachSchubert, author = {Schnellenbach, Jan and Schubert, Christian}, title = {Behavioral political economy: A survey}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {40}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {B}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002}, pages = {395 -- 417}, abstract = {In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "behavioral political economy" and considers the scope for further research.}, language = {en} }